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Citizenship and Displacement:
Naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania (2010-2017)

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To my mother, Aneta Sadowska-Wojak, and to her well-trained angels

Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, for any other degree or professional qualification. Except where stated by reference and acknowledgement, the work is entirely my own.

Signature

Amelia Magdalena Kuch

Abstract

Between 2010-2017, 150,000 of Burundian refugees, whose families fled to Tanzania in the 1970s, received citizenship in Tanzania. This thesis explores how the experience of naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees' views of citizenship, and considers how this can help develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. My research traces the implementation and aftermath of naturalisation in Ulyankulu settlement and the city of Dar es Salaam between 2014 and 2017, focusing on and foregrounding former refugees' experiences and narratives of citizenship and displacement. The methods employed in this study were ethnographic in nature and included repeated visits to the research sites, living with the community members, learning Kiswahili, and conducting over 160 interviews. Unlike the existing studies of naturalisation which focus solely on the settlements, this thesis adopts a multi-sited approach, which incorporates insights from both rural and urban settings, drawing parallels and contrasting the various experiences and perspectives.

The thesis builds on the existing literature on citizenship, displacement and their nexus (Arendt 1973; Malkki 1995; Kibreab 1999; Warner 1999; Kelly 2006; Long, 2013a; Bakewell 2011; Brun 2015; Grabska 2015; Hammar 2014, 2018), contributing new empirical and conceptual insights on the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. Drawing on former refugees' experiences and narratives, the thesis puts forward a new concept of 'probational citizenship' which aims to capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement. Former refugees living with 'probational citizenship' experience a paradoxical interplay of both safety and uncertainty about their status, which dominates their lives and shapes their actions post-naturalisation. To shed light on these processes, the thesis brings together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, not often addressed at the same time, namely political representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship.

Lay Summary

Between 2010-2017, 150,000 of Burundian refugees, whose families fled to Tanzania in the 1970s, received citizenship in Tanzania. This thesis explores how the experience of naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees' views of citizenship and considers how this can help us to develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. This study relied on ethnographic methods, including repeated visits to the research sites, living with the community members, learning Kiswahili, and conducting over 160 interviews. Unlike the existing studies of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania which focus solely on the settlements, this thesis adopts a multi-sited approach, which incorporates insights from both rural and urban settings. To shed light on the processes of naturalisation, the thesis brings together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, not often addressed at the same time, namely: political representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship. Drawing on former refugees' experiences and narratives, the thesis puts forward a new concept of 'probational citizenship' which aims to capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement. Although this study focuses on the specific case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, I advance an argument that the notion of 'probational citizenship' and the protracted uncertainty regarding one's legal status is becoming increasingly common in the experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as other first and second-generation migrants in the Global North.

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Acronyms

CCM	Party of the Revolution [Kiswahili: Chama Cha Mapinduzi]
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
IRC	International Rescue Committee
GOT	Government of Tanzania
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IRRI	International Refugee Rights Initiative
LGAs	Local Government Authorities (LGAs)
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MRALG	Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government
NaSCIP	National Strategy for Community Integration Programme
TANCOSS	Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy
TANSPLI	Tanzania Strategic Plan for Local Integration of the New Citizens
TCRS	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
TZS	Tanzanian Shilling
UNDAP	United Nations Development Assistant Plan
UNDP	The United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
UPRONA	Union for National Progress [French: Union pour le Progrès national]
VETA	Vocational Education and Training Authority

Glossary

<i>amani</i>	peace
<i>diwani</i>	councillor
<i>kambi ya wakimbizi</i>	refugee camp
<i>kibali</i>	clearance/ permit
<i>kusafiri</i>	travel
<i>makazi ya wakimbizi</i>	refugee settlement
<i>mandaazi</i>	donuts
<i>mkuu</i>	head/ master
<i>pikipiki</i>	motorcycle
<i>sana sana</i>	very much
<i>sina uwezo</i>	not being able to
<i>utawala</i>	rule/ governance
Julius Kambarage Nyerere	President of Tanganyika from 1963 to 1964 and the first President of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985
Ali Hassan Mwinyi	the second President of Tanzania from 1985 to 1995
Benjamin William Mkapa	the third President of Tanzania from 1995 to 2005.
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	the fourth President of Tanzania from 2005 to 2015
John Joseph Magufuli	the President of Tanzania, in office since 2015

1. Introduction

When I met Alida, she was sitting on a large tree trunk in front of her house. She jumped off to welcome me and my research assistant Mr Mtasha and before we even sat down, she started telling her story. She reiterated how in 2008, her family was asked a life-changing question that they did not see coming: do they want to return to Burundi or stay in Tanzania and apply for Tanzanian citizenship? The decision was meant to be made by the head of the household on behalf of all the family members, and her husband wanted to register them for repatriation. Alida insisted that she and her five children would not go anywhere, and she held her ground. When we asked her why she did not want to return Burundi, she said: ‘I do not know anyone in Burundi and I do not have anything in Burundi. What if my husband leaves me, I would be alone there, without anything. My life is here in Tanzania’ (int. 2016).

Alida fled to Tanzania with her grandmother when she was a child. The two of them escaped ethnic violence and mass killing which tore Burundi apart in 1972. In Ulyankulu, they were reunited with Alida’s uncle, who helped them and who raised her as his daughter. Her parents and her siblings were killed during the massacre in Burundi and Alida never went back. She married young and moved to a small, but neat house on a large plot of land inherited by her husband. In 2008, the couple faced a fundamental decision between returning to Burundi or remaining in Tanzania. After many arguments, Alida and her husband applied for Tanzanian citizenship, and they received their citizenship certificates in 2015. She invited us to her house and proudly showed us a laminated copy of the certificate and said: ‘Why is citizenship certificate

so important? Because it allows me to stay here, no problems will happen. I can live here in peace' (int. 2016).

Alida walked with us to the main road, from which we caught a motorcycle to go back to Kaswa village at the centre of Ulyankulu settlement. She waved at us smiling, covered in a pink scarf. Her story is one of many of 220,000 Burundian refugees, who in 2008 were asked to make a momentous choice between repatriation and naturalisation under the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS).

TANCOSS was an agreement between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Burundian Government and Tanzanian Government. Initially, TANCOSS included three pillars: voluntary repatriation to Burundi, processing of citizenship applications for those who opted for naturalisation in Tanzania, and relocation of the naturalised refugees from the refugee settlements to other regions of Tanzania (Kuch, 2016). Presented with this choice, almost 79% of the refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship and 21% decided to return to Burundi (SA3, 2007). The relocation plan for the naturalised refugees was subsequently suspended and former refugees were permitted to choose if they wish to leave or to remain in the areas of the settlements. Despite setbacks and challenges in implementation, by 2015 the majority of former Burundian refugees have received Tanzanian citizenship and many of them decided to remain in the settlements where they lived for decades.

The TANCOSS agreement had global significance. At roughly the same time when it was announced, the UNHCR launched an initiative to 'reinvigorate possibilities for solutions to protracted refugee situations' (UNHCR, 2008, p. 1) which culminated in an Executive Committee Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations (2009).

‘Protracted refugee situation’ was defined as one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo, where their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile (UNHCR, 2009). The case of Tanzania was quickly identified as an opportunity to implement the global policy on protracted refugee situations and demonstrate its ability to help secure solutions for refugees (Milner, 2014, p. 554). The proposed naturalisation and repatriation strategy became a high-profile initiative, attracting a total of \$103 million for implementation (UN Tanzania, 2010). By June 2010, most of the applications for naturalisation had been approved and many considered the policy to be a resounding success (Milner 2014, p. 554).

The counter-narrative that this case offered captured my attention and imagination. Between 2014-2017, I visited Tanzania on three extended research trips. During the three study periods, I interviewed over 160 people (many on multiple occasions) living and working in and near Ulyankulu settlement, the town of Tabora and the city of Dar es Salaam. I also conducted 34 focus group discussions and interviewed 18 academics, local and international NGO staff, and government officials. My research focused on the naturalisation aspect of TANCOS, however I also collected secondary data about people’s family members and friends who repatriated to Burundi. Ability to return to the field sites several times allowed me to see the unfolding results of the mass naturalisation policy over time. Rather than analysing the impact of TANCOS at one fixed point in time, I had an opportunity to study the non-linear nature of naturalisation, with all its’ promises, pitfalls, and unexpected turns of events.

As the research developed, I discovered that naturalisation was implemented incompletely, which led to further uncertainty in the lives of the former refugees. This unusual context of long-term displacement, mass naturalisation, and subsequent protracted uncertainty created a unique space for bringing to light the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. Drawing on observations as well as people's stories and narratives, this project explored the following question:

How did the experience of displacement and naturalisation shape Burundian refugees' understanding of citizenship and how do these insights help us to develop the concept of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context?

1.1. Rethinking citizenship in displacement

Questions of citizenship and belonging have long been asked in relation to displaced populations (eds. Brysk and G. Shafir, 2004; Kibreab, 1999; Malkki, 1995; Moulin & Nyers, 2007; Polzer, 2009; Warner, 1999) and a lot has been written about restoration of citizenship in displacement (Bradley, 2008; Hovil & Lomo 2015; Long, 2013a; Van Hear, 2006). Displacement, broadly, is an act, experience or effect of some form of the enforced dislocation of people from their homes, typically because of war, persecution, or natural disaster (Hammar, 2014, pp. 4-5) and it is characterised by a subjective and temporal condition of uncertainty. The context of displacement heightens the importance of citizenship as access to citizenship, or lack of thereof, determines many migrants' and refugees' chances for accessing rights. In other words, the power of citizenship is revealed in its absence, and therefore contexts of displacement generate new critical insights about citizenship theory and practice.

The existing literature approaches the dynamics of citizenship in displacement in two different ways. On the one hand, legal and policy-oriented work focuses on the understanding of displaced people as citizens or non-citizens, the formal processes available (or not available) to them, and the consequences of exclusion from formal, statutory citizenship or asylum (Costello, 2015; eds. Edwards & Ferstman, 2010, 2007; Manby, 2009; Milner, 2009). On the other hand, many contemporary scholars writing on citizenship in displacement focus on the importance of informal processes, claim assertions, protest and other forms of local agency and practice (Moulin & Nyers, 2007; Agier, 2008; Hanafi, 2010; Holzer, 2012, 2015; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015; Ilcan, 2018; Lecadet, 2016; Omata, 2017). As such, most of the available literature on citizenship in displacement focuses on *de facto* citizenship, showing that although many displacees are denied formal citizenship and rights, they claim and assert them in informal struggles. Thus, the existing debates often rely on the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* citizenship, differentiating between formal, legal and informal ways of belonging.

Following Lazar (2012), I observe that when non-citizens or second-class citizens make claims to full citizenship, the nature of citizenship itself changes in the process (p. 345). Through an in-depth exploration of the process of naturalisation of Burundian refugees under Tanzanian Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), my analysis sheds light on how long-term refugees in settlements and in the cities experience access to formal, institutional citizenship and what struggles they face in the process of claiming substantive rights following naturalisation. Drawing on this case study, I argue that the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* citizenship fails to

capture the complexity of evolving citizenship in displacement, necessitating new approaches that encompass the uncertainty and temporality of both formal and informal modes of belonging in displacement.

The thesis explores the processes of evolving citizenship for the long-term displacees by bringing together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, seldom addressed at the same time, namely: political representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship. Rather than deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, the thesis explores how experiences and priorities of the displacees can shift and alter the established elements of citizenship. Based on insights from former refugees' experiences and narratives, I put forward a new concept of 'probational citizenship' which aims to capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement. Former refugees living with 'probational citizenship' experience a paradoxical interplay of both safety and uncertainty about their new status, which dominates their lives and shapes their actions post-naturalisation. The notion of 'probational citizenship' is not intended as an all-encompassing analytical framework. Rather, it functions as a lens for bringing together various interrelated narratives and experiences and for working out their significance in the wider, global context.

The contribution of this project is threefold. First, the thesis provides new empirical data on an under-researched policy, analysing both implementation and aftermath of TANCOS. In contrast to the existing studies on this topic (Hovil, 2016; Kweka, 2015; Milner, 2014; Miletzki, 2014;), the thesis adopts a long-term perspective, tracing the

consequences of TANCROSS beyond the initial distribution of citizenship certificates. Moreover, unlike the existing studies, which focus solely on the refugee settlements, the thesis adopts a multi-sited approach, which incorporates insights from both rural and urban settings, drawing parallels and contrasting the various experiences and perspectives.

Secondly, the thesis contributes to the existing literature on the nexus of citizenship and displacement (Bradley 2008; eds. Brysk & G. Shafi, 2004; Hammar, 2014; Hovil & Lomo, 2015; Kibreab, 1999; Long, 2013a; Malkki, 1995; Moulin & Nyers, 2007; Polzer, 2009; Warner, 1999) by proposing a new concept of ‘probational citizenship’. The concept of ‘probational citizenship’ aims to encompass the uncertainty, temporality and ongoing struggles for recognition which characterise both formal and informal modes of belonging in displacement. Apart from this main theoretical contribution, the empirical chapters of the thesis speak to the various angles of citizenship in displacement and contribute new knowledge to the following bodies of literature: the existing literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; Daley 1989; Sommers, 2001a; Turner, 2010), refugee politics in camps (Agier, 2008; Lecadet, 2016, Omata, 2017), citizenship and land rights in contexts of migration and displacement (Jackson, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Lentz, 2013; Boas & Dunn, 2013) and the role of mobility in displacement (de Haas, 2009; Long, 2013b; Long & Crisp, 2010; Maple, 2016).

Finally, besides the intention to present new ethnographic material and contribute to the theoretical debates on citizenship and displacement, this dissertation brings

attention to the precarious situation of the former Burundian refugees in Tanzania and the relevance of their experience in the wider, global context. The decision of the Tanzanian government to grant citizenship to over 150,000 refugees must be recognised and applauded. At the same time, however, it needs to be acknowledged that the incomplete implementation of naturalisation by the various involved stakeholders created a responsibility gap that renders the former refugees vulnerable. This thesis aims to bring attention to the risks and challenges that former Burundian refugees face in Tanzania post-naturalisation. Although this study focuses on the specific case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, in the Conclusion, I advance an argument that the notion of ‘probational citizenship’ and the protracted uncertainty regarding one’s legal status is becoming increasingly common in the experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as other first and second-generation migrants in the Global North.

1.2. Thesis’ structure

The thesis explores the subject of citizenship in displacement by bringing together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, not often addressed at the same time, namely: political representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship. These aspects of citizenship were selected to reflect the concerns and priorities shared by former refugees in qualitative interviews. In interviews, I paid close attention to which aspects people chose to focus on, which questions were considered more relevant, and ultimately which facets of citizenship are at the core of how former refugees conceptualise citizenship in displacement. The order of the chapters follows the logic of moving from the broader understanding of

citizenship in its political dimension to the more specific, individual experiences and concerns. The first three chapters following the Introduction set out the necessary background and context, outline the analytical framework and present the research methods. The empirical chapters start with the subject of political representation, moving to the issue of land rights, the crucial role of mobility in displacement and, finally, the importance of the materiality of citizenship documents in displacement. Below, I present the chapters' outlines.

Chapter 2 briefly outlines the background and context vital for the analysis developed in the subsequent empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter outlines the origin of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, with a focus on the individuals and families who fled to Tanzania in 1972. This section explains the reasons behind refugees' flight and introduces the settlements where they were hosted (and where the central part of this research was conducted). The next part discusses the development of Tanzanian refugee policy and the context in which Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS) was proposed, designed and implemented. Step by step, the chapter explains the turns and twists of the negotiations and the resulting pitfalls of the policy. It argues that a responsibility gap was created and that the policy was implemented incompletely which affects how former Burundian refugees conceptualise their new status following naturalisation.

Chapter 3 presents key conceptual frameworks and theories relating to citizenship and displacement. The chapter begins by engaging with the small, but influential body of literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; Daley, 1989; Sommers,

2001a; Turner, 2010) which allows for developing a more grounded, historical perspective on Burundian refugees' attitudes towards Tanzanian citizenship. From that discussion, the chapter moves into outlining the relevant tenets of citizenship theory and explaining the focus on politics, land, mobility, and materiality as the key analytical elements of citizenship in this thesis. Next, the chapter differentiates between *operation* and *relational* definitions of displacement, explaining the relationship between displacement and migration and defining the concept of displacement for the purpose of this thesis. Finally, the chapter introduces the debates on the restoration of citizenship in displacement and the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship. The chapter argues that the existing conceptualisations do not capture the temporality and uncertainty of displacement and that the distinctive process of evolving citizenship in displacement does not receive sufficient attention. To address this gap in knowledge, the final part of the chapter defines the contours of citizenship in displacement and proposes a concept of 'probational citizenship'.

Chapter 4 outlines the research methods employed in this study. In order to seek answers to the research question, I chose to rely on extensive, multi-sited anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and informal interviewing. This method was chosen as the most appropriate for approaching sensitive and complex subjects in the context of vulnerability and protracted uncertainty. The empirical material was collected during three visits to Tanzania: the first one took place when the process of relocation was suspended (March-April 2014); the subsequent study followed the majority of the former refugees receiving their citizenship certificates (April-June 2015); and the final stage of fieldwork traced changes since the distribution of citizenship certificates (May 2016-March 2017). The long-term scope

of the project allowed for repeated visits to the sites pre-and post-naturalisation and for conducting follow-up interviews with the key participants.

The areas of data collection included eight villages in Ulyankulu Division, the nearby Urambo Town, Tabora Town, and the city of Dar es Salaam. Conducting research in both rural and urban sites aimed to capture the experiences and livelihoods of individuals and families who left Ulyankulu and established their lives in urban centres. Moreover, incorporating an urban component sets this research apart from the existing studies of naturalisation of Burundians in Tanzania (Hovil & Kweka, 2008; Hovil & Kweka 2009; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016; Miletzki, 2014; Nordic Consulting Group, 2010; SA3, 2007) which focus only on the refugee settlements.

The first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, tackles the problem of the transition in governance from refugee settlements to ‘settlements of citizens’, and the kinds of opportunities, frustrations, and tensions that this process entailed. The chapter demonstrates how the settlement’s governance was transformed incompletely; creating a hybrid system where former refugees continue to live under camp governance despite having citizenship. For the people concerned, this creates ambiguous lines of authority and incites uncertainty about the future, which I identify as the characteristics of ‘probational citizenship’. I show, however, how the new citizens navigate these altered forms of governance and attempt to assert their new status by voting in national elections, joining political parties, and attempting to elect a local councillor. Although many studies discuss refugees’ political organisations in camps, not much attention has been given to a *post-camp* scenario, in which refugees

access citizenship. This chapter contributes new knowledge on the topic of camp governance post-naturalisation, and it brings attention to the importance of active and participatory elements of citizenship in displacement.

Chapter 6 explores how former Burundian refugees were able to access land in exile and how, following naturalisation, they seek recognition of their land rights.¹ The chapter discusses in detail how in Ulyankulu, while seeking recognition of their land rights, former refugees rely on claim-making strategies that are not confronted by the discourse of autochthony. Instead, they seek recognition of their rights based on the long-term productive use of the land, land transactions with local Tanzanians and engagement in land disputes. In this chapter, I suggest that the strategies employed by former refugees indicate that people are trying to convert land access, which they have enjoyed for decades, into land rights. The chapter argues that access to citizenship documents increased people's sense of entitlement to the land in Tanzania and it generated new opportunities and new avenues for claim-making. At the same time, however, the state's engagement in the area following naturalisation has destabilised the previous tenure system, creating new uncertainties. Here, I analyse the interplay of safety and uncertainty regarding land access through the lens of 'probational citizenship'. For the former refugees, recognition of rights to land is a crucial marker of citizenship, and in this chapter, I show how their claim-making practices both reinforce and reinterpret the link between land and membership in the nation-state.

¹ I published some ideas presented in this chapter in Kuch, A. (2018). Land and exile: revisiting the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, *Critical African Studies*, 10:1, 108-125 but the material in the PhD is not a direct reproduction of that publication.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the role of mobility in displacement. Former Burundian refugees I met in Tanzania repeatedly told me that freedom of movement is one of the most important advantages of the newly acquired citizenship status, despite evidence that people have been moving extensively to and from the settlements since the 1970s with minimal official sanction. Moreover, people who have never left the settlements and do not intend to do so, believe firmly that freedom of movement is a crucial benefit of naturalisation. Chapter 7 explores the significance of these narratives, asking what has changed in people's experience of movement following naturalisation and what does that reveal about the importance of mobility in the process of affirming citizenship in displacement. The main finding of this chapter is that access to citizenship documents allows for beginning the transition from movement to mobility which is key in former refugees' conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement. The benefits of citizenship, however, are not stable or evenly distributed, and in the latter part of the chapter I discuss how class differentiation impacts refugees' ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by naturalisation. Many of my interlocutors narrated the benefits of freedom of movement in future-oriented terms, revealing that mobility as a capability is still a probational rather than a fundamental right.

The last empirical chapter focuses on the materiality of identification documents, approaching citizenship in its visible, material form.² Although citizenship is more than a document, documents become more and more necessary to prove and assert

² I published some ideas presented in this chapter in Kuch, A. (2017). Naturalization of Burundian Refugees in Tanzania: The Debates on Local Integration and the Meaning of Citizenship Revisited. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 30(3), 468-487 but the material in the PhD is not a direct reproduction of that publication.

one's formal status. In Chapter 8, I show how former refugees treat their new citizenship documents in their material form and how close attention to these practices reveals an ongoing interplay of safety and uncertainty. Following Hammar (2018) and Kelly (2006), I believe that studying and looking *at* citizenship documents and the way people treat, use, and understand them, can give insights into how they conceptualise citizenship itself. Paying close attention to the materiality of naturalisation highlights both the benefits of certification such as safety and ability to plan for the future, as well as the new uncertainties and vulnerabilities created with access to citizenship documents. Drawing on the existing literature, I explore why uncertainty and safety occupy a central space in the lives of the displacees and how the perspective of former refugees accentuates contradictory tendencies of certification. Building on these insights, I expand on the notion of 'probational citizenship' and show why former refugees speak about their citizenship in probational terms.

Besides the intention to present new ethnographic material and to make a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the complexity of evolving citizenship in displacement, this dissertation also aims to bring attention to the precarious situation of the 1972 Burundian refugees and its broader relevance. In the Conclusion, I put forward an argument that the experience of 'probational citizenship', narrated by former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, has global significance. Thinking through the lens of developing 'theory from the South' (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012) and drawing on recent cases of deportation and denaturalisation in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), I suggest that the notion of 'probational citizenship' and the protracted uncertainty regarding one's legal status is becoming increasingly common

in the experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as other first and second-generation migrants in the Global North.

2. Background and context

This chapter provides background and context necessary for the analysis developed in the subsequent empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter outlines the origin of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, with a focus on the individuals and families who fled to Tanzania in 1972. This section explains the reasons behind people's flight, introduces the settlements where they were hosted, and discusses the links between naturalisation and repatriation. The next part examines the details of Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS). It argues that a responsibility gap was created as the policy was implemented incompletely which had an impact on how former Burundian refugees conceptualise citizenship following naturalisation.

2.1. Burundian refugees in Tanzania: the cycles of displacement

Reasons for flight

Following a decade of instability since independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi was riven by rivalries and antagonisms *between* and *within* the different 'ethnic' groups (Hutu and Tutsi) which were reinforced by the colonial categories (Russell, 2015). A military coup had established a republic in 1966, and as the years passed it increasingly became dominated by a group of Tutsis. Every attempt made by Hutu leaders to overthrow the government – in 1965, 1969, 1972 – ended in failure and brutal repression. In 1972, Hutu militias organised an uprising and attacked Tutsi civilians. In response, the army was called to exterminate all individuals suspected of being involved in the assassinations. For two months the army moved across the

country, methodically killing people of Hutu origin, targeting skilled and educated members of the society (Lemarchand, 1996).

It is estimated that 100,000 to 300,000 were killed and hundreds of thousands fled to the neighbouring states, with the majority ending up in Tanzania (Uvin, 2009). Because the reprisals were directed at the educated Hutus, peasants were better able to flee the country and thus constituted the bulk of the refugee population (Daley, 1989). After escaping the ethnic violence and finding refuge in Tanzania, the 1972 Burundian refugees were first hosted in transitory camps in Kigoma region, from which they were relocated to three rural settlements in Mpanda and Rukwa regions: Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu (now referred to as the ‘Old Settlements’). In Chapter 4., the main research site, Ulyankulu settlement, is discussed in detail.




Figure 1. Map showing the location of the Old Settlements and refugee camps in Tanzania. Source: UNHCR 2014.

In Burundi, Union for National Progress (UPRONA) became the single political party in a totalitarian system that aimed at a total exclusion of the Hutu population from political participation, access to education, and employment (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000, p. 390). Although the regime was trying to prevent protests by forging national unity (Lemarchand, 1994, 108), these efforts did not succeed. When violence erupted in 1988, the international community began putting pressure on Burundian elites to democratise national politics (Reyntjens, 1993). However, in 1993 the first Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, and a civil war broke out.

Over 300,000 are estimated to have been killed, and more than one million people were displaced during the civil war that lasted until 2005 (Daley, 2006, p. 658). The civil war generated another massive wave of refugees, many of them fleeing to Tanzania for the second or third time. Despite major similarities and kinship links between the various groups of refugees, Burundians who fled in the 1990s were hosted in different camps than the 1972 population and were treated as a 'separate' caseload. This division had real consequences, as people registered in the 1990s' camps did not qualify for the naturalisation which was offered to the people whose families fled to Tanzania in 1972.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000) for Burundi arose from a regional initiative and was signed in August 2000 (Daley, 2007, p. 338). The civil war, however, continued despite the efforts of the international community to create a peace process. Officially, the war ended in 2005 with the establishment of a power-sharing transitional government and the installing of a democratically elected government. Daley (2006) and other observers, however, have argued that Burundi continued to exist in an in-between state popularly termed 'no peace no war' (p. 658).

The fragility of this in-between state became evident in April 2015, when civil unrest broke out in Bujumbura. People came out on the streets to protest President Nkurunziza's third term in office, which runs counter to the Arusha Agreement's terms. Following these events, 100,000 Burundians fled again to Tanzania. In total, since April 2015, hundreds of people have been killed, and more than 250,500 have fled to Rwanda, Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania as a result of political violence (Fleming, 2015). The tensions in Burundi continue and Tanzania continues to host over 220,000 Burundian refugees (IOM, 2018). Their security, however, is tenuous, and both Tanzanian and Burundian governments have issued multiple statements urging people to return to Burundi (Okiror, 2017).

The returning repatriates

Although this project focuses primarily on the naturalisation aspect of the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), the political situation in Burundi and the experiences of the repatriates are both directly relevant to this research. Approximately 45,000 refugees decided to repatriate as part of the UNHCR-organised repatriation scheme under TANCOSS and many others left individually over the years. Those who still had relatives in Burundi and were able to regain their property settled in the areas they were familiar with. Many others, however, were housed in Peace Villages built for the purpose of reintegrating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returning refugees (Falisse & Niyonkuru, 2015).

During fieldwork, I collected secondary data about people's relatives and friends who repatriated to Burundi. I found that many of the repatriates returned to Tanzania, unable to regain their land and re-establish their livelihoods in Burundi. People's social networks had become extremely weak back in Burundi and when in May 2015 civil unrest broke out many repatriated refugees fled again to Tanzania. Some of them want now to receive Tanzanian citizenship but TANCOSS had stated clearly that the decision to opt for repatriation could not be reversed. The experiences and stories of the repatriates are crucial because they influenced how those who opted for naturalisation perceive their Tanzanian citizenship, which I explore further in Chapter 8. Therefore, although this research project focuses primarily on the experience of naturalisation and evolving citizenship in displacement, it maintains a holistic

perspective which incorporates the social worlds and kinship links of the former Burundian refugees across borders.

2.2. Tanzanian Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS)

This section discusses the details of TANCOSS, the reasons and motivations behind this policy, the role of influential individuals in governmental and non-governmental agencies, and the challenges in implementation. The section argues the policy was poorly designed and implemented incompletely, leading to a responsibility gap, where neither the international stakeholders nor the Tanzanian government feel responsible for further incorporation of the settlements into the regional and national governance. Before moving to a discussion of TANCOSS, I first briefly outline the evolution of Tanzanian refugee policy, which allows to situate TANCOSS in a historical context.

Evolution of Tanzanian Refugee Policy

A lot has been written about the evolution of the Tanzanian refugee policy (Chaulia, 2003; Chimni, 2004; Landau, 2008; Milner, 2014; Rutinwa, 2002). Although my research focuses primarily on the experiences of the people affected by TANCOSS rather than a strict policy development analysis, a brief outline of the progression of Tanzanian refugee policy provides a necessary context. Researchers find that Tanzanian refugee policies fall into three distinct periods from Independence to the present.

From 1962 to 1985 Tanzania hosted tens of thousands of refugees fleeing both wars of national liberation in Southern Africa as well as post-colonial conflicts in the neighbouring states. Several authors have attributed the 'Open Door' policy to both ideological and pragmatic considerations, pointing to Nyerere's genuine commitment to Pan-African ideals, as well as the opportunities that refugees provided for attracting resources for the development of remote and under-populated regions (Armstrong, 1991; Kweka, 2007). In line with these priorities, the 1972 group of Burundian refugees was allocated land to farm and live on in three sites: Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo. The evolving situation of that group of refugees is the focal point of my analysis.

The second period came in 1985 with the economic disarray, the end of President Nyerere's presidency, and the beginning of President Mwinyi's term as President. Mwinyi embarked on the Economic Recovery Programme, which was associated with some decisive measures aimed at reducing public spending (Kweka, 2007). The growing numbers of refugees, deteriorating security situation in the region, economic hardships induced by the Structural Adjustment Programs, as well as the decreasing levels of funding, all converged to make the Tanzanian state less inclined to host refugees (Landau, 2008; Whitaker, 2002). This was the political situation when the enormous displacement in the region happened following the Great Lakes crisis and the influx of hundred thousand people further radicalised the asylum climate (Whitaker, 2003).

The border closure with Rwanda in 1995 and the expulsion of the Rwandese refugees in 1996 marked the start of the third period of refugee policies in Tanzania (Rutinwa,

1996). In 1998, the government passed a new Refugees Act, followed by 2003 Tanzanian National Refugee Policy, which restricted movements of refugees to camps and limited economic activity. Consequently, Tanzanian authorities began rounding-up refugees living outside the camps and ‘forced deportations were common’ (Chaulia, 2003, p. 161). The use of anti-refugee rhetoric increased, and Nyerere’s reference to refugees as ‘resident guests’ was replaced by public discourses about refugees as ‘threats to national security’ (Collier, 2011).

On the surface, it seems that Tanzania went through a massive shift from a more open-door policy which emphasised self-sufficiency and local integration, to a current more restrictive policy of encampment. In fact, however, although refugee regime in Tanzania became progressively more restrictive, the Tanzanian government always discouraged spontaneous settlement (Holborn, 1975). In other words, restrictions on refugee mobility and preference for organised settlements over self-settlement were always key markers of the Tanzanian refugee regime. What has changed is the logic of what types of settlement schemes are seen as beneficial from the perspective of the state’s interests. In the 1970s, rural settlement was seen as the major device by which states could exercise control over refugees and benefit from their labour (Daley, 1989). Therefore, at that time, rural settlement was the most attractive and politically feasible response to displacement. This has changed with time, as encampment and aid provision became the more mainstream methods of refugee protection. Although the 1970s policy of rural settlements significantly improved refugees’ economic self-reliance in comparison to the later encampment practices, it is important not to idealise it. From the perspective of the refugees, control of movement, control of labour, and exclusion from the local decision-making defined their experience of displacement in

the Old Settlements. The implementation and aftermath of TANCROSS must be seen against that backdrop.

TANCROSS: the impetus behind a comprehensive refugee policy

The 2005 election manifesto of Tanzania's ruling party, CCM, included a pledge to make Tanzania refugee-free by 2010 (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010), which reflected the objectives 1998 Refugees Act and 2003 Tanzanian National Refugee Policy. In 2006, the Government of Tanzania informed the UNHCR that it intended to close the remaining camp (Mtabila) for 1993 Burundian refugees in Tanzania by encouraging voluntary repatriation. Initially, these discussions were not meant to address the situation of the 1972 Burundians living in the Old Settlements. In June 2007, however, at a meeting of the Tripartite Commission, the governments of Burundi and Tanzania expressed their desire to close all of the refugee camps in Tanzania, including the Old Settlements established in the 1970s (Milner, 2013). UNHCR accepted the proposal to close Mtabila camp which hosted refugees from 1993. However, it managed to negotiate an alternative solution for the 1972 refugees.

The tripartite meeting recommended the establishment of Old Settlements Task Force charged with finding a set of durable solutions for the Old Settlements. First steps were to conduct a population census and an independent socio-economic study of the Old Settlements, which comprised of individual registration and intention survey (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). The survey collected personal details and recorded the choice of either voluntary repatriation or application for naturalisation. The decision for either repatriation or naturalisation was supposed to be made by the head of the

households on behalf of other family members which led to many tensions. Nonetheless, the survey was conducted, and the outcome of that survey indicated an overwhelming preference for naturalisation: 79% (171,629) of refugees identified the acquisition of Tanzanian citizenship as their preferred durable solution, with the remaining 21% (45,547) opting for repatriation (SA3, 2007). Based on these results, the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS) was formulated, and the strategy document was disseminated in early 2008. The agreement outlined three pillars: voluntary repatriation to Burundi, processing of citizenship applications for those who wished to pursue naturalisation in Tanzania, and relocation of naturalised refugees from the settlements to other regions of Tanzania.

Creating the opportunity for mass naturalisation

It is worth noting that naturalisation of refugees is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania and earlier groups included the naturalisation of Rwandese refugees in 1980 (Gasarasi, 1990). However, the 1972 group was the first one where the offer was extended to Burundians and to such a large number of refugees as well as through individual processing rather than by decree. Interviews with stakeholders conducted for this research reveal that the motivation to offer naturalisation was linked to the Nyerere's pan-African policies at the time of arrival of this groups of refugees, the significant economic contribution made by the refugees, and the ethnic affiliation and peaceful co-existence with the host population. Furthermore, a crucial element of the design of this policy was a personal commitment of influential individuals.

The then Minister of Home Affairs (MOHA), Joseph Mungai, played a major role in promoting naturalisation, because of his personal knowledge of the settlements (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, pp. 26-27). He had been Minister of Agriculture (at the age of 28) when the Burundians came in 1972 and had been part of the decision to settle and allocate land to them (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, p. 27). Lawrence Masha, the new MOHA minister following Mungai, continued the naturalisation process. Masha maintained, in line with his predecessor, that forced repatriation of the 1972 group could lead to serious security problems in Burundi.

Furthermore, in his research Milner (2013, 2014) exposes the importance of the personal relationship between the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs in 2007, Lawrence Masha, and the UNHCR Representative to Tanzania, Yacoub el Hillo, in making TANCOSSE feasible. He notes that Masha and el Hillo had developed a close working relationship already in the 1990s and their ability to cooperate was key in pushing the TANCOSSE strategy forward (Milner, 2014, p. 562).

Another important incentive was provided by large funding meant for implementation of TANCOSSE. The appeal, with two-year budgets for both Tanzania and Burundi, was originally at USD 34.2 million, and USD 22.5 million was spent in 2008. The budget for 2009, originally at USD 11.5 million was then revised upwards to USD 28 million, most of which was funded (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, p. 41). Ultimately, a total of USD 103 million was included in the 2011-15 United Nations Development Assistant Plan (UNDAP) meant for relocation and integration of naturalised refugees (Milner, 2014, p. 561). These investments were central in negotiating naturalisation: they included promises of development on the district level, boosting Tanzania's

reputation as a progressive refugee-hosting state, and a possibility of attracting more funding for development projects in the near future.

Challenges and delays in implementation

Notwithstanding the existing motivation of the key figures in the government and the potential benefits of donor's investments, the process stalled in the years 2010-2014. Until October 2014, it was unclear if the process of naturalisation would be completed and several statements by the Government of Tanzania during this period suggested a declining commitment to the process and the possibility that the decision to grant citizenship could be reversed (for details see Milner 2013, 2014). However, despite the major delays and setbacks in the process, in October 2014 President Kikwete travelled to the settlements to inaugurate a citizenship certificates distribution ceremony. The main reason for the delay was caused by the shift in approach towards local integration of refugees who opted for naturalisation.

Initially, the naturalisation pillar assumed that refugees would be resettled from the settlements to 21 designated regions in Tanzania and that the refugee settlements would be closed. In 2010, a National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NaSCIP) was developed to serve as the blueprint for the implementation of this integration scheme. However, due to opposition by local politicians in the locations chosen as well as the resistance of the international community to support this strategy of relocation of refugees, the implementation of the NaSCIP was suspended. This episode shows a major conflict in what UNHCR and local government saw as the best

approach to integration. Ultimately, the UNHCR's advocated solution was accepted, and the government decided that the new Tanzanians could remain in the existing settlements and those who wished to relocate could do so accordingly with their wishes and resources.

At this stage of the policy implementation, in 2011, Oakland Institute has exposed that the initial insistence on relocation of refugees from the settlements has been motivated by a prospective land deal. The report by Oakland Institute (Freedman, 2012) stated that AgriSol, a major U.S. energy company³, was meant to benefit from the forcible eviction of the refugees by leasing 800,000 acres of Katumba and Mishamo settlements. A spokesperson for AgriSol Tanzania denied these allegations and claimed that the government had been the one that had instigated the movement of refugees and that AgriSol was informed that the refugee camps were closed or in the process of being closed before they engaged in the deal (Freedman, 2012). Due to public pressure, the company initially announced that it will delay involvement in the deal until refugees are resettled and finally it withdrew from the initial agreement. Although this scandal has been resolved before I started fieldwork, it offers critical insight into the precarious situation of the former refugees and it shows that the ultimate solution of allowing former refugees to remain in the settlements was not aligned with the original vision of the Tanzanian government. This had fundamental consequences for how integration of the former refugees, both in terms of local

³ AgriSol Energy Tanzania, the company behind the Tanzanian operations, was a partnership venture between Rastetter's AgriSol Energy and the Tanzania-based Serengeti Advisers Limited. Iddi Simba, the former Minister for Industry and Trade for Tanzania was one of the heads of Serengeti Limited (Freedman, 2012).

governance and land, has been conducted (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).

Despite these challenges and insecurities, from 2015 onwards, over 160,000 of the people living in the settlements have received their certificates. Due to a fundamental shift in integration policy and the permission for the former refugees to remain in the Old Settlements, the Government devised a new strategy for the local integration programme: the Tanzania Strategic Plan for Local Integration of the New Citizens (TANSPLI). According to the stipulations of TANSPLI, two actions will be undertaken regarding changing the status of the settlement area. The first will be the removal by the Minister for Home Affairs of the refugee-designated status over the settlement areas and incorporation of the settlement into the local governance structure. The second action will be changing the designated status of the area. This will mean the creation of a master land use plan for the settlement and the surrounding areas, followed by the registration of villages in each settlement and provision of preliminary documentation for land rights. The timeline for these transformations, however, is uncertain, and at the time of writing (2018), the stipulations of TANSPLI have not been implemented.

Responsibility gap and the lack of accountability

Now that the people concerned are no longer labelled refugees but have become citizens instead, they have fallen into a responsibility gap. What I mean here is that because they were granted naturalisation, they are no longer considered to fall under

the protection of UNHCR. As one UNHCR official told me on condition of anonymity: ‘We have done our part. They are not refugees anymore and they are not our responsibility’ (int. 2014). At the same time, however, the settlements inhabited by former refugees have not yet been incorporated into the Tanzanian state structure and remain under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs; with no political representation or secure access to land. In the words of an official at the Ministry of Home Affairs: ‘We kept our part of the deal and distributed citizenship. But none of the promises materialised’ (int. 2017). According to the civil servants interviewed (both in Dar es Salaam and in Tabora region), the donors (UNHCR, the World Bank, UNDP, European Union) promised the Tanzanian Government that major investments will follow the distribution of citizenship, but these promised never materialised. From the perspective of the donors interviewed, the Tanzanian Government did not deliver naturalisation within the timeframe agreed and therefore funding meant to support this initiative was redirected to support refugees in other emergencies, including the recent war in Syria. These ambiguities have led to a political stalemate between humanitarian organisations and the government, with each claiming the other has not kept its promises.

This sentiment has far-reaching consequences. The failure of international organisations to contribute to the integration of the 1972 Burundian refugees has been used by President Magafuli as an argument against engaging in prospective durable solutions policies. In late January 2018, the Tanzanian President announced in a public

speech that one of the reasons for pulling out of the UN's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)⁴ was the disappointing experience of TANCOS:

We are leaving the framework due to the experience we had when we gave citizenship to over 160,000 refugees. The international community has promised it would provide funds to facilitate their housing and other things but surprisingly to date no money has been given (CGTN, 2018).

Thus, the incomplete implementation of TANCOS is now used by the government as a trump card for justifying a more hostile policy environment towards other refugees.

The TANCOS agreement and subsequent TANSPLI strategy document left it ambiguous who would be responsible for implementing the administrative, developmental and social programs that were designed to turn former refugee settlements into properly integrated towns and villages. TANSPLI proposed three pillars for implementation: Legal Integration Pillar (Pillar 1), Social and Economic Integration Pillar (Pillar 2) and Governance and Administration Pillar (Pillar 3). These pillars covered addressing outstanding legal status issues and access to legal rights, reform of the governance and administration of the settlements, socio-economic investments in support of local integration, as well as administrative and administration costs.

⁴ CRRF proposes that refugees should be included in the communities from the very beginning and the initiative is meant to provide lasting solutions to refugees, including integration into communities.

The TANSPLI strategy was forward looking and ambitious, however it was never implemented. In late 2018, governance in the settlement remains in transition. On the one hand, legally speaking, the Old Settlements have the status of a designated area under the Refugees Act 1998 (GOT, 1998). On the other hand, former refugees received citizenship and are now allowed to move, access education freely, and vote in national elections. The promises that accompanied naturalisation, however, have not yet been fulfilled. In the current transitional period, the power over politics and land governance in the settlements remains vested in the Settlement Officers appointed by the Director of the Refugee Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Despite naturalisation, former refugees are unable to appoint local political representatives from the community or to seek recognition of their rights to land (more in Chapter 6).

Without political representation, the new citizens are not able to influence the local or district policies and without accountability mechanisms in place, the recipients of TANCOS policy are also unable to hold humanitarian organisations accountable (see Barnett & Wiess, 2008; Tan & Schreeb, 2015; Souter, 2014). The interviews with members of the international organisations (UNHCR, the World Bank) that initiated the process reveal that they have no sense of responsibility regarding the outcome of TANCOS and have no plans for addressing the precarious situation of the new citizens. Thus, the incomplete and problematic implementation of the various pillars of TANCOS policy left the former refugees in an uncertain ‘in-between’ state.

Conclusion

This chapter provided context for understanding the analysis that follows in the subsequent theoretical and empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter briefly introduced the reasons behind the flight of Burundian refugees in 1972. It discussed the links between repatriation and naturalisation, exposing how the continued instability in Burundi has an impact on how former Burundian refugees in Tanzania perceive their new citizenship as a symbol of safety and security. The main part of the chapter elaborated on the context in which the policy of TANCOS was designed and implemented. Here, the challenges in implementation and the subsequent consequences were discussed. The evidence shows that the incomplete implementation of naturalisation has created a responsibility gap, leaving the new citizens outside the Tanzanian government structures and beyond the concern of the international organisations. In the next chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for expanding the understanding of evolving citizenship in displacement.

2. Analytical framework

*In the past our parents used to tell us about the importance of going back to Burundi.
Now we are mature, we have our own families and can make our own decisions*
(int. 2014).

*In the processes of both non-citizens' claims to citizenship and of second-class
citizens' claims for full citizenship, the nature of citizenship itself changes*
(Lazar, 2012, p. 345).

This research asks how did the experience of displacement and subsequent naturalisation shape Burundian refugees views of citizenship and considers how these insights help to develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. In order to approach these questions, this chapter develops an analytical framework which introduces the relevant themes and identifies the key shortcomings in the existing literature. In this effort, I aim to forge new connections between the existing disciplines and bodies of literature including citizenship studies, African studies, and migration and forced migration studies.

The chapter opens by engaging with the small but influential body of literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; Daley, 1989; Sommers, 2001a; Turner, 2010). These works highlight how people's aspirations and dispositions towards Tanzanian citizenship have changed over time, which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the context in which TANCOS was developed, implemented and understood by the people concerned. Revisiting the earlier studies against the backdrop of TANCOS opens spaces for both observing the continuity of key themes and challenging the established analysis with new empirical insights.

The second part of the chapter outlines the relevant theories of citizenship. First, I briefly introduce the main tenets of citizenship theory and I outline why exclusion, inequality and the diverging understandings of citizenship as ‘right’ and citizenship as ‘privilege’ are the main tensions in citizenship theory (Bosniak, 2006; Bezabeh, 2011; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Castles, 2005; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Wimmer & Glick Shiller, 2002). I use this discussion to bring attention to what it means to be a citizen in Tanzania and how is that removed from the normative citizenship ideal (Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). Next, I turn to citizenship in African studies (ed. Hunter, 2016; MacLean, 2011; Mamdani, 1996; Smith, 2013), discussing the relationship between belonging and land, and the new insights that the context of displacement can bring into the existing debates. Finally, I look at the contemporary literature on ‘acts of citizenship’, which locates citizenship in claim-making processes, beyond legal and institutional recognition. Instead, this body of literature (Holston & Appadurai, 1996; Lowe, 1996; Ong, 1999; Lazar, 2012) focuses on citizenship as a practice and explores the differences between formal and informal, active citizenship.

The second key theoretical concept in this thesis is displacement. In the third part of the chapter, I evaluate the relevant literature on displacement, outlining the existing debates on the difference between displacement and migration and defining how I understand and use the concept of displacement in my research. Here, I briefly outline the concept of durable solutions and in relation to it I differentiate between *operation* and *relational* definitions of displacement. In defining displacement, I draw on insights

from Bakewell (2011), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015), Hammar (2014), Lubkemann (2008), and my own qualitative work.

In the fourth part of the chapter, I scrutinise the existing literature on restoration of citizenship in displacement and situate my research in relation to these efforts (Bradley, 2008; Hovil & Lomo 2015; Long, 2013a; Van Hear, 2006). I observe, however, that the distinctive process of evolving citizenship in displacement does not receive sufficient attention in the existing studies. To illustrate this, I outline the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* citizenship and the shortcomings of this debate. I argue that the existing approaches fail to account for the experiences of the people concerned and that a more nuanced understanding of citizenship in displacement is needed. I propose a concept of ‘probational citizenship’, which I develop in conversation with a growing body of literature on different forms of citizenship that blur the boundaries between citizenship and non-citizenship (Menjívar, 2006; Bosniak, 2008, Nyers, 2010, 2018; McNevin, 2011; Rigo, 2018). All of the existing concepts of ‘ambiguous’ (Mhurchú, 2014), ‘irregular’ (Nyers, 2010) citizenships, however, have been developed in the Western context, and they fail to account for the specific characteristics of citizenship in displacement in Africa.

Moreover, I argue that what is missing from the existing conceptualisations of citizenship in displacement is close attention to the essential aspects of displacement such as uncertainty and temporality. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to lay out an analytical framework for approaching and understanding citizenship in displacement. Rather than deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, in this thesis I explore how

experiences and priorities of the displaced can shift and alter the established elements and understanding of citizenship.

3.1. Burundian refugees in Tanzania: past and present

There is a limited, though influential, body of literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania including the work of Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995, 1996), Patricia Daley (1989, 1991, 2013), Marc Sommers (1995, 2001a) and Simon Turner (2004, 2010). Engagement with these studies allows for gaining a long-term perspective into how Burundian refugees' aspirations and dispositions towards Tanzanian citizenship have changed. The decision of the majority of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to apply for naturalisation stands as a counterpoint to the earlier narratives, which emphasize protection of refugee status and repatriation (Malkki, 1995). My work was developed in conversation with these earlier studies, tracing the reasons and determinants behind people's decision to remain in Tanzania. As such, engagement with the existing studies anchors the analytical framework in the specific context of Burundian refugees in Tanzania and at the same time provides an entry point into the ensuing, broader conceptual discussions of citizenship and displacement.

Identity and belonging in displacement

In *Purity and Exile*, Liisa Malkki (1995) expands on the postmodern notion of deterritorialised identity (Clifford, 1992; Hannerz, 1996; Soysal, 1994; Appadurai, 2001), exploring how it plays out and transforms when applied in the context of forced migration. Following ethnographic research with Burundian refugees in Mishamo

camp and in Kigoma town in the 1980s, she develops a compelling argument that the Hutu refugees in Tanzania have re-territorialised themselves in displacement, where the homeland became a moral destination, rather than a territorial or topographic entity (Malkki, 1992). To achieve that, she contrasts the purist notion of identity constructed in the camps with the pragmatic processes through which some Burundian refugees assimilated and established livelihoods in Kigoma town. She discusses elements such as intermarriage with citizens, obtaining documentation and seeing a return to Burundi as undesirable, and shows how these stood in contrast with the priorities and desires of the population living in the camp (Malkki, 1995a).

Malkki finds that those living in Mishamo camp created an elaborate ‘mythico-history’ of the Hutu people, which gave significance and meaning to exile, and promised a collective return to Burundi. Other refugees, who had assimilated in a more urban setting of Kigoma, shaped their identities in response to the circumstances of their day to day lives. In line with postmodern notions of deterritorialised identity, Malkki rejects assumptions of simply linking people to places, and instead proposes a more nuanced perspective that highlights the making of identity and the meaning and power that people extract from the social location they inhabit (Malkki, 1992, 1995a). Her work is a critique of a ‘sedentarist’ bias (1995, p. 208), which she defines as a tendency to conceive of people’s movements as problematic in a world of normal, ‘rooted’ citizens, attached to territories. This analysis does not imply a denial of the importance of place in the construction of identity, but it shifts the emphasis from static to dynamic modes of identification.

Gaim Kibreab (1999) criticises Malkki for making an artificial distinction between the camp and the town refugees, which according to him disregards the reality of continual migration of individuals and families between these locations. Moreover, Kibreab questions the validity of Malkki's findings from Kigoma, arguing that the precarious legal situation of refugees living in towns could have likely functioned as a restraint on their willingness to admit attachment to a foreign territory. In her exploration of town refugees, Malkki was also criticised for overstating a romantic vision of 'cosmopolitanism' and 'juggling' of identities, which could be re-narrated as a necessity, a pragmatic survival strategy rather than an ideal. Kibreab, in contrast to Malkki, emphasises the practical as opposed to affective aspects of belonging, observing that the reality of nation-state systems and the prohibitive migration laws necessitate stronger attachment to the place of origin, which provides an individual with freedoms that cannot be obtained in exile (Kibreab, 2003). He brings attention to the factors that motivate peoples' desire to return to their homes and maintains that in contemporary Africa access to resources (i.e. land and citizenship) is critical in conceptualizing belonging (Kibreab, 2003). Therefore, by arguing that 'territory remains the major repository of rights and membership', Kibreab (1999, p. 387) urges us to reconsider the objective existence of deterritorialised identities.

In this thesis, I continue the debates began by Malkki and Kibreab, taking the existing analysis a step further by complementing and challenging it with the new empirical material. The new context of mass naturalisation allows for developing a further understanding of what significance does citizenship status and access to land have for long-term and sustainable integration of refugees. Building on Malkki's and Kibreab's

insights allows for adopting a longitudinal perspective on citizenship in displacement, both continuing and challenging the earlier conversations.

Valuing refugee status over citizenship

Another important contribution to the literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania has been made by Marc Sommers in his book *Fear in Bongoland* (2001a). In the book, Sommers (2001a) relates the events from the time of Mrema's ultimatum. In 1992, Augustine Mrema, then Tanzanian Minister of Home Affairs, announced that Burundian refugees had three months to decide whether they wished to repatriate or become Tanzanian citizens. Mrema's ultimatum was a result of compounded efforts of the Burundian and Tanzanian governments to assure Burundian refugees that conditions in Burundi were stable and peaceful. Mrema's ultimatum was never upheld, but it stirred up the debates about the choice between naturalisation and repatriation for the 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania.

Sommers (2001a) labels the events of 1992 'a crisis in the lives of all Burundian refugees in Tanzania' (p. 196) and argues that refugees responded to the ultimatum with fear and anxiety. He relates feelings of helplessness and panic that spread among the people with whom he was acquainted. Sommers argues that the people concerned did not want to seize the opportunity to apply for Tanzanian citizenship, but at the same time they did not think that Burundi was safe enough to return to. Likewise, explaining the reception of the Ministry's ultimatum, Malkki (1995) cites a letter from one of her informants, who wrote: 'It seems therefore that 90% of the people of

Mishamo will prefer to regain their native country, included in that myself and my family' (p. 278).

Based on fieldwork conducted in 1986, and subsequent correspondence with her informants, Malkki (1995) holds that assimilation at the level of naturalisation was resisted and refused by the majority of the Burundians living in the camps, as it signified abandoning the hope of a collective return to the 'homeland'. At that time, naturalisation was seen as detrimental for the construction of deterritorialised Hutu identity in exile, which was constructed through notions of 'purity' and 'marginality' (Malkki, 1992, p. 35). Thus, Malkki (1995) presents an argument that for the overarching purpose of constructing a collective identity, Hutu refugees in Tanzania wanted to remain in a categorical state of displacement, both 'legally and socially' (p. 209).

The narrative of protecting a refugee identity against naturalisation is a common thread in all works on Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Daley's (1989, 1991) early research on Burundian refugees focuses on the settlement of Katumba. Although Daley's early work does not focus on questions of belonging and citizenship, she notes that very few refugees seized an opportunity to apply for citizenship, as refugee status was considered to bring more benefits. In line with Daley's (1989) observations, Turner (2004) shows how maintaining a refugee status can provide a more attractive alternative to the national citizenship of Tanzania because it gives 'access to the resources offered by the international community' (Turner, 2004, p. 231). Moreover, he notes that for refugees who continue to believe strongly in the Burundi nation,

retaining a refugee status helps to also protect a hope and possibility of return (Turner, 2010, p. 239).

Malkki (1995), as well as Daley (1989), Sommers (2001a) and Turner (2010), do not reflect on the possibility of naturalisation for Burundian refugees in Tanzania. At the time of their research, the potentiality of naturalisation was not a dominant theme among the refugees as many still hoped for a possibility of returning to Burundi. As years passed, people's perceptions of the value of refugee status and citizenship began to transform.

From refugee status to citizenship: changing perspectives on naturalisation

In 2007, when given a choice between repatriation and naturalisation, almost 80% of 1972 Burundian refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship. The decision of the majority of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to apply for naturalisation stands as a counterpoint to the earlier narratives. A mythical vision of a Hutu identity contingent on retaining the refugee status, which was observed and described by Malkki (1995) and Sommers (2001b), seems to have transformed and the decision of the majority of Burundian refugees to apply for Tanzanian citizenship emphasizes the practical rather than affective aspects of belonging (Kibreab, 2003).

The recent decision of hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees to opt for Tanzanian citizenship, instead of returning to Burundi, indicates that the sense and strategies of belonging have transformed over time. Both the people and their concerns

have changed, and the decision to opt for naturalisation is an evidence of that shift. It is crucial to note that at the time of the intention survey, 78% of refugees were born in Tanzania, and only 22% were born in Burundi (SA3, 2007, p. 17), and this extended time spent in exile was reported as one of the most important reasons for opting for naturalisation in Tanzania. Other markers included lack of trust in sustainable peace in Burundi, acquired familiarity with Tanzania and the Kiswahili language, access to land, better employment and livelihood opportunities, and a mix of personal obligations and aspirations.

As Hannah Arendt observed, finding oneself outside of the tightly organized closed community of nations becomes 'the greatest danger' (1973, p. 294). Burundian refugees' decision to apply for Tanzanian citizenship can be conceptualised as an attempt to reimagine and reconstruct their place in the tightening of the categorical order of nation-states. In her analysis, Malkki (1995) argued that refugees' insistence on their liminality became meaningful as a central element of constructing a collective Hutu identity. According to Malkki (1992), refugees extracted meaning and power from the social location they inhabited, and their insistence on retaining their refugee status functioned as a symbol of the ultimate 'temporariness of exile' (p. 35). Today, in contrast, it is citizenship that has become a way of accessing power and asserting one's identity. Instead of subverting the national categories, Burundian refugees devise strategies for reinventing and reimagining their place in the Tanzanian state as citizens. Naturalisation, however, is not a static, singular event. Rather, as the narratives of Burundian refugees in Tanzania illustrate, it is a long and non-linear process which encompasses elements such as registration, accessing documents, and asserting rights

that come with the new status. This new context requires new conceptual tools to capture the process of evolving citizenship in displacement.

3.2. Key tenets and tensions of citizenship theory

The status of citizenship marks the membership of individuals in a state. Citizens possess a range of civil, political and social rights which are accompanied by a series of obligations to the community and the state. Citizenship, in its aspirational form, leads to securing equal treatment and participation of all in the state. The reality of this ideal, however, has always been different, and the two main tensions in citizenship theory are inequality and exclusion; both between and within states. In the simplest terms, citizens differ from non-citizens in the extent of voting rights, freedom of movement, ability to run for political positions, and ability to own land and property. Ability to exercise these and other rights, however, depends on social and economic resources, which leads to inequality between citizens. In this section, I discuss the origin and key tenets of citizenship theory with close attention to the main tensions in citizenship theory, mainly inequality, exclusion and the divergent views of ‘citizenship as a right’ and ‘citizenship as a privilege’.

Social and political citizenship

Contemporary writing about citizenship presents citizenship as both a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations *and* as an active practice. Bosniak (2006), following Shklar (1995), categorises citizenship in three different ways: first, as a legal

status, which encompasses civil, political, and social rights. In that understanding, a citizen is a legal person acting according to the law and having the right to claim the law's protection. Second, as a state of active engagement in the community, where citizens are political agents actively participating in a society's political institutions. Third, as membership in a political community. Bosniak (2006) expands on the concept of citizenship to include a cultural orientation and a source of a distinct form of identity, including individual identity, collective identity, and social integration.

As J.G.A Pocock's (1992) well-known work demonstrates, the contemporary thinking about citizenship, such as Bosniak's (2006) categorisation, has its conceptual origins in the early Athenian and Roman conceptions, which carried forward to our time. From the Roman model, we derive thinking about citizenship as legal status and the widely shared understanding of citizenship as rights. The Aristotelian view of active citizenship puts at the centre of citizenship's political dimension, emphasises citizens' participation and approaches membership as a practice of collective self-governance. Roman tradition is closely reflected in the work of British sociologist T. H. Marshall (1983), who is best known for his description of citizenship as constituted by a tripartite structure of civil, political, and social rights.

Drawing on the context of post-war welfare state in Britain, Marshall (1983) elaborated a notion of social citizenship, a rights-based model of citizenship under which citizens are entitled to services (such as housing, education, health). Access to services was meant to allow citizens full participation in British society. Marshall (1983) equated community with the nation and viewed membership in that community

as primarily an individual ownership of a set of rights and corresponding duties. Citizenship, in that perspective, is primarily a legal status ascribed to individuals; with rights and benefits given to each by the nation-state. The now normative definition of citizenship by T. H. Marshall is: ‘Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are *equal* [emphasis added] with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (Marshall, 1983, p. 253). This definition of social citizenship remains the foundation for studies of citizenship and social policy.

Marshall’s social citizenship, however, has been criticised for undermining civil liberties and being unable to offer real equality to marginalised groups. Marshall’s critics exposed the tension between civil and social rights, arguing that the universal aims of the welfare state contradicted the individual aims of each citizen. Revi (2014) shows that Marshall was aware of the limitations of this conceptual framework, but ‘nonetheless held the provision of social rights to be a valuable normative project’ (Revi, 2014, p. 454). In other words, Marshall believed that social citizenship, even if difficult to achieve, was a valuable, normative approach worth striving for.

Anthropologists and political scientist have challenged the rights-based approach arguing that meaningful membership is more than the possession of rights and responsibilities. Rather, it is something that needs to be maintained and requires active participation: active citizenship (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Lister, 1997; Mouffe 1992; Oldfield, 1990). This civic republican version of citizenship goes back to Aristotle and can be traced through the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Rousseau,

Hannah Arendt, among others. From Greek times, the participation of citizens in politics was considered essential for creating the sense of community necessary for political life (Fotopoulos, 1997). That participation was mediated ‘not only through voting but also through speech and deliberation’ (Castoriadis, 1992 as cited in Lazar, 2012, p. 340). For those who follow this tradition, citizenship denotes the process of democratic self-government and the practice of active engagement in the life of the political community. In contrast to the liberal tradition which emphasises protecting individual freedoms, the republican model prioritises citizens’ active participation in decision-making.

The different models are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Some elements of each co-exist in the various conceptualisations of citizenship. The differences are created by the aspects (status, rights or participation) that are foregrounded. Understanding the schematic difference between the civic republican version of citizenship and the liberal tradition, however, is helpful for explaining the distinction between the notion of ‘citizenship as a privilege’ and ‘citizenship as a right’. The proponents of the liberal tradition prioritise protection of individual freedoms and rights over active participation and they approach and conceptualise citizenship as a ‘right’. This approach to citizenship has been instrumental in shaping many international laws and ‘the right to a nationality’ is now enshrined in a series of international legal instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). On the other hand, the civic republican version of citizenship emphasizes that citizenship is a privilege that needs to be gained and maintained through various behaviours and practices depending on the context. In that conceptualisation, deprivation of

citizenship through denaturalisation becomes justifiable. In reality, however, the distinction between these two versions of citizenship is not clear-cut. The authorities in power, naturalised citizens and other members of the society can express different and conflicting perspectives on the question of citizenship being a right or privilege and these can overlap and change over time.

Key tensions in citizenship theory

As an ideal, the concept of citizenship evokes virtues of equality in access to rights and political participation among the members of the same polity. The reality, however, has always been different, and the problems of inequality and exclusion constitute the two main tensions at the core of citizenship theory. Despite the claim that liberalism provides universal citizenship to all members of the polity, various disadvantaged groups and minorities have challenged that premise (Kymlicka, 1994). Discrimination based on class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and other criteria exists in most nation-states, and it has always meant that various groups enjoy varying degrees of rights and privileges within the same polity (Wimmer, 2002; Castles, 2005).

Inequality in access to rights and privileges among citizens of one polity has always meant that some people could not be full citizens (Castles & Davidson, 2000). Depending on the country, the result is an internally divided society with differentiated citizenship. Citizenship manifests unevenly across space and time as well as within particular political or social communities, producing what Bezabeh (2011) refers to as ‘graduated citizenship’, characterised by differently-valued positions on a hierarchical

‘citizenship ladder’. Another aspect of inequality of citizenship is that not all citizenships are equally valuable. Tanzanian citizenship or EU member state citizenship offer very different access to visas, travel, employment, scholarships, and benefits. Thus, citizenship is inherently unequal both within and between states.

Inequality of citizenship is exposed by the movement of people and the exclusion of migrants and refugees from citizenship. The growing international movement of people questions the basis for belonging to one nation-state and exposes the inherent exclusionary tendencies of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992; Castles & Davidson, 2000; Bosniak, 2006). From the perspective of movement, national citizenship is not an equalising measure; but rather a mechanism that protects the privilege of the few (Joppke, 2010; Jones, 2016). Brubaker (1992) was the first to articulate the inherent tension in citizenship as both ‘internally inclusive’ and ‘externally exclusive’. Internally inclusive stands for citizenship allowing for only one formally equal membership status within society. Externally exclusive, on the other hand, denotes citizenship’s capacity to exclude all foreigners from equal membership status categorically. Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated that although seemingly contradictory, these two tendencies of citizenship are intrinsically interrelated.

In the context of lived experiences and circumstances of Burundian refugees, these tensions of inequality between citizens of the same country as well as between citizens and non-citizens are exposed and aggravated. The people I worked with experienced exclusion on the basis of their status as ‘refugees’ and their marginalisation manifested itself especially through movement control, lack of ID documentation, and inability to

make political decisions about their immediate surroundings. After being politically silenced for decades, today, former refugees aspire to a normative ideal of citizenship, emphasizing active political participation, mobility and land rights as crucial element of citizenship. Their aspirations, however, need to be seen the local and national context of Tanzania, where many Tanzanian citizens also feel disempowered and disfranchised (Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). Acknowledging these paradoxes and thinking about the situation of the former refugees in the broader, national context is crucial for fully understanding the experiences of displacement and consequently the ways in which former refugees conceptualise citizenship.

Capabilities Approach and citizenship

In order to flesh out the complexities of evolving citizenship in displacement, I turn to Sen's Capabilities Approach (CA). Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, have developed capabilities approach (CA) framework which claims to provide practical and analytical guidance to understand, measure and promote freedom (1993). Capabilities approach proposes that a person's capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. According to Sen (1999), the various kinds of resources we have should never be misunderstood as goals in their own right. Rather, they are needed to achieve certain functionings and to be able to choose between different functionings. The number of potential functionings is unlimited ranging from very basic ones, such as being sufficiently nourished or having access to adequate housing, to complex ones, such as having self-respect or

being able to participate in society (Sen, 1989). The question of the ability to *choose* between different functionings, different kinds of life, is crucial in the capabilities approach and it proves fruitful when applied in the context of my case study.

Although the CA has been broadly applied by philosophers, political theorists and development practitioners, it has only occasionally been applied to issues of citizenship explicitly (see Deakin, 2005; Pfister, 2012). In addition, the broad literature on citizenship has taken up the CA only rarely and, if at all, then mostly with regard to the specific dimension of social citizenship (Pfister, 2012, p. 241). Scholars have pointed out that it is not clear how the CA relates to rights (Deakin, 2005), that the CA does not account for structural inequalities (Lewis & Giullari, 2005) and that it ignores power relations and power struggles which are essential for understanding citizenship (Zimmermann, 2006).

The CA is certainly not a citizenship theory, and this is not how I apply it in this thesis. Rather, I see the strength of the CA approach in its' attention and focus on the different lives people are able to live rather than on abstract conditions. The CA provides concrete tools and markers that reveal how different individuals and groups achieve (or fail to achieve) the functionings they desire. In the context of my case study, the CA is helpful for discerning the differentiation within the Burundian refugee community, for understanding the specific challenges of displacement, and for creating analytical space for individual choices and desires in relation to citizenship. I hold that capability, understood as a freedom to achieve various lifestyles (Sen, 1999, p. 75), is a productive lens for researching the tangible and intangible changes in

Burundian refugees' lives following naturalisation, which would otherwise remain invisible, such as mobility, safety, and ability to plan for the future.

3.4. Citizenship in African Studies

Researchers have examined how state institutions have shaped the construction of political identities as well as the normative content of citizenship in Africa (ed. Hunter, 2016; MacLean 2011; Mamdani, 1996). In many places, institutions that affect people's lives face a crisis of legitimacy and citizens express disillusionment with governments, expressing concern over their lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor (Narayan et al., 2000). In fact, as Hunter (2016) observes, there is a perception that Africa is suffering from so-called 'crisis of citizenship' (p.1). Moreover, many scholars argue that the return of multiparty politics gave rise to new dynamics of inclusion and exclusion which have led to the denial of rights and privileges to those designated as 'strangers' (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent, 2007). Geschiere (2011) observes that the exclusion of 'strangers' and 'migrants' proved to be a fruitful political strategy on a continent where movement has always been the norm and discourses of autochthony become a powerful tool for expression of exclusion and inclusion. It is crucial to highlight that even those who 'enjoy the legal status of citizenship and the political rights that flow from it face difficulties in approaching the state as active citizens engaged in ruling themselves' (Hammar, 2016, p. 1). Thus, inequality between citizens and non-citizens as well as citizens and second-class citizens, is aggravated in many African countries, including Tanzania. These inequalities of citizenship and exclusion strategies are often exposed in relation to land rights.

Land and citizenship are intertwined, both in Western thought, as well as in the more specific African context. According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001), in contemporary Africa, access to rights and ability to exercise political agency are informed by the notion of ‘indigeneity’, which directly links belonging to the land. He argues that these autochthonous discourses are rooted in the colonial tendency to define every citizen as either native or settler. Under colonialism, identity and land became increasingly intertwined (Boas & Dunn, 2013). In Sudan, the distinction between settlers and natives became official, from administration to law. There, ‘native’ were treated preferentially and non-natives were discriminated against in access to land, settlement disputes, and participation in governance (Mamdani, 2001). Upon independence, as Mamdani (2001) contends, Africans seized the legal language of rights and citizenship, but reproduced the colonial mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion.

The contemporary literature on autochthony has been shaped primarily by Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005), Geschiere (2009), Jackson (2006), and Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000). These works explore and try to account for the intensification of the politics of belonging and exclusion, especially in Francophone Africa. The logic of autochthony holds that people can only claim belonging and ownership in places where they can demonstrate some ancestral affiliation (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000, p. 448). Following Mamdani, Patricia Daley (2013) argues that ‘indigeneity’ has become the *de facto* basis for access to citizenship rights in Africa. Migrants’ and refugees’ access to land has become a contentious issue, leading to violent clashes

between the ‘native’ and ‘incoming’ populations in many countries across the continent including Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Kenya (Boas & Dunn, 2013). I argue, however, that there is a risk that this emphasis on autochthony hides other instances and quiet cases of integration, in which autochthony is not the dominant trope through which citizenship or land rights are claimed, as this thesis demonstrates in the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania.

It is crucial to stress here that it is the ‘discourses of indigeneity’ rather than ‘indigeneity’ *per se* that is the crux of the debate. Autochthony is a strategy, not a fact – it is an attempt to reify claims about identity and obscure the dynamic processes of identification (Boas & Dunn, 2013). In the *Politics of Origin* (2013), Boas and Dunn bring attention to the function of land and landlessness in the making of contemporary identity in Africa, and observe how because of its ambiguity and plasticity, the discourses of autochthony are employed to validate claims of belonging and ownership. Boas and Dunn (2013) define autochthony as a ‘discourse that links identity and space and thus allows the speaker to establish a direct claim to a territory by asserting that he or she is an original inhabitant and a son of the soil’ (Boas & Dunn, 2013, p. 2). As evidence shows, the discourses of autochthony are malleable and adjusted to respond to the current political needs and realities (Geschiere, 2009, p. 62).

The denial of a right to citizenship has far-reaching consequences. In fact, as Manby (2009) argues, it lies at the heart of many conflicts in post-colonial Africa. In the book *Struggles for Citizenship* (2009), she discerns a relationship between peace, security, and national citizenship law in seven different countries in Africa. She argues that

political leaders seek to buttress their support among one part of the population, consequently excluding others by abuse and manipulation of citizenship laws. The denial of the rights to citizenship becomes a first step in denial of other rights, and ultimately, such political strategies lead to economic and political struggles, or even war. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) support this argument and show that autochthony discourses have gained strength in connection to the democratisation processes in Africa in the 1990s.

The discussions of autochthony and the importance of land ownership for political belonging are crucial in relation to my case study. 1972 Burundian refugees were given access to land to live and farm on. Over the decades, they strengthened their access to land within the settlements through productive use of land, land transactions, and the recognition of Tanzanian neighbours. Following naturalisation, land became a key marker of citizenship for the former Burundian refugees. In Chapter 6, I explore the strategies that former refugees employ to make claims to land following naturalisation and I argue that the paradigm of autochthony does not capture the concerns of accessing land in this particular context of displacement, which exhibits different characteristics.

3.5. Citizenship as a claim-making process

Anthropologists and other scholars (see Holston & Appadurai, 1996; Lowe, 1996; Lazar, 2012; Ong, 1996; Smith, 2013) have examined how states make citizens under various citizenship regimes and how citizens make themselves as political subjects through practices of claim-making. In this conceptualisation, citizenship as an

analytical category is a practice of articulating claims to rights on the state or other institutions. This can take various forms from refugees making claims on camp authorities (Ilcan, 2014) to slum dwellers making claims to the city through the illegal residence and house building (Holston, 2009). Bloemraad (2016) expands this notion and argues that claim-making can occur between the individual and the state but also between fellow citizens and non-citizens.

Thinking about citizenship as claim-making has its roots in the feminist critique of classical notions of citizenship, which undermined the idea that a private domain exists distinct and insulated from state and law. Thanks to feminist contributions, citizenship has gained substantial release from its conventional association with the traditionally defined public sphere and thinking about what constitutes the domain of political has been expanded (Okin, 1992). The feminist critique also inspired a burgeoning body of literature on acts of citizenship that emphasise that people can engage in citizenship practices even when lacking legal status and political membership (Werbner & Yuval-Davis, 1999).

This mode of analysis disrupts the conventional dependency of citizenship on the statist model, and it expands the boundaries of the concept. The crux of this mode of analysis is that citizenship is something that must be enacted or claimed, and these claims can be made on various institutions, not necessarily the state. In the book *Acts of Citizenship*, Isin (2008) defines acts of citizenship as: ‘Those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new acts as activist citizens (claimants

of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle' (p. 39). Following Isin's earlier work, in the recent *Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies*, Isin and Nyers (2014) define citizenship broadly as an 'institution' mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong.

The idea of substantive citizenship and claim-making as citizenship-making practice has been elaborated by Holston and Appadurai drawing on case studies from the impoverished urban metropolis of India and Brazil. Holston and Appadurai (2003) argue that: 'Struggles over the nature of belonging to the national society [...] are particularly evident in the social movements of the urban poor for rights to the city. They are especially associated with the emergence of democracy because they empower poor citizens to mobilise around the redistributive right-claims of citizenship' (p. 302). These processes of claim-making, as Holston and Appadurai show, are 'unprecedented in many cases because they create new kinds of rights outside of the normative and institutional definitions of the state and its legal codes [...] by affirming access to housing, property, sanitation, health services, education, child care, and so forth on the basis of citizenship' (p. 302). The literature on 'acts of citizenship' is relevant for my case study because it sheds light on what strategies non-citizens and second-class citizens (or, in my case, former refugees) employ to claim rights and what rights are accessible to them.

The result of these struggles is that not only do more people become beneficiaries of socio-economic rights, but also through that experience the very conception of right and citizenship changes. Rights, in that conceptualisation, are not something that

citizens receive and possess; rather, rights become more of a claim upon the world, a 'claim upon society for the resources necessary to meet the basic needs and interests of members rather than a kind of property some possess and others do not' (Holston & Appadurai, 2003, p. 302). The underlying reason why the claim-making processes are successful is based on new urban workers confidence that because they contribute to the public sphere economically, they should be as well allowed to contribute morally and politically.

Contemporary approaches to citizenship increasingly conceptualise everyday interactions as an important domain in which citizenship is manifested (and denied), highlighting a distinction between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship. In this thesis, I use the term 'formal citizenship' to denote the legal-statutory dimensions associated with universalised, formal rights and obligations, as well as citizenship documentation. When I refer to 'substantive' or 'active' citizenship, I think broadly about how 'the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people possess and exercise' (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190). Holston and Appadurai (1996, p. 190) argue that much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from discrepancy between theory and practice of citizenship, where in theory full access to rights depends on membership but in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively is often independent of its formal status.

Although I find the distinction and interaction between formal and substantive citizenship helpful for my framing of citizenship in displacement, I disagree with Holston and Appadurai's (1996) observation that 'formal citizenship is less necessary

for access to substantive rights' (p. 190). Holston and Appadurai (1996) maintain that because in many places in the world institutions that affect people's lives face a crisis of legitimacy, there is an increasing consciousness that for many people, in practice, formal, national citizenship is a meaningless idea (Heater, 1999, p. 3). My findings stand as a counterpoint to this analysis and drawing on the experiences of former Burundian refugees, in this thesis I explore the tangible and intangible benefits of formal, state citizenship and the significance of the materiality of citizenship documents in displacement. Before turning to the discussion of the complex interplay of *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship in displacement, I first outline the contours of the concept of displacement.

3.6. The relational and operational concepts of displacement

Displacement, broadly, is an act, experience or effect of some form of the enforced dislocation of people from their homes, typically because of war, persecution, or natural disaster (Hammar, 2014). As such, the concept has a long history itself, and it constituted the human experience of violent conquest, occupation, enclosure, enslavement, dispossession, forced resettlement, with their profound individual as well as collective consequences (Hammar, 2014, p. 4-5). In recent history, however, displacement emerged as a *concept* and as an object of study. This was linked to humanitarian efforts meant to address the situation of migrations and refugees in the post- Second World War era. Focusing on typologies of causes, and forms of physical dislocation or removal, relocation, and resettlement, an entire humanitarian regime has come into being aimed at protecting or assisting those categorised within this framework (Harrell-Bond, 1986). As Hammar (2014) observes, in that solution-

oriented context, ‘displacement’ has evolved as an *operational* rather than *relational* concept.⁵ In this part of the chapter, I discuss the difference between migration and displacement and define how I understand and use the concept of displacement in this study. Before moving to that discussion, however, I first briefly discuss the legacy of Hannah Arendt’s understanding of causes and consequences of displacement and the origin and context of ‘durable solutions’.

Refugees in the nation-state-territory triad

In *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1973), Hannah Arendt maps out both the process through which refugees were created and the results of this enforced alienation. She points out to how the structure of a tightly organised community of nations where human rights are only realised when one is a citizen is the underlying cause of the suffering encountered by those in displacement. In Arendt’s words, ‘finding oneself outside of the tightly organised closed communities of nations becomes the greatest danger’ (1973, p. 294).

In the field of migration studies, Arendt’s lasting contribution can be located precisely in her identification of the causes and consequences of displacement. Arendt identifies the source of ‘refugeehood’ in the structure of the international order rather than in the direct conditions that force people to migrate. It is crucial here that migration and borders existed before and movement of individuals or whole groups of people for

⁵ *Operational* concept of displacement is understood here as a solution-oriented theorisation of displacement whereas *relational* concept of displacement shifts attention the relations and dynamics that shape the experience of displacement.

political or economic reasons is not unprecedented. What is unprecedented, as Arendt (1973) writes, 'is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one' (p. 293).

Starting from this premise, refugees and migrants lack the citizens' unproblematic grounding within a territorial space which deprives them of access to rights (Soguk, 1999, p. 10). As such, refugees and other migrants are a challenge to the conventional conceptions of membership in the political community (Soguk, 1999) because they do not conform to the definition of citizens as members in a nation-state. In that framework, refugees and other migrants are constructed in contrast to the 'normal', rooted citizen. While the citizen remains rooted in the territorial space, the refugee is seen as uprooted from the community of citizens.

The anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995) was among the first to link the critique of the ties between people and territories to nationalist discourses. In her work, Malkki explores how sedentarist thinking permeates both 'nationalist discourses and [...] scholarly studies of nations, nationalism, and refugees' (1992, p. 25). Taking the metaphor of roots and rootedness seriously, she provides a schematic exploration of how ordinary language reflects taken-for-granted ways of thinking about identity and territory:

Motherland and fatherland, aside from their other historical connotations, suggest that each nation is a grand genealogical tree, rooted in the soil that nourishes it. By implication, it is impossible to be a part of more than one tree. Such a tree evokes both temporal continuity of essence and territorial rootedness (Malkki, 1992, p. 28).

Building on the recent shift in anthropology, Malkki exposes how sedentarism is so pervasive in our thinking that it is almost invisible. It is not just a theoretical observation, as sedentary metaphysics is key in legitimising the international nation-state system and structuring responses to displacement. In other words, seeing the world as rooted and bounded dominates and shapes social practice and policy. In the next section, I turn to a brief discussion of durable solutions and the *operational* understanding of displacement.

Durable solutions

The administrative apparatus that deals with the phenomenon of displacement (often also termed forced displacement or forced migration) as a social and legal category of global dimensions emerged and developed only toward the end of the Second World War (Zolberg et al., 1983). This is not to say that before that people did not migrate and seek refuge, but techniques and processes for managing them did not exist in its modern form. The first formal, global instrument put in place was the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, later supplemented by the 1967 Protocol (Gottwald 2012).⁶ The Convention proposed a definition of refugee, which stated that:

Refugees is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group

⁶ These agreements were a legacy of earlier attempts at Refugee Conventions and earlier agencies with specific mandates (e.g. Nansen's repatriation agreement with Russians back in 1921), however 1951 Convention differed in terms of scale and reach.

or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it [...]

142 states adopted the 1951 Convention and these agreements mandated the United Nation Higher Commission to Refugees (UNHCR) to facilitate what became known as three durable solutions⁷: local integration in countries of asylum, resettlement to third countries, and voluntary repatriation (Gottwald, 2012). In essence, durable solutions are an attempt to rebuild refugees' relationship to a territorial state, and they refer to any measure that ends refugee status for the individuals or groups involved (Yacob-Haliso, 2016, p. 53). It is essential to highlight here that 1951 Convention and UNHCR statutes were shaped by the context of Cold War tensions and reflect the political concerns of that time. For that reason, none of this related to the specific African context and the agreements said almost nothing about voluntary repatriation.

In 1969 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) expanded the existing definition to reflect Africa's history of colonial uprisings and internal political and military uprisings. The primary concern was to establish a definition that addresses a large number of Africans fleeing conflict arising from the struggles against colonialism. The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee

⁷ Although not specifically coined as 'durable solutions' in the 1951 Convention, as this policy term entered into usage only in the 1970s.

Problems in Africa (the OAU Refugee Convention) was enacted in 1969 and came into force in 1974. In result, the definition added an external dimension to the primary internal threats identified in the UN Convention. The OAU proposed that the term 'refugee', besides encompassing the Convention definition, should 'also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality', was forced to 'seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality'. Also, while the 1951 Convention recognised the right of refugees to return to their places of origin, the OAU explicitly stressed that repatriation had to be voluntary.

Tracing the development of displacement as a concept and an object of study, Hammar (2014) exposes the shortcomings of the above conceptualisation of displacement and proposes a *relational* (rather than *operational*) definition of displacement. This is particularly important for the analytical framework I am developing in this chapter because it shifts the attention from solution-oriented theorisation of displacement to the relations and dynamics that shape the experience of displacement. The *relational* understanding of displacement aims to capture the experience of displacement in a holistic way, prioritising the experiences and concerns of migrants and refugees. In the following paragraphs, I define how I understand and apply the concept of displacement in this thesis and I explain the qualitative difference between migration and displacement following Bakewell's (2011) typology.

Defining the contours of displacement

Trying to define the contours of displacement brings us to the heart of theoretical debates at the core of forced migration studies. Forced migration as an academic study emerged only in the 1980s as a multi-disciplinary area. In very broad terms, within the discipline, we can discern two opposing but intertwined trends. On the one hand, some scholars advocate for widening the scope of forced migration to capture other displaced people whose experiences are parallel with those of refugees, such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Cohen, 2004; DeWind, 2007). On the other hand, others call for maintaining a sharp distinction between refugees and other displaced people to maintain the legal protection granted to refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Hathaway, 2007).

Bakewell (2011) suggests that the terms ‘displacement’ and ‘migration’ are often used interchangeably causing semantic confusion. A clear definition of the terms does not solve the underlying debate; however, it provides more accurate terminology that can move the debate forward. Through a detailed mapping of the migration processes, Bakewell (2011) suggests that displacement can be viewed as a particular subset of the broader migration space. For the purpose of this project, it is crucial to outline and clarify the characteristics of displacement because the experience of displacement has had profound consequences on how former Burundian refugees in Tanzania conceptualise naturalisation and citizenship. Drawing on insights from Bakewell (2011), Hammar (2014), Lubkemann (2008), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015) and my own qualitative work, in this thesis I think about displacement as an enforced, complex

and subjective condition of uncertainty which manifests itself through multiple temporalities.

As Hammar (2014) argues, force (enforcement to move and to be unable to move) sets displacement apart from other notions such as migration, transnationalism or mobility more generally (De Bruijn et al., 2001). Thus, the notion of force is critical to the concept of displacement. It is important here, however, that what is meant as force ranges from overt forms of physical violence or threats to life and survival to more subtle and invisible ways in which people are compelled to move. Crucially, this approach also takes into consideration psychological dimensions associated with force (such as fear or desperation).

Another important characteristic of displacement is that it may result in a continuous state of being displaced that can be maintained over time and reproduced through generations. Thus, as Bakewell explains (2011)

Unlike being a migrant, the condition of displacement does not become fixed with the end of movement; it remains an ongoing condition which is concerned with a separation from “home”, the place of origin from which people were compelled to move. It is about not being where one wants to be, and as often described in terms of exile [...] (p. 23).

This means that it is possible for people to be born into the condition of displacement (Bakewell, 2011). Thus, rather than a process, displacement is better understood as a condition or a particular ‘state of being’ (Bakewell, 2011, p. 22).

Thirdly, displacement is a ‘subjective condition which is based not just on one’s history (were you once displaced?) but also one’s ongoing sense of displacement’ (Bakewell, 2011, p. 23). In other words, displacement is not an objective state, but people can perceive themselves as displaced. This means that the condition of being displaced can be separated from personal experience of movement (migration). As Lubkemann (2008) argues “‘refugee studies’ or ‘forced migration studies’ has coalesced and developed around the largely unquestioned propositions that migration is a requisite aspect of ‘displacement’ (i.e. to be ‘displaced’ one must always have moved) and that displacement is inevitably the product of movement under crisis conditions (i.e. if you migrate in a crisis context you will suffer displacement)’ (p. 456). Indeed, as Lubkemann’s work (2008) in the context of Mozambican Civil War demonstrates, some people who experienced the most severe consequences of displacement have never physically moved.

Finally, following Hammar (2014) and others (Brun & Fabos, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 2015; Turner, 2016), I think about displacement in spatial and temporal terms. Spatiality is a necessary but not isolated element of displacement. Movement in any direction, or no direction (stuckness), is always necessarily spatial, and ‘space in itself always matters and is always relational’ (Hammar, 2014, p. 10). This definition of displacement urges us to pay attention to actual and symbolic locations or places,

including those from which people are forced to move and those they move to or are unable to leave (Lubkemann, 2008).

Spatiality intertwines with temporality and displacement needs to be seen through a multi-temporal lens (Hammar, 2014). The experience of displacement can precipitate a changed relationship to time: to the past, and even more so to the future, each affecting relationships with the present (Vigh, 2008). Understanding time changes under conditions of displacement and sustained crisis, which subsequently affects people's ability to plan for and to imagine a future (Vigh, 2008). The lens of temporality requires thinking about displacement as a condition rather than an event, and 'whereas it is relatively easy to know when someone has migrated and when their migration (process) ends, it is never so clear when displacement occurs or when that displacement ends' (Bakewell, 2011, p. 23).

This line of thinking about displacement accentuates uncertainty as an important characteristic of the experience of displacement. In recent studies, El-Shaarawi (2015), Brun and Fabos (2015), Grabska (2015) show how the spatial and temporal aspects of uncertainty are central to the experiences of conflict-induced displacement. Drawing on cases from Georgia, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya and beyond, the authors observe that uncertainty about the future becomes a dominant characteristic of the experience of displacement, generating radical and protracted anxiety. As El-Shaarawi (2015) observes, in some ways, a rhetoric of uncertain future appears to be a tautology. Is not the future always uncertain? However, in the case of exile and displacement, 'perhaps what is important is not the existence of uncertainty but the extent to which uncertainty

becomes the focus of attention in contexts of displacement, with destabilising effects’ (El-Shaarawi, 2015, p. 53). Moreover, the long duration of many conflicts and, by extension, of displacement creates new, liminal spaces in which refugees and IDPs create their lives (Agier, 2008; Horst, 2006; Turner, 2004). The pervasiveness of uncertainty is especially visible in the context of refugee camps, where refugees’ mobility is controlled and their ability to plan is restricted, but it is also experienced by urban refugees and asylum seekers living beyond the boundaries of camps.

In parallel to protracted uncertainty, the existing literature on displacement emphasises displacees’ agency and shows how displacement both disrupts and ‘produces’, causing impossibility and opportunity, loss and gain (Hammar, 2014). These paradoxes lead to a context of significant differentiation, where gender, generational, mobility-related, and socioeconomic differences have an impact on the varying effects uncertainty has on migrants and refugees (Grabska & Fanjoy, 2015; Omata, 2017). In this research, I pay close attention to differentiation in displacement, observing how the opportunities created by naturalisation are unevenly distributed. To sum up, in this thesis I think about displacement as an enforced, complex and subjective condition of uncertainty which manifests itself through multiple temporalities and spatialities. In the next section, I examine how a more expansive understanding of displacement has led scholars to reconceptualise durable solutions and reprioritise restoration of ‘meaningful citizenship’.

3.7. Restoring citizenship in displacement

The trinity of ‘durable solutions’ is essentially predicated on the restoration of a refugee’s status as a citizen. However, in practice, the conventional durable solutions are dominated by technocratic logic where displacement is more about physical dislocation than political exclusion. In contrast, at the core of more radical conceptualisations of solutions to displacement is a recognition that we need to focus on the denial of refugees’ political rights as citizens, rather than continue seeing the ‘refugee problem’ in term of simply physical dislocation. Thus, a unifying thread in progressive scholarship on displacement is the emphasis on restoration of ‘meaningful citizenship’.

Critical approaches to durable solutions

Most of the current critical studies on restoration of meaningful citizenship in displacement focus on the question of repatriation. While the legitimacy of repatriation programmes has been addressed before (Warner, 1994; Harrell-Bond, 1989), return processes have only recently begun to receive systematic normative attention (Bradley, 2008, 2014; Long, 2011; Omata, 2013). These studies rethink the conditions of repatriation, bringing in questions of justice and the social contract. As Bradley (2008) states: ‘The goal of a just return process must be to put returnees back on an equal footing with their non-displaced co-nationals by restoring a normal relationship of rights and duties between the state and its returning citizens’ (p. 286). The studies also foreground the refugee agency and reveal the complexity of decision-making in protracted exile, thus refuting a notion that repatriation is always the ‘ideal’ solution

for the population concerned (Omata, 2013). In practical terms, they encourage conceptualisation and design of responses to displacement that are built on the premise that ‘home’ is a political space where citizenship can be realised (Long, 2013a).

An important contribution to critical approaches to durable solutions has been put forward by scholars who emphasise the notion of mobility as a ‘solution’ to displacement (de Haas, 2010; Crisp & Long, 2010; Maple, 2016; Chatelard, 2010; Capo, 2015). Already in 2003, Van Hear argued for a shift in policymaking to encompass transnational diaspora and their migratory patterns. Capo’s (2015) research with Bosnian and Croatian refugees supports Van Hear’s thesis. She shows how the formation of a transnational social field in refugee diaspora operates as an ‘enduring solutions’ to the condition of displacement (Capo 2015). Crisp and Long (2010) show how it is now increasingly recognised that ‘human mobility provides an important means for people to improve their standard of living and to contribute to the economic and social life of their countries of origin and destination’ (p. 56). Long (2014) argues that migration might even offer a ‘fourth solution’ to complement the conventional solutions of repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. The existing studies question the mutual exclusivity of various durable solutions and advocate for adopting a transnational connections’ perspective. Linked to it are studies that emphasise the importance of refugees’ freedom of movement (Maple 2016) and advocate for facilitating refugees’ mobility to enable them to come up with their transformative solutions. There is growing recognition that refugees’ mobility is a positive asset that can contribute to their lasting protection (Crisp & Long 2010)

and in Chapter 7 I analyse in more detail the significance of mobility in displacement.

Debates about restoration of citizenship in displacement have been especially prominent in relation to the Great Lakes Region and this literature is directly relevant to the case study of Burundian refugees. The case of Burundi, with its continuous cycles of displacement and re-displacement, mirrors broader trends in Africa's Great Lakes region⁸. Since the 1960s, the region experienced successive and multiple civil wars, genocidal violence and forced displacement of at an incomparable scale, and an estimated four million people have lost their lives and a further four million have been forcibly displaced both within and across the borders (Daley, 2006, p. 303; Prunier, 2009). Despite countless peace building interventions and negotiations, the cycles of violence and displacement in the region continue (Stys, 2015). As Daley observes, 'war affected communities are finding it difficult to find safe spaces whether for asylum or within their countries of origin' (Daley, 2013, p. 893).

Between 2008 and 2015 the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) commissioned a series of research case studies in East and Central Africa coordinated by Lucy Hovil and Zachary A. Lomo. The IRRI team collected data and examined conflict and displacement in the light of the crisis of citizenship in the following countries: Tanzania, Burundi, North Kivu, Uganda, South Sudan, Congo and Rwanda. Based on that extensive study, Hovil and Lomo (2015) argue that (in)ability to realise

⁸ The region comprises the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; formerly Zaire), Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda

citizenship is both the cause of and the solution to displacement. They conclude that the roots of continued displacement in the Great Lakes Region are at least partially a result of an endemic and systemic inability of many people to realise citizenship in a meaningful way. IRRI report puts forward an argument that if ‘lacking the benefits of citizenship is one major cause of displacement, ensuring parity in the enjoyment of its benefits is also a solution to the crisis’ (Hovil & Lomo, 2015, p. 40). They argue that the international processes initiated for the region (e.g. the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) never tackled the inability to realise citizenship as an explicit problem (Hovil & Lomo, 2015, p. 48).

What exactly is meant by realising citizenship in a meaningful way in a context of displacement is less clear. From the literature, one gets an impression that the restoration of meaningful citizenship is a state where an individual’s rights can be protected by normal state responsibilities (Haddad, 2008). This is achieved by reestablishment of the former or creation of new ‘social bonds’ between the individual/community and a state. Thus, scholars who emphasise restoration of meaningful citizenship in displacement fall back on a definition of citizenship as full inclusion of individuals in a territorial nation-state, with marginal attention to how the experience of displacement can transform the concept of citizenship itself for the people concerned. I address this gap in knowledge by re-conceptualising citizenship in displacement through the lens of the experiences and narratives of former refugees, seeking approaches that capture the complexity, temporality and uncertainty of citizenship in displacement.

3.8. Citizenship in displacement: De facto and de jure integration debate

The literature on ‘acts of citizenship’ discussed in this chapter shifts the focus from citizenship as legal status to citizenship as participation and ability to integrate despite the lack of legal status. This is not to say that scholars of critical citizenship studies dismiss the value of legal recognition; rather, they accentuate the disruptions that claiming rights by non-citizens causes to the established understandings. Linked with the ‘acts of citizenship’ approach is the debate about the *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship. This literature focuses on people’s ability to integrate and claim rights despite access to formal documentation, and it examines the opportunities and limitations of these processes. This analytical lens has been widely applied by scholars researching the experiences of migrants and refugees who manage to claim rights despite the lack of legal and institutional recognition (see Gasarasi, 1990; Jacobsen, 2001; Polzer, 2008). The lens of *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship has also been applied in the existing studies of the integration and naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Miletzki, 2014; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016). In my research, however, I found that the distinction between *de facto/de jure* fails to account for the experiences of former Burundian refugees and that a more nuanced conceptual understanding of citizenship in displacement is needed. Before critiquing the shortcomings of this approach, I first define the concept of naturalisation and outline the central premise of the *de facto* and *de jure* integration debate.

Defining de facto or de jure integration

This research revolves around the policy of naturalisation of Burundian refugees, and therefore it is important to explain what the term stands for. In a legal sense, naturalisation denotes a straightforward procedure: the admittance of a foreigner to the citizenship of a country. Research has shown that people can integrate without access to formal citizenship, and that documented citizenship often does not guarantee rights and privileges. It is helpful to think about naturalisation as an element on a spectrum of local integration (Hovil, 2014). Understood in terms of durable solutions, the definition of local integration combines three interrelated dimensions (Crisp, 2004): (i) a process of adaptation that enables the refugees to live without fear of discrimination, (ii) an economic process of establishing financially sustainable livelihoods, (iii) a legal process that allows refugees to establish access to employment, services, and rights in the host state. These dimensions can be attained with or without formal citizenship and they should never be seen as static. Rather, they may develop simultaneously, overlap, or could be reversed. In the literature on local integration, scholars distinguish between *de facto* and *de jure* local integration.

De facto local integration is a process where refugee individuals or groups establish belonging at the local level. The success of this type of local integration is largely dependent on the relationship between refugees and the host population in the locality they inhabit (Bakewell, 2000; Jacobsen, 2001). *De facto* local integration takes place on a spectrum, and it can be easily destabilised by external circumstances (Hovil, 2014). On the other hand, *de jure* integration is primarily about national belonging - it

is achieved by renouncing refugee status and obtaining new citizenship in the host country. As such, it is an overtly political and formalised process. In some cases, however, formal citizenship does not translate into integration; especially if local communities do not accept the naturalised refugees and state authorities continue to discriminate against them (e.g. Nubians in Kenya: Balaton-Chrimes, 2014). The crux of these debates is that one can possess formal state membership and yet be excluded (in law or fact) from certain civil, political, or social rights; and one can also have access to an array of rights and remain excluded from formal, legal citizenship.

The perils of 'de facto' citizenship

Cases of mass naturalisation are infrequent, and therefore most of the available literature on citizenship in displacement focuses on *de facto* citizenship, documenting how refugees and migrants integrate despite government and international refugee policy, rather than because of it (Bakewell, 2000; Hovil, 2014). Scholars have been arguing that especially in Africa many refugees integrate without access to formal citizenship, which is secondary to integration at the locality they inhabit (Blitz 2011; Grace, 2013; Balaton-Chrimes, 2014; Whitehouse, 2012). Lucy Hovil (2016) shows how Sudanese refugees living in Uganda's West Nile region were not legally citizens, and yet many were paying taxes and running for political office within the local government structures (p. 26). She argues that for as long as they were perceived to be legitimately Ugandan within the local spaces in which they operated, no one was going to ask for proof or evidence that they are Ugandan citizens. However, such forms of

local legitimacy can be easily destabilised by local, national and global transformations.

One of the threats to *de facto* integration is posed by the growing implementation of biometric identification. The arguments about the *de facto* integration of migrants and refugees often stipulate that since the wider national population does not have access to ID documents or/and passports and ID documents are easily available on the black market, it is easier for migrants and refugees to cross borders, settle, and *de facto* integrate. However, with the increasing securitisation agenda and states' investments in national ID card schemes on the continent (e.g. ECOWAS biometric passports; Smart ID in South Africa, NIDA in Tanzania)⁹, it becomes gradually more difficult to construct secure livelihoods without access to legal documentation. Manby (2016) speculates that these existing strategies and processes of *de facto* integration on the continent are now being undermined by the rapid roll-out of ID programs across Africa, which allow the authorities to differentiate more effectively between the 'members' and 'non-members' of a community.

Threats of biometric identification for 'de facto' citizenship

Ambitious claims are made about the benefits of biometric identification, including increased national security and increased capability to deliver services. At the same time, however, there is almost no focus on the need to resolve underlying questions of who qualifies for the national ID (Manby, 2016). The danger is that in places where

⁹ At least 23 National Identification (NID) programs or programs of similar type have been introduced in African since 2000 compared with only 15 in the four prior decades (Manby, 2016)

people have integrated without securing legal status, a roll-out of strict requirements for documentation (e.g. proving the nationality of one's parents or grandparents) will simply remove access to all the coping strategies that have previously been deployed. This could, consequently, close the buffer zone in which those of undetermined citizenship have operated and create stateless populations (Manby, 2016). In other words, increased securitisation is not necessarily the answer to the lack of legal status. Having more documentation does not immediately translate into more inclusive societies. On the contrary, rapid roll-out of ID programs without clear and reflective criteria can lead to, or even be manipulated for purposes of, marginalisation and exclusion. Thus, the notion that access to *de jure* citizenship is not essential for integration in many African contexts is now being progressively undermined.¹⁰

In Tanzania, the government launched its national identity card program on 7 February 2013 (Appleman & Leiden, 2013). By March 2015, over 6.1 million people had been registered and 1.7 million people had been issued IDs (IRB, 2016). Major controversies emerged from the process, and in 2016 President Magafuli issued a statement that the existing cards are flawed because they lack a visible signature. Despite the controversies, ID cards entered the public sphere and became an increasingly desirable document. With millions of Tanzanians registering for biometric documentation, the 'hiding' strategies of refugees living in urban centres might be exposed. Burundian refugees are acutely aware of these processes, and

¹⁰ This does not mean that black markets for documentation disappear. Rather, rapid implementation of sophisticated biometric certification leads to more criminalised and exclusive illegal citizenship markets, where prices for fake documents rise, fewer players control the trade, and the situation becomes more precarious.

following naturalisation, many of my respondents remarked that they intend to apply for ID cards.¹¹

Beyond de facto and de jure debates

In her PhD thesis, Miletzki (2014) argues that Burundian refugees developed belonging to the host nation and acquired *de facto* citizenship within the confines of the settlements. In line with the ‘acts of citizenship’ literature, Miletzki shows how people in the settlements claim *de facto* citizenship rights on a day-to-day basis in the locality they inhabit. Through her analytical framework, Miletzki (2014) examines the interplay between exclusion from formal, legal citizenship and a sense of local belonging and integration that refugees developed despite the lack of access to formal citizenship. Likewise, Hovil (2016) demonstrates that Burundian refugees before naturalisation successfully integrated on the local level, but they remained isolated from nationally ascribed forms of belonging (p. 82). In contrast, Kweka (2015) maintains that even after naturalisation, Burundian refugees still struggle to negotiate recognition on the local level and are yet to be integrated. She argues that Burundian refugees are not fully accepted by the local population and that the extent of local integration has been exaggerated in the studies of Western researchers and donors. Thus, the existing studies which rely on the *de facto* and *de jure* framework to assess the ‘extent’ of local integration of Burundian refugees provide conflicting and unclear conclusions.

¹¹ At the time of research, ID cards in Tabora region were only available to civil servants, and a major registry for the general population had not yet taken place.

All of the existing research projects about naturalisation of Burundian refugees were conducted prior to the distribution of citizenship certificates, focusing only on a certain point in time on a long timeline of naturalisation. As such, they overlook the aftermath of the distribution of citizenship certificates and the new challenges and consequences that followed. For that reason, the role of *de jure* citizenship for former refugees is ignored in the existing studies. My research addresses these shortcomings by providing a longitudinal perspective which captures the situation both before and after distribution of citizenship certificates; revealing the complex, non-linear and ambiguous process of naturalisation. In the light of my fieldwork, I suggest that the distinction between the *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship is not sufficiently nuanced to capture the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. As I discuss against the evidence in the subsequent empirical chapters, the experiences of former refugees in Tanzania blur the boundary between *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship, or in fact between citizenship and refugee status itself, demanding a different conceptual approach to citizenship in displacement.

3.9. Beyond *de facto* and *de jure* dichotomy

There is a growing body of literature which develops the conceptual work around the different experiences of people who fall between the categories of citizens and non-citizens. Work in that field elaborates new concepts of ‘in-between citizenships’ which aim to capture the realities of people who defy the simplistic dichotomy between citizenship and non-citizenship (Menjívar, 2006; Bosniak, 2008, Nyers, 2006, 2019; McNevin, 2013; Rigo, 2011). Together, the authors expand the understanding of how migrants and refugees, through their experience of migration and exile, create other

categories of being political that fall between citizenship and non-citizenship; creating partial, contested and incomplete citizenships (ed. Squire, 2011).

Aoileann Ní Mhurchú (2014) advances the discussion of exclusion and inclusion as the defining aspects of citizenship. She observes sharply that the politics of citizenship is defined as a clash between particularistic statist ('restrictive') and universal post-statist ('liberal') models of citizenship. Mhurchú points out that these approaches do not capture transgenerational migrants who do not experience either being included or excluded from the state but are caught between citizenship and migration. She calls that state 'ambiguous citizenship'. Her notion of ambiguous citizenship is set within a growing body of literature on different forms of citizenship that blur the boundaries between citizenship and non-citizenship. In his work, Nyers (2019) examines the transformation of 'regular' citizens into deportable 'irregular' citizens by presenting cases of people who get caught up in the deportation apparatus and must struggle to remain in or return to their country of citizenship. Drawing on a case study of Abdelrazik, a Canadian citizen who was falsely accused of terrorism and forced into exile, Nyers distinguishes between revoking someone's citizenship and irregularising it. Rigo (2011) develops a similar argument and invites the reader to think through the paradox of 'illegal citizenship' by pointing out to informal citizenship practices of migrants and refugees which are targeted by restrictive policies. In the same line of analysis, McNevin (2007, 2011, 2012) puts forward a concept of 'undocumented citizens' to capture the experiences of long-term migrants who face threats of deportation. She argues that the demands of 'undocumented citizens' constitute the key contemporary sites of 'the political'.

The conceptual work around ‘ambiguous’, ‘illegal’, ‘irregular’, ‘alien’, ‘undocumented’ citizenships is relevant to the experiences of former Burundian refugees in Tanzania. I argue, however, that the existing conceptual developments do not adequately address the concerns of the people I worked with. Although a lot has been written about citizenship in the context of migration, it is usually grounded in the Western migratory contexts, responding primarily to the concerns to South-North migration. This ignores certain aspects of South-South migration, such as the specifics of political membership in African context and the importance of access to land. Moreover, the existing work on ‘in-between’ citizenships focuses primarily on context of migration. As argued before, displacement as a condition is a subset of migration with specific dimensions and characteristics (Bakewell, 2011). As such, the contexts of displacement and migration present many similar characteristics and they also carry some distinctive challenges and features. Therefore, thinking about citizenship in the specific context of displacement necessitating different conceptual approaches to citizenship which might or might not be adaptable in other contexts of migration, depending on the context.

3.10. Probational citizenship - thinking about citizenship in displacement

This thesis contributes to the understanding of evolving citizenship in displacement by bringing together cross-disciplinary insights from citizenship studies, migration studies and African studies. In doing so, it builds on Marshall’s (1983) normative ideal of citizenship, Sen’s (1999) Capabilities Approach, Arendt’s (1973) analysis of the causes and consequences of displacement, Bakewell’s (2011), Hammar’s (2014) conceptual work on migration and displacement, as well as many contemporary

scholars who explore the possibilities and obstacles of restoring meaningful citizenship for those in displacement, including Bradley (2008), Long (2013b), Omata (2013, 2017), Hovil and Lomo (2015), Hovil (2016), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015). In these efforts, the thesis emphasizes how temporality and uncertainty (inherent in the experience of displacement) become the crucial characteristics of citizenship in displacement.

While working with people who acquired citizenship in displacement, I observed that they experienced an interplay of both safety and anxiety about their citizenship status, which dominated their lives and shaped their actions post-naturalisation. Former refugees I met insisted that benefits of citizenship, including mobility, safety and ability to plan for the future, cannot be attained without access to formal documentation. At the same time, their narratives revealed that citizenship they obtained remains only temporarily fixed - it is aspirational but not quite realised. To capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement, I put forward a concept of 'probational citizenship'. The concept of 'probational citizenship' emerged directly from observations, interviews and conversations conducted during fieldwork. Once I noticed the recurrence of this theme, I developed it further in focused interviews and conversations with primary informants and research assistants. Using narrative measures, I tested if the notion was meaningful and clear for the people concerned.

The notion of 'probation' in probational citizenship, is metaphorical rather than legalistic. According to a dictionary definition, probation is as 'a process of testing or

observing the character or abilities of a person with an objective of making an important decision subjective to their good behaviour under supervision' (Probation, n.d). Former refugees in Tanzania, however, were not put on an official scheme of 'probationary citizenship'¹² and they are not in an officially declared transition period. Nonetheless, the new citizens believe that citizenship can be arbitrarily withdrawn and that their status is ultimately uncertain. 'Probational citizenship', therefore, is not about the official, legalistic nature of their citizenship status. It is more about the practices of the state that induce anxiety regarding their status and consequently how those granted 'probational' citizenship perceive and act on their status.

As such, the meaning of probation in the concept of 'probational citizenship' links to two interrelated discussions. On the one hand, probation links to practices of assessing, judging, valuing. Here, the question is who can be put on probation and how, by whom, and to what effect. The second, performative meaning of probation as a condition and as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The condition of probation is characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation is uncertain, there is no evident end-date, it can be extended or might lead to unwanted or tragic consequences. The underlying conditions and boundaries of 'probational citizenship' are unclear. The recipients believe that it can be withdrawn, but it is unclear how long the probation period is meant to last and who is enforcing it. Although the people I worked with

¹² For example, in 2009, the UK government announced a new proposal advocating for a points-based system for UK citizenship and a system of 'probationary citizenship' before 'full citizenship'. The change of government in 2010 has seen such proposals dropped with the Home Secretary dismissing them as too costly and difficult to implement.

received citizenship certificates, they remain anxious about their rights and the long-term security of their status.

The idea of ‘probational citizenship’ links back to the liberal and civic republican conceptions of citizenship, where, in a very crude, schematic sense, liberals see citizenship as a fundamental right and republicans think about citizenship more as a privilege. Political liberalism envisions a more limited political arena, with ‘greater focus on procedures that would ensure fair, inclusive deliberation about governance and policy’ (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, p. 662). As such, from a liberal point of view, citizenship is a right of the individual and it must be prioritised. The civic republican discourse stresses instead an implicit social contract that demands loyalty to the state. When holding citizenship is construed as a privilege, not a right, it then becomes conditional on a certain standard of behaviour. The concept of ‘probational citizenship’ is grounded in the increasing prevalence of the view that citizenship of migrants and refugees is a privilege that must be earned and that can be withheld if certain requirements and standards of behaviour are not met. The republican discourse on citizenship, naturalisation and denaturalisation allows for the rise of uncertainty and temporality around citizenship status. As such, the right to citizenship becomes contingent and ‘probational’ rather than fundamental. Although the concept of ‘probational citizenship’ is being developed in this thesis directly through the narratives of former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the final chapter of this thesis argues that ‘probational citizenship’ it is not exceptional. Rather, it is becoming increasingly common and it resonates with the circumstances of migrants and citizens in other contexts in the UK and the US.

Conclusion

French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari note that ‘history is always written from the sedentary point of view’ (1987, p. 23). Not only history, but also political theory is shaped by the perspectives of sedentary people, privileging the experiences of belonging to a nation-state over experiences of exile and displacement. Movement, as an alternative approach to understanding the human condition, is sidelined in dominant conceptual frameworks. In result, the existing theories of citizenship fall short of being able to encompass and interpret the experiences of former Burundian refugees in Tanzania as well as others who are seeking to secure citizenship in displacement. This chapter sought to develop a theoretical approach to capture the in-between, uncertain, and ‘probational’ modes of experiencing citizenship in displacement.

The chapter argues that the main tenets of citizenship theory were conceptualised to capture the boundaries of membership within a nation-state; not including or accounting for the experiences of transnational migrants and refugees. Despite the new understandings of citizenship in academia as notoriously polyvalent and multifarious, the conventional state-centred, sedentary understanding of citizenship dominates mainstream political discourses; shaping and structuring the politically feasible responses to displacement. As the social and political debates about belonging and membership of migrants and refugees continue to occupy a central stage across the world, more acumen is needed into how experiences of migration challenge the established tenets of citizenship theory; generating new modes of thinking about political membership and belonging.

In this chapter, I presented an analytical framework that argues that the disruptive experiences of exile and displacement affect how migrants and refugees conceptualise and narrate citizenship. Drawing on the existing literature and insight from my fieldwork, I begin outlining the contours of ‘probational citizenship’ in displacement as a complex, multi-spatial, multi-temporal process characterised by uncertainty and ongoing struggles for recognition. In the following chapters, I show how these complex and often paradoxical views on citizenship unfold in various spheres of former refugees’ lives, including political participation (Chapter 5), access to land (Chapter 6), mobility (Chapter 7), and materiality of citizenship documents (Chapter 8).

4. Methods

Serendipity involves planned insight coupled with unplanned events, core to the philosophy of qualitative research (Fine & Deegan, 1996, p. 445).

This thesis explores how the experience of naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees' views of citizenship, and considers how this can help develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. With this project I aimed to examine how Burundian refugees in Tanzania experienced and interpreted the implementation of TANCOS policy and how it affected their day-to-day lives. As the project progressed, I also began to critically analyse how former refugees' use and treat their citizenship documents, what is the role of mobility in displacement, in what ways do former refugees make claims to land and political representation, and finally how these processes are experienced differently by various individuals and groups.

In order to seek answers to these questions, I chose to rely on extensive, multi-sited anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and informal interviewing. As Leitner and Ehrkamp (2005) remark, migrants' and refugees' perspectives on citizenship are rarely examined in either academic or public policy debates, which concentrate instead on broader legal and political aspects of citizenship changes in national citizenship laws and policies. In my research, I chose an approach that builds on people's views and experiences. Instead of making claims about former refugees'

attitudes towards citizenship from afar, I engaged in observations, conversations, and interviews with the people concerned in order to gain insights into the meaning and value they assign to citizenship. In this chapter, I synthesise questions of research methods and ethics pertinent to this project. Where relevant, I discuss the changes in my approach, decisions I had to make, and alteration to the initial research plans. I explore both the strength and pitfalls of the methods chosen with the awareness that serendipity played an important role in shaping this project, that my decisions were often partial and subjective, and that sometimes there is not a perfect choice to be made.

4.1. Project overview

This research project was conducted in 3 phases between 2014-2017 and took place predominantly in Ulyankulu settlement, Tabora region, and in the city of Dar es Salaam. The project relied on anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and informal interviewing. The qualitative methods included living with the community members, observation of key sites and events such as urban and rural markets, attendance at church services, visits and volunteering in schools, observation of local assemblies, attendance at court proceedings, visits to farming and building plots, attendance at important events such as graduations, weddings etc., as well as individual interviews and focus group discussions. During the three stages of fieldwork I lived in a boarding school in Ulyankulu, with a host family, and in a rented room on the premises of a Catholic church in Kaswa village. The interviews were enhanced by

learning Kiswahili language, periodic and extended visits to the research sites, and repeated meetings with primary informants.

Over all three study periods, I conducted a total of 121 individual interviews and 34 focus group discussions with 136 participants with people living and working in and near Ulyankulu settlements, Urambo town and Tabora city. I have also interviewed 23 people from the Burundian community in Dar es Salaam. In the settlements as well as in Dar es Salaam, I interviewed many people multiple times and the conversations and interactions which inform this study were not limited to the semi-formal interviews. In Dar es Salaam, I also spoke with academics at the University of Dar es Salaam, local and international NGO staff, government officials, and UNHCR staff working both in Tanzania and Geneva. In total, I conducted 18 elite interviews in Dar es Salaam. The interviews with senior government officials and international actors were conducted in English. The interviews in the settlement were conducted by myself in Kiswahili or Kirundi with support of a local research assistant. A few of my participants preferred to speak Kirundi and these interviews were directly translated by my research assistant. I interviewed some people once and others multiple times, building long-term relationships and discussions that continued both in person and online even after the completion of fieldwork in 2017. I had 6 key interlocutors in Ulyankulu settlement and 6 in Dar es Salaam with whom I spoke at length on multiple occasions between 2014-2017.

The long-term duration of this research and repeated visits to Tanzania over time constituted one of the main strengths of this project. Ability to return to Ulyankulu

multiple times allowed me to see the results of mass naturalisation over time. Rather than analysing it at one fixed point in time, I had an opportunity to study the non-linear impacts of policy implementation: with all its' promises, pitfalls, and unexpected consequences. Moreover, multiple visits to the settlements helped me to establish credibility and trust in the community, which is conventionally accustomed to researchers who come once, ask questions, and never return. The long-term scope of this research meant that not only the social and political conditions in the research location have changed over time, but also that my skills and capabilities as a researcher have developed. The repeated visits to the sites helped me to iterate and develop better questions, identify leading themes, establish trust and relationships and most importantly see how the aftermath of naturalisation unfolded over time.

Research stages

I research stage: The first stage of fieldwork for this study was conducted over five weeks between March 2014 and April 2014 in Ulyankulu settlement in Tabora region and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The first week of fieldwork was conducted in Dar es Salaam, and it focused on establishing connections with all significant actors involved in the process of naturalisation, including Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Asylum Access, the UNHCR and the Ministry of Home Affairs. In the following three weeks, I stayed at a Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA) boarding school in Ulyankulu settlement. I began the research by interviewing students and staff at the school, meeting their

families, attending church gatherings, and from there snowballing and expanding my social network. This stage of the research was set predominantly in schools, churches and on tobacco farms. There, I met some of my primary informants and established a friendship with Mr Mtasha who later hosted me and became my research assistant. For the last week of the project, I returned to Dar es Salaam, where I conducted follow-up interviews with government officials and NGO's employees, drawing on insights and questions collected during research in the settlement.

II research stage: A year later I came back to Tanzania to conduct a second stage of my research. Before my arrival, I followed two semesters of an intensive Kiswahili course at the University of Edinburgh. This time I decided to live with Mr Mtasha's family, whom I met on my previous visit and to volunteer in a secondary school where Mr Mtasha's wife (Mama Blessi) worked as a teacher. I stayed in the settlement for five weeks from the end of April 2015 until the end of May 2015, living and working with the host family. I spent the first weeks getting to know the settlement better, cycling to various villages, making friends and focusing more on observations and informal conversations rather than structured interviews. In the latter part of my stay, I conducted unstructured interviews with host family' friends and people I met at the school (from teachers to cleaners and guards). The dominant topics at that time included recent distribution of citizenship certificates, plans for establishing a district of Ulyankulu, population and business growth in the settlement, as well as the political situation in Burundi and the related challenges faced by the repatriates. This second stage of my research was crucial for building relationships and establishing trust.

III research stage: The last stage of the research was the most extensive one, lasting from May 2016 until March 2017. This stage constituted the main part of my fieldwork. It can be divided into three sub-sections:

- i) The first part included preparatory six weeks in Dar es Salaam (May-June 2016), where I followed an advanced Kiswahili course for researchers, applied for a new research visa and research permit, and conducted multiple interviews with relevant government officials and NGOs. Next, I spent a month in Ulyankulu settlement, where I rented a room at the Catholic Parish of Ulyankulu. I began conducting more targeted and focused interviews in each village of the settlement, covering topics of access to land, political inclusion, psychosocial benefits of citizenship, and challenges related to naturalisation. Due to an illness, I had to leave the settlement and travel back to Europe for treatment.
- ii) I returned to Ulyankulu in late September 2016 and continued research there until December 2016. During these months, I was based at the Catholic Church in Kaswa village and I continued collecting data on the same set of questions across the settlement, developing understanding and knowledge of land tenure in Ulyankulu, political structure and conflicts, the history and significance of Tanzanians living in the refugee settlement, as well as family's migration patterns to and from the settlement. Stories and experiences of urban migration became a prominent theme in many interviews and conversations. Following this lead, I decided to conduct the

last months of my research project with Burundian refugees and former refugees in Dar es Salaam.

- iii) The Kariakoo market, where many Burundian refugees trade and do business, was the focal point of my research in the urban zone. I have also established close links with the biggest Burundian Pentecostal church in Dar es Salaam, where many refugees congregate and socialise. Relying on the network of friends and relatives of my research assistant, I have also visited several families from the Old Settlements in their homes in Dar es Salaam.

This research approach resulted in four data sets each with a slightly different focus. My first stage of research (March-April 2014) coincided with the suspension of the naturalisation process and was dominated by profound confusion and uncertainty – both among the refugees and the other state and non-state actors. The interviews at the time were dominated by themes of fear, anxiety, distrust and disappointment. The data collected in 2015, following the implementation of naturalisation, is marked by a sense of hope, promises of development, themes of growth and planning. Other leading themes included political developments in Burundi as well as the related theme of struggles faced by the repatriates. The most detailed and extensive interviews were conducted in 2016, a year after distribution of citizenship certificates when new challenges about naturalisation became apparent. These interviews provide insights on land rights post-naturalisation, local politics and camp governance, and the various challenges and opportunities faced by inhabitants of Ulyankulu following naturalisation. The final part of my research in early 2017 focused on urban refugee livelihoods, the questions of mobility/ immobility, and the feelings of safety and

security attained through access to legal status. The long-term, multi-sited and cyclical nature of this research influenced the data collected, exposing non-linear and paradoxical effects of the implementation of naturalisation. In the following section, I introduce the two main field sites.

4.2. Field sites

Ulyankulu

Between 1972 and 1975, 54,000 Hutu refugees were brought to Ulyankulu in several large groups, including thousands who had lived in the Tanzania-Burundi border area for several years (TCRS, 1984; cited in Malkki, 1995, p. 98). In the settlement, families were granted five and some up to ten hectares of land, as well as financial assistance by the UNHCR. Infrastructure such as roads, schools, water points and administrative centres were established with the help of humanitarian agencies. Refugees had to clear the land and build their own houses on assigned plots. The increased influx of Burundian refugees into Tanzania led to the construction of another settlement, Katumba, built in 1973 in what is now Katavi region (formerly Rukwa). A third settlement, Mishamo, was only built several years later, in 1978, in Katavi region due to deteriorating environmental conditions in Ulyankulu settlement. According to Malkki (1995, p. 39) half of Ulyankulu's population, which had risen to 60,000, was moved to Mishamo after a survey of land and water resources in Ulyankulu in 1977.

All three settlements were located in underdeveloped and remote areas, which were susceptible to environmental challenges such as seasonal draught and floods.




Figure 2. Ulyankulu location and distance from urban centres. Source: Sarkara, M. *Rural Watermarks*, KU Leuven (2018-2019).

Ulyankulu settlement constituted the primary research site for this project. Ulyankulu covers an area of 2112 km², consists of 11 villages and has a population of 53,180 (SA3, 2007). When I first visited Ulyankulu, I was surprised by how vibrant, well-connected, and thriving the place is. The settlement is located in Tabora region, 90km from Tabora town and connected by a dirt road, which is passable most of the year. The region of Tabora lies in the central-western part of the country and it is one of the largest regions by area. According to the 2012 Population and Housing Census (2013), the region had a population of 2,291,623 and the most prominent economic activity in

the region is agriculture. The area of Ulyankulu reflects the broader trends of the region.

The main economic activity in Ulyankulu is farming, and tobacco is the primary cash crop. Prices of tobacco are relatively high, and many tobacco farmers in the settlements were reported to have accumulated substantial wealth. Other crops such as maize, beans, millet, and cassava are grown for subsistence and cash. A plethora of other economic activities, ranging from video and music studios, pharmacies, hairdresser and tailoring salons, restaurants and hostels, flourish in the settlement. With a large marketplace, 15 primary schools, three secondary schools, five dispensaries, one Health Centre, and 32 churches, Ulyankulu settlement has become the second largest urban centre in the district after the district headquarters in Urambo (SA3 2007).



Figure 3. Main market in Ulyankulu, 2018. Credit: Biala, A.

Across the three settlements, 78% of refugees were born in Tanzania, and only 22% were born in Burundi (SA3, 2007, p. 17).¹³ In a livelihood analysis, it was found that the majority of the population (85%) engaged in farming activities, whereas 15% of the settlements' population were pastoralists. The pastoralists were predominantly Sukuma and Nyamwezi origin. They lived in the villages neighbouring the settlements, and they came to Ulyankulu to acquire goods and to sell their meat and dairy products. A small number decided to remain and settle in Ulyankulu, attracted by business opportunities. Thus, Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas have been moving to Ulyankulu settlement for business and trade over the years, and their presence is an important element of integration (more in Chapter 7). At the time of research, the main languages spoken in Ulyankulu were Kiswahili, Kirundi, Sukuma, and Nyamwezi.



Figure 4 Bakery in the centre of Ulyankulu which was opened by a Tanzanian owner, 2018. Credit: Biala, A.

¹³ The last major survey in the settlement was conducted over a decade ago, in 2007, and therefore at the time of writing, in 2018, the figures will be significantly higher.

The settlement of Ulyankulu is characterised by large open spaces, permanent buildings, existing infrastructure and absence of enclosure. The villages within the settlement resemble other villages in Tanzania. What distinguishes Ulyankulu is the presence of the Settlement Officer and the different laws that govern mobility, land ownership and political engagement in the area. Initially, Ulyankulu was governed by the Refugees (Control) Act 1965 (GOT, 1966), which was replaced at a later stage by the Refugee Act 1998 (GOT, 1998). The 1998 Act stipulates that refugees are required to reside in the designated areas, which in effect puts restrictions on the freedom of movement and permits deportation in case an offence is made against the Act. The 1998 Act also indicates that all the land and buildings within the settlement are under the custody of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Paragraph 16 of the 1998 Act). Although today former refugees do not require permission to exit the settlement, land ownership has not been reassigned and the Settlement Officer remains the highest political authority in the settlement.



Figure 5. A boy in front of new houses being built in the centre of Ulyankulu, 2018. Credit: Biala, A.

Camp or settlement?

From its inception, Ulyankulu has been referred to as a settlement. In the language of organisations administering refugees, a ‘camp denotes a temporary¹⁴ or emergency accommodation while a settlement refers to a more permanently settled group of refugees’ (Malkki, 1995, p. 304). In line with this definition, Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba can be classified as settlements. Malkki, however, inspired by the critical point raised by her interlocutors, contests this definition and shows that refugees in Mishamo insist on using the term *camp*. My informants used the terms

¹⁴ This terminology, however, does not reflect reality, as many refugee ‘camps’ are not a temporary emergency measure; rather, they remain open for decades and they grow over the years, turning into cities.

interchangeably, alternating between *kambi ya wakimbizi* (refugee camp) and *makazi ya wakimbizi* (refugee settlement). However, in some contexts, former refugees used and emphasised the word *camp* when they wanted to underline restrictions on freedom of movement and political representation in Ulyankulu. In the thesis, I consistently use the word settlement unless I am quoting or reiterating interviewees who used the term camp.

Dar es Salaam

All the existing studies on the naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania were conducted in the settlements of Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo (Hovil & Kweka, 2008; Hovil & Kweka 2009; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016; Miletzki, 2014; SA3, 2007). Both conceptually and methodologically, the studies focus on the rural context, with its specific livelihood challenges and aspirations. The question of what acquiring citizenship status means for the urban Burundian refugees has been largely overlooked. Yet as my research shows, to understand the effects of naturalisation fully it is necessary to think across the urban/rural divide.

The aim of the naturalisation policy for the 1972 Burundian refugees was to provide a durable solution for the population of the three rural settlement: Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu. Every person I interviewed, however, told me that they have relatives in urban centres. Therefore, the naturalisation policy has also (unintentionally and indirectly) reconfigured refugees' urban lives. Not only some of the Burundians who already lived in Dar es Salaam (and other cities) got access to citizenship, but

naturalisation also facilitated an increased movement out from the settlements. Reflecting on these processes, I realised that in order to develop a complete understanding of the naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, an element of urban fieldwork is essential. The social worlds of my respondents were not limited to the settlements, and by expanding my fieldwork into the city I was able to understand the broader implications of naturalisation, such as the importance of freedom of movement (Chapter 7) and the differences in claim-making processes between urban and rural contexts (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).

In Dar es Salaam, I initially relied on the network of my research assistant Benedict. I met his friends working in the Kariakoo market, visited his family and met his fellow worshippers from the Pentecostal community. Together, we went to various parts of Dar es Salaam (Buguruni, Temeke, Mwananyamala, Sinza) and visited people in their homes. After a few weeks, I established a good relationship with one of the Pentecostal preachers, and I continued to conduct interviews by myself in his parish. I interviewed people from across the urban refugee community, ranging from the very wealthy businessman, professors, activists, street vendors, musicians, to the poorest and most disadvantaged members of the refugee community. The interviews were conducted in formal and informal settings, including peoples' homes, cafes, churches, and offices.

It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive comparison *between* the experiences of naturalisation in the rural and urban setting. Rather, I want to show how the policy which on paper was meant to address the protracted displacement of refugees living *in* Katumba, Ulyankulu and Mishamo, ended up having a crucial urban component. Although my focus remained on the settlements, frequent references of the urban context are an integral part of the thesis.

Churches

For the 1972 Burundian refugees, churches became vehicles that helped them to inhabit and make sense of their new lives in exile. Over the years, churches established and entrenched themselves as the most powerful institutions in the settlements and in 2016, Ulyankulu settlement had 32 registered churches. Both in Ulyankulu settlement and in Dar es Salaam, churches have become crucial points of contact, where I was able to introduce my research, gain trust and meet many different people from the 1972 refugee community. Although I did not plan to conduct my fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in Pentecostal churches, from one meeting to another I realised that many of my interlocutors were part of the same congregation, which happened to be located at a short distance from where I lived. My research assistant, Benedict, introduced me to Pastor Simoni at the Pentecostal Church in Mwananyamala. With time, the church became a place where I was able to meet new people and arrange interviews, which many people preferred to a visit in their house or a meeting in a public space.



Figure 6. A complex of buildings belonging to the Catholic Church in Kaswa village, Ulyankulu, 2018.

In Ulyankulu, the premises of churches are utilised by the community for many purposes, including masses, prayers, Sunday schools, women's groups meetings, microfinance groups meetings, entrepreneurship classes. As such, they created an opportunity for me to meet the same people on regular basis and to conduct focus group discussions. All of my interlocutors went to Pentecostal or Catholic churches¹⁵ and my willingness to join them in mass and other religious celebrations was important for demonstrating my integrity. I initially visited 11 different churches across Ulyankulu, but I only established a relationship with two churches (Pentecostal Church

¹⁵ Only three of all my interlocutors were Muslim and one of them invited me to a service in Ulyankulu's only mosque, where I also had a chance to interview the leader of the Muslim community.

in Kaswa village and the Catholic Church in Kaswa village) where I was formally introduced to the congregation and spoke about my project on stage. Although there is a rivalry between the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches in Ulyankulu regarding who can attract more members and more funds for development projects, there are no hostilities or violence between the different denominations. I was always conscious of potential biases and I was deliberately trying to interview people from both denominations. Although I lived on the premises of a Catholic Church and many of my primary informants were members of that congregation, my research assistants were Pentecostal, and through them I was introduced to the Pentecostal leaders, congregation members and women's groups.

4.3. A note on terminology

On the few occasions when I had an opportunity to speak about my research to a broader audience, I received feedback about the inconsistent use of terminology. 'Why do you mix the terms refugees with new Tanzanian and naturalised refugees? Why do you still use the word refugees at all?' The advice I received was straightforward – you should decide on one term and use it consistently. Unfortunately, I do not think consistency is possible or meaningful in the very peculiar context of my research, where everything, including terminology, is in flux. In this section I want to argue, instead, that context specific use of terminology is necessary.

As the current debates around migration in the Western countries manifest, semantics is a powerful force that can play an important role in shaping migration policy. The

terminology we use can affect public attitudes towards migrants and refugees, it can have an impact on elections, and ultimately lead to implementation of new policies. It is no different in Tanzania, where the various stakeholders invested in TANCOS struggle with the use of terminology in private and public conversations; anxious that a wrong use of words can have a negative impact on the future of this population.

The confusion about the right use of terminology was perfectly illustrated at the validation workshop held by International Rescue Committee (IRC) in March 2017. IRC invited the government of Tanzania, UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and academics to discuss preliminary findings and recommendations on a new local integration report. At the event, every single speaker struggled with terminology and multiple terms were employed to describe the concerned population. The ones I noted included: *Tanzanians, Burundians, Former refugees, Newly Naturalised Tanzanians, Naturalised refugees, New Tanzanians, New citizens, 1972 caseload, 1972 population, Residents of the Old Settlements.*

As the speeches' of the participants at the workshop illustrated, there are many words that can be used to describe the concerned population, and there is no clear consensus on which is the most accurate and adequate. In fact, the question of terminology remains problematic because the 1972 caseload we are referring to is far from uniform. Within that population, there are people who obtained citizenship certificates, those who applied and were rejected, applied and never received their documents, repatriated to Burundi and now returned to Tanzania and live without any documentation, people who never opted for any option and continue to live with a refugee status, mix marriage

couples and their children who were never registered, as well as individuals who over the years fully integrated in urban centres and consider applying for naturalisation as a risk to their already established livelihoods. Being aware of how diverse the 1972 population is, I propose to alternate the use of terminology in ways that reflect people's status and do justice to the specific narratives I am presenting. Moreover, my research incorporates historical narratives, in which I continue using the term refugee, because at the time when the described events occurred, people in the settlements still had a refugee status.

The question of semantics occupies not only the people speaking and writing about the 1972 population – it is also a contested point of debate among the people concerned themselves. In 2016, the leaders of 1972 association in Dar es Salaam initiated an online poll in which people could vote on their preference for a new tribal name they would like to use. For years, the urban refugees disguised themselves as Haa from Kigoma, Nyamwezi from Tabora, or Sukuma from Mwanza. These fake identities became an integral part of their integration strategies, as many learnt the respective local languages and associated themselves with other urban residents from the respective tribes. With the process of naturalisation and their new status as legal Tanzanian citizens, some urban refugees expressed a desire to claim back their original tribe - but what would that be? It is a discussion that sharply divides the community. People argue that Hutu has such negative connotations in Tanzania that they will never be able to use it without risking their own and their family's safety. Continuing to use the names of other tribes that they do not belong to seems inappropriate for some.

Out of these discussions an initiative arose to introduce a new tribe name for all the naturalised refugees from Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu: *Higwe*. The proponents of this idea argue that in absolute terms, they are more numerous than many of the tribes in Tanzania. Moreover, considering that the country has over one hundred tribes and many people do not know the names of all of them, introducing a new tribe should not be a problem and people would not immediately associate them with Burundi. This proposal, in contrast to using the names of other tribes, has the benefit of retaining their identity as former refugees and it also allows to distinguish themselves from Hutu in Burundi that many of them do not wish to identify with. It is a compromise, a quintessential process of reinventing the tradition by introducing a new name that simultaneously contains the history of the group, but is also forward oriented and underlines people's desire to permanently settle and integrate in Tanzania. Until today, however, the new name was not embraced, which leaves me with no other option but to navigate the fluid terrain of semantics to my best ability; with sensitivity and attention to context. In the following sections, I discuss and critically evaluate the research methods used in this study.

4.4. The learning curve of qualitative interviewing

The objectives of this research were to understand how refugees living in the settlement and Dar es Salaam experienced and interpreted the implementation of TANCOS policy, and what impact naturalisation had on their daily lives. The essence of the research revolved around the human experience of a social phenomenon, and therefore I decided to use semi-structured interviews and observations as the central

methods of this research project (see Brettell, 2002). In semi-structured interviews, the new information shared by the participants can be easily integrated into the interview guide and included in the ensuing questions, which significantly enhances the learning process. Longitudinal observations complemented the interviews and allowed for developing better and more relevant questions. In the following paragraphs, I discuss issues of sampling, working with research assistants, documenting, analysing and positionality.

4.4.a. The uneasy: working with research assistants

Although uncomfortable for some and historically omitted in ethnographic accounts, reflecting and writing about this project begins for me with the problematic and rewarding dimensions of working with research assistants. Critical insights from Molony & Hammett (2007), Turner (2010), and Borchegrevink (2003) prepare aspiring researchers for methodological and ethical challenges related to interviewing and working with research assistants. Sanjek (1993) and others expose the deeply problematic colonial legacy of anthropology and problematise the disregarded contributions of research assistants to the discipline of social sciences more broadly. Sanjek (1993, p. 13) argues that problems arise due to our failure to acknowledge and understand the meanings of the dependence of researchers on the people who help them. In this context, both ethnographers and their assistants lose something irreplaceable. Although in my research I did not rely on one key interpreter as some anthropologists in the past did, I still owe the scope and breadth of my analysis to the generosity, curiosity and networks shared with me by my research assistants.

Beyond translation and logistics

Over the years of conducting research in Tanzania, I worked long-term with two research assistants: Issaya Mtasha and Benedict, who helped me with arranging interviews and translating from both Kiswahili and Kirundi. As my Kiswahili improved and I became more settled in Ulyankulu, I worked for two months with Deny Msonge, who did not support me with translation, but he used his network to introduce me to people in and around his village, and he facilitated arranging meetings and home visits. Although at the later stages of my PhD fieldwork my level of Kiswahili allowed me to conduct interviews on my own, I continued working with research assistants, both in Dar es Salaam and in Ulyankulu. I learnt that it was productive to conduct interviews with my assistants, as they understood both my research and the context we worked in and were able to criticise my assumptions and contribute their interpretations.

After the interview, as we travelled back together, shared lunch or tea, went shopping, or simply waited for the next interview, we always did an informal debrief, discussing the interview that just happened. I would reiterate the relevant details of the conversation and share how I interpret them and what I found new, unclear or surprising. My research assistants responded to my questions and doubts with their interpretations, helping me to better contextualise and analyse the findings. Thus, their contribution went far beyond arranging and assisting with translation at interviews. They were the first point of contact I had for testing ideas and deepening my

understanding of the issues I was studying. Their contribution to this project was vital and cannot be emphasised enough.

I paid my research assistants an agreed amount per day or per month which they suggested, and I compared with other local research salaries. In Dar es Salaam, I paid Benedict for a half or full day of work, also covering his travel and lunch expenses. He had many other commitments and was not able to work with me full-time. In Ulyankulu, where I sometimes worked with my assistants on a monthly basis and saw them every day, we agreed on a monthly salary, which, due to their request, was paid in installments. Some payments were made in cash whereas others were done by mPesa (phone money transferring system operating in Tanzania).

Association bias

Throughout the project, I was acutely aware that in any circumstances a research assistant might be associated — by name, appearance, and accent — with a group the respondents either fears or despises (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 193). In Ulyankulu, my priority was to work with people who lived in the settlement and spoke fluent English, Kiswahili, and Kirundi. In Dar es Salaam, I prioritised working with a young person who was comfortable in diverse environments and did not seem threatening to the respondents. Both in Ulyankulu and Dar es Salaam I worked with male research assistants. Although I consciously made efforts to work with one female research assistant, I did not meet a woman who grew up in the settlement, spoke sufficient English, and was free of household and childcare duties to spend the whole days with

me. I am aware of the biases this brings into my study and at the later stages of my research, I made efforts to conduct some interviews and focus groups with women on my own.

My primary research assistant at the early stages of my project in Ulyankulu was Mr Mtasha. Mr Mtasha was a teacher in a primary school and a respected preacher at the local Pentecostal church. He was 43 years old and came from a mixed Tanzanian and Burundian family from Kigoma region. He spoke fluent Kiswahili, English, Kirundi and can carry conversations in Kisukuma. He was posted to Ulyankulu to work as a teacher in the local primary school. Thus, his family did not have a direct experience of displacement. However, his position and the respect with which he was treated in the community facilitated conducting interviews with local village chairpersons, religious leaders, aspiring political candidates, and people in business. Moreover, his mixed background and fluency in various languages opened many doors. For a brief period, I also lived with his family and close association with them was crucial for developing trust with other members of the community. The biases produced by Mr Mtasha's position, however, could not be escaped. I had no control over the intimidating effect he could sometimes have over some respondents due to his position of authority or the potential reservations people from non-Pentecostal churches might have had towards him. We had open conversations about these issues and attempted to mitigate them to our best abilities.

In Dar es Salaam, I worked with Benedict, whom I met in 2014 when he was studying in Dar es Salaam on a UNHCR scholarship. Benedict was born and raised in Katumba, and he decided to establish his life in Dar es Salaam despite his family's recent decision to repatriate. Over the years, I supported him in his study while he supported

me in my research. His networks among the Burundian urban community and his intrinsic knowledge of various parts of Dar es Salaam were invaluable. I met his family, relatives, many of his friends, and together we also travelled to the settlements to understand better the links between urban and rural experiences of naturalisation. Benedict was always very opinionated and critically pushed me to evaluate my assumptions. I was aware, however, that his young age limited our ability to conduct interviews with more senior members of the community.

Moreover, due to his studies and other work, Benedict was often unable to join me during interviews. Despite these limitations, I was reluctant to work with someone else. That made me realise that the amount of trust built with years of knowing each other added value to the interviews in ways that could not be easily substituted by working with a more reliable but less familiar assistant. That person, I thought to myself, would never understand the scope and aims of my work in the same way, and therefore making changes was unproductive. Here, my dependence and attachment to my research assistants, which I always acknowledged and reflected on, was highlighted again.

4.4.b. Sampling

Following Rodgers (2004), I assert the relevance of data generated largely through intensive informal and interpersonal interactions. Rodgers standpoint challenges Jacobsen and Landau (2003) who urge researchers of forced migration to produce more representative data, publish larger data sets and collect data in ways that can be analysed more quantitatively. Rodgers argues that spaces of displacement do not exhibit laboratory-like conditions. Rather, they ‘are defined by social chaos and subversive economies where affected populations experience a profound sense of confusion and disorientation’ (Rodgers, 2004). Approaching these contexts with perfectly designed surveys not only takes away the opportunity from people in displacement to shape the research questions but also it risks missing the defining aspects of the issues we try to study. The informal and everyday nature of the interactions and processes allow us to generate information that in a more participatory way.

At the initial stages of my research, my sampling technique was very much based on luck (see Fine & Deegan, 1996, on serendipity in ethnographic research) and the story of how I met Mama Alice illustrates this. On my first trip to Ulyankulu, I was getting breakfast of tea and *mandazi* at the bus station in Tabora before boarding the bus to Ulyankulu. Alice was sitting next to me, also eating *mandazi* and chatting with the ladies who were cooking. She was an energetic and jovial lady with contagious laughter, and she approached me with a series of questions: Do I like maandazi? What do I think about Tanzania? Am I married? We chatted for a few minutes and when she found out that I was on my way to Ulyankulu she was surprised and promised to come

to visit me there before I left. What I did not know at that point was that Alice was a Burundian refugee who married a Tanzanian man she loved, contradicting the will of her family. We exchanged numbers, and in the next weeks (and then years) I was to hear the details of her life and love story over many more cups of tea. We kept in touch, I met her family, visited her office in Urambo and shared meals. This encounter was typical of the first stages of my research, which were characterised by a collection of lucky coincidences. While I am not saying here that all ethnographic findings are random, I believe that chance is an important component in the collection and interpretation of data (Fine & Deegan, 1996). As Fine and Deegan (1996) observe, ‘unplanned does not suggest that anything is possible, only that a range of things are’ (p. 445). In my data collection and analysis, I embraced the role of chance and throughout the process remained opened and attentive to serendipitous encounters.

As my meeting with Mama Alice illustrated, at the first stages of my research, I was not selective or specific, and I spoke to anyone in and around the settlement who was keen to share their time and story. I spent much time simply ‘hanging out’ (Rodgers, 2004) with people in private and public spaces. I used ‘snowball’ sampling approach to expand my connections (Bernard, 2006). As Jacobsen and Landau (2003, p. 189) point out, unless done very carefully, a snowball selection approach runs a high risk of producing a biased sample. Unlike a random sample, where everyone in the target population has an equal chance of being selected, ‘a snowball sample draws subjects from a particular segment of the community, and they are likely to be similar in certain ways — sharing a social network, for example, belonging to the same religious group or interacting with a particular NGO’ (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 196). In order to

tackle this issue, I developed multiple ‘snowballs’ by establishing connections with many unrelated families from different churches and making a conscious effort to meet new people and then snowball sample from these groups. I initially interviewed all Burundian teachers at VETA school, met their families, their neighbours, went to church with them. Next, I conducted interviews at the churches I visited and was also invited to come to nearby schools where I interviewed staff and teachers. My closest respondents became teachers, church leaders and choir members.

At the latter stages of my research, I began to plan interviews with specific members of the community: I spoke to village leadership in all villages in Ulyankulu, I met the political candidates for district elections, I made conscious efforts to interview more women and young people from various social classes, I scheduled interviews with local judges arbitrating in land disputes, and I also conducted repeated interviews with families affected by long-lasting land disputes. Moreover, I got introduced to and spoke to many Tanzanians who moved into the settlements searching for business and livelihood opportunities. Although at this point I was more selective and specific regarding the profile of the people I wanted to meet and speak with, my research was never randomised, and I still relied on the connections I made in churches, schools, and markets. It is important to highlight that conducting a controlled randomised study was not a desirable approach for the purpose and aims of my research. The open-ended design and sampling and personal connections with people allowed me to keep open the channel for former refugees to shape my research and for critical human connections to be formed.

In its final stages, my research incorporated both approaches. I remained open and attentive to the serendipity and the unexpected encounters and connections that were

the dominant characteristic at the first stages of my research. At the same time, I continued with the more structured and selective sampling, which allowed me to diversify my sample and consciously include people from across the community. At the table below shows, despite my efforts, my interviews remained extremely skewed towards middle-aged men. At the initial stages of my research, the higher percentage of men in my interviews was a result of the gender and positionality of my research assistants, who organised most of the interviews. In the latter part of my research, I organised and conducted many of the interviews on my own but the disproportionately higher amount of interviews with men was an effect of my interest in questions of local politics and land conflict. I decided to interview people in positions of leadership across the villages of Ulyankulu as well as the people involved in land disputes. Most of the individuals in these contexts were men, and this has resulted in having a disproportionately larger number of interviews with male rather than female members of the community. In order to collect sufficient amount of data on the topics governance and land I compromised attention to gender balance in my research. Citizenship, as I discovered, was a very gendered space. I am aware that this could have impacted my findings and I tried to ameliorate it by discussing all my final arguments with the key informants. The tables below illustrate the breakdown of the interviews by gender, age and location (for a full table with information about all the participants, see Appendix 1.).

Table 1. Individual interviews with refugees, former refugees and Tanzanians living in Ulyankulu, Urambo and Tabora.

Age Range	Gender	
	Male	Female
18-30	9	0
30-50	51	23
50+	33	6

Table 2. Participants in focus group discussions and group interviews conducted in Ulyankulu, Urambo and Tabora.

Age Range	Gender	
	Male	Female
18-30	15	12
30-50	40	42
50+	16	11

Table 3. Interviews with refugees and former refugees conducted in Dar es Salaam.

Age Range	Gender	
	Male	Female
18-30	9	1
30-50	9	4
50+	2	1

4.4.c. Mindful interviewing: attentive speaking and listening

Many books have been written on the subject of qualitative interviewing that advise on structuring questions, preparing follow-ups, notetaking and coding (see Roulston, 2010; Brinkmann, 2013). Regardless of the number of qualitative research courses and preparations, most researchers know that interviewing can only be mastered following a painful and often disheartening streak of mistakes. As I became more forgiving towards my own oversights in research, I improved, grew in confidence, and ultimately realised that interviewing is a form of art; and everyone develops their own style and their own pace. In the following, I discuss aspects of qualitative interviewing that help to illustrate how my approach and practice changed over time.

The fieldwork for this project included interviews conducted in very diverse settings. I spoke with the director of the Refugee Department in his freezing air-conditioned office, with the Settlement Officer on a long car ride asking questions between the multiple phone calls he answered, to a parish priest in his church in the unplanned settlement in Dar es Salaam, to a young woman while she braided her daughters' hair, to teachers during their lunch breaks between lessons, to sellers in cafes of the busy Kariakoo market, to farmers as we walked across the rice fields, to patients waiting in line at the clinic, to traders selling cows, to young men in bike shops and hair salons. In all the interviews, regardless of the context, I practised what I refer to as mindful interviewing, a practice focused on attentive speaking and listening. Interviews and conversations constituted the central part of my project and developing a conscious and effective way of interviewing was the most important learning process of this research.

The questions I asked centered around the history of the settlements, the initial land distribution and governance in the settlement, the changes in land access and governance over time, details of the process of naturalisation and repatriation, the reasons behind people's decision to remain in Tanzania, the story of their relatives who returned, what they expected from naturalisation, how they experienced the process of naturalisation, what are their concerns regarding naturalisation, if they and/or their relatives migrated to urban centres, do they have Tanzanian neighbours and what are their relationships, do they intend to remain in the settlements, what, if anything, has changed for them following naturalisation.

In interviews, I sought not only to gather information but to genuinely establish an understanding with the people I spoke to. I made efforts to ensure that interviews were scheduled at times and in spaces convenient for them and that the nature and aims of my project were clear. At the end of each interview an opportunity was made available for respondents to ask questions about me, my family, my life in Europe or say anything else they thought was not sufficiently covered in our conversation. I respected feedback and clues given by my research assistants and did everything not to repeat mistakes, such as scheduling an interview in a cafe where our respondent did not feel comfortable. Throughout the research process, the range of interview questions was frequently adjusted, and my interview guide was often revised to include findings that arose from previous conversations. The long-scope of this project and repeated visits to the field sites resulted in both changes in people's circumstances as well as changes in my aptitude to conduct interviews. Thus, the data sets collected in the different years differ slightly both in content and quality; with subsequent interviews and notes offering more nuance and perspective.

4.4.d. Documenting

I relied on note-taking during most of the interviews, and people often paused while sharing something they thought of special significance to ensure that I wrote it down accurately. I made an attempt at recording interviews and at the beginning of my research, however, all of my participants indicated a preference for note-taking. At the end of each day, I summarised and annotated each interview, adding thoughts and points for further investigation. I have eleven long conversations with primary informants which I recorded and transcribed. In most interviews, however, people I met and spoke to were suspicious and fearful of voice recording, and I relied on note-taking. Although this method was considered more comfortable for my informants, especially at the beginning it was challenging for me to take notes, write down quotes accurately and pay attention to nuance in people's voice and attitude at the same time. With time, I made improvements, and after conducting multiple interviews, I became more familiar with people's narrative styles and more skilled at discerning which responses need a word by word recording and when I need to code relevant information.

I quickly learnt how much one absorbs in a few days of field research and how overwhelming it is to figure out what data is important, what is not, and how to record them in the best possible way (Sanjek, 1990). Following advice from other researchers, I wrote down everything, and I avoided relying too much on my memory. Following Seligmann's (2005, p. 247) guidelines, I organised my field notes into three sections. The first one was a daily entry specifying the individuals involved, the date, and the narrative text. The second section included transcription of the interviews and both

theoretical and practical questions that emerged on that day. The third section included files with photographs of events and places and scans of documents consulted. At the end of fieldwork, I also compiled a table including details of all interviews and focus group discussions conducted with dates and locations.

4.5. Analysing qualitative data

Scholars for a long time have been debating the problem of ‘distortion’ in research which affects both the act of interviewing itself as well as the process of transcribing and editing (Sanjek, 1990). The interview is not a neutral situation where we are given access to the truth about someone or something. Rather, it is always a result of an interaction between interviewer and interviewed. Similarly, while editing and transcribing, we make subjective decisions about narratives that we privilege, statements we use more often to prove our point, and interview quotes that perfectly illustrate our premise. Awareness of how knowledge is produced can lead to questioning the purpose of research altogether. From my perspective, however, the awareness that the discourse of the informant and the discourse of academia are transformed in the interface allows letting go of attempting to reach an authentic, privileged source of knowledge. Ethnographic fieldwork is worthwhile precisely because it allows for academic, theoretical understanding to be challenged and transformed in a confrontation with other, more experiential, understandings.

As Liisa Malkki wrote:

Whenever the anthropologist wants to say that a collectivity holds X belief or Y value, it is necessary either to use statistical and survey methods (with their own well-known limitations) or to make ethnographic generalisations which convince by showing how particular or idiosyncratic observations exemplify wider patterns (1995, p. 56).

Thus, it can be argued that the aim in testing the validity of qualitative research is to convince the reader of the arguments presented. This, however, cannot be done by generalising our data or proving their validity by replication. Rather, generating a strong argument from qualitative data is done by a clear presentation of the research process, consistent use of terms and methods, and demonstration of transparency and thorough understanding of the context.

In my analysis, I read and re-read all interviews multiple times, looking for common themes, questions and puzzles. I critically analysed potential biases of my informants, my research assistant and my own. I highlighted recurring themes and clustered the interviews around them. I assessed the times and places where the recurring themes occurred, comparing them across urban and rural context, education level and gender, thinking about what impact these specific context had on people's answers and what can be learned from it. Next, I wrote summaries and preliminary analysis around the clusters, incorporating relevant quotes and signposting potential contribution. Finally, I organised and I placed former refugees' narratives into text, complementing and juxtaposing it with the existing studies. Using former refugees' narratives as guiding principles for my analysis, I examined how the experience of naturalisation shaped

Burundian refugees views of citizenship, and considered how this can help develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context.

4.6. Ethics, positionality and advocacy

My positionality as a white, female researcher cannot be completely separated from the data I collected. By positionality, I mean a concept articulated by Linda Alcoff (1992) and others, namely that gender, race, class, and other aspects of our identities are markers of relational positions rather than essential qualities (Maher & Tetreault, 1994). Knowledge is valid when it includes an acknowledgement of the knower's specific position in any context (Maher & Tetreault, 1994, p. 118). I have found the lens of positionality (my own and my informants') to be particularly useful in developing a more critical perspective on my research findings. Doing the research, I kept reminding myself that the ideology and value system I inhabit in Europe (which is, to a large extent, feminist, secular, and liberal) has an impact on the questions I ask, perceptions I have, and arguments I develop. In the same vein, the perceptions the people in the settlements have about race, gender, and Western values, were crucial in influencing their attitudes towards me.

Moreover, conducting work among refugees, who directly or indirectly experienced violence and trauma, and currently, live in a state of profound anxiety about their future, necessitated special considerations. Given the precarious situation of the Burundian refugees pre- and post-naturalisation, it was essential to me throughout this project to ensure that my confidentiality and research purpose were abundantly clear. Before every interview, I introduce myself, explained the nature of my work and

outlined the purpose of my research. It was always my priority to ensure that people made an informed decision to participate in the research. Ample time was given for addressing any questions or concerns. Following Malkki (1995), I believe that the success of fieldwork hinges not so much on a ‘determination to uncover “the facts” as on a willingness to leave some stones unturned and to listen to what informants deem important’ (p. 51).

Although I ‘physically’ left Tanzania in June 2017 and I finished my data collection then, I remained in regular communication with my primary informants. I try to resist the language of ‘entering’ and ‘exiting’ fieldwork, creating boundaries between the worlds we live in and do research in, separating them; anxious of potential overlap. Following Taylor (1991), I believe that during research, reciprocal relationships and responsibilities develop that cannot be simply ‘discarded’ with an arbitrary ‘end date of fieldwork’. As ethnographers in the past continued correspondence with their informants via letters, today WhatsApp remains the medium of extending fieldwork and blurring the boundaries between the fieldwork/ post-fieldwork worlds. After leaving Tanzania in 2017, I remained in regular online communication with a few of my primary respondents, who share with me news about their families, health, and future plans. Maintaining relationships with the people I worked with, who trusted me and supported me throughout my research, is an important ethical component of this project.

Graduate students and seasoned researchers alike are often left grappling with a wide range of ethical challenges raised by and throughout their research (see eds. Block, Riggs & Haslam, 2013; Ansoms, Murison, & Thomson, 2013). David Turton (1996) argues that research in contexts of human suffering could only be ethically justified if part of the objective of that research is to help alleviate that suffering. Likewise, Jacobsen and Landau (2003) insist that researchers should ensure that their work is relevant to those agencies and organisations working to improve conditions for refugees and asylum seekers. Various contributors to the edited volume *Values and Vulnerabilities: The Ethics of Research with Refugees and Asylum Seekers* (eds. Block, Riggs & Haslam, 2013) insist that research without advocacy amounts to exploitation. At the same time, however, there has been a strong push against policy-oriented research in refugee and migration studies. Already in 1992, Fuchs wrote about the importance of academic inquiry into migration and refugee matters beyond the immediate policy relevance: ‘Good research in the pursuit of important knowledge is intrinsically valuable. International Migration Review (IRM), while helpful to those of us involved in policy, is not justified only by its usefulness to policy-makers’ (p. 1069). Bakewell (2008) makes the same observation, putting forward a case for ‘policy irrelevant research’ (p. 450). The argument behind this concept is that policy-driven research is limited by the existing policy categories and in result might obscure crucial questions or overlook certain groups and individuals in displacement. On the other hand, by breaking away from policy relevance and limiting categories, research can ‘challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin much practice and in due

course bring much more significant changes to the lives of forced migrants' (Bakewell, 2008, p. 432).

Although under all circumstances I was careful to explain that I was conducting research for a dissertation, my presence in the settlement raised hopes that my work could have a positive impact on the outcomes of naturalisation or at least on people's living standards. The emotional burden that came with the meaning of the space I began to occupy in the settlement dominated my fieldwork experience and shaped my ensuing involvement in multiple development projects in the settlement. Driven by a sense of indebtedness and obligations towards the community, I engaged in writing advocacy pieces for academic and media outlets to expose the incomplete implementation of naturalisation and the vulnerabilities it created. Frustrated by the lack of impact that these engagements were generating, I helped to create Wayair Foundation, a small organisation which today financially support projects and ideas initiated by former refugees in Ulyankulu and offers life-long scholarships for selected students.

Therefore, in my work I try to square the circle. Sharing resources and knowledge to support the initiatives undertaken by former refugees in Ulyankulu, I am giving back in the only way I know to the people whose generosity, openness and kindness helped me to obtain my degrees and build my career. At the same time, however, in the following chapters of this thesis and academic articles published, I try to maintain a belief in policy 'irrelevant' writing, focusing on how this particular case of naturalisation in displacement contributes new insights into theory and practice of citizenship – within and beyond the context of Tanzania.

Conclusion

The objective of my research was to understand how the experience of naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees views of citizenship and to consider how this can help develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. The underlying aspiration was to conduct research grounded in the concerns of the people I worked with. Following this aspiration, I employed ethnographic methods which are the most suited for understanding and addressing the lived experience of individuals and communities. The long-term, ethnographic and periodic nature of this project created additional spaces for learning and a chance to witness the non-linear consequences of naturalisation. In contrast to survey-based work, qualitative interviews allow for establishing relationships, learning about what the informants find important, and adjusting the initial premises and assumptions. During my research, I worked with two research assistants, who became my primary informants. Their networks, positionality and knowledge had a significant impact on all stages of this research from sampling to documentation. I am conscious of the strenghts and biases of their contribution and I recognise it throughtout my analysis.

The process of fieldwork was a challenging journey, which included mistakes, illness, reconsideration of approach, fine-tuning of interviewing techniques, and multiple compromises. A great degree of intuition and reflexivity went into the analysis of my findings. In the following chapters, I present and analyse the narratives and stories that many kind and generous people shared with me over the years.

5. From refugee settlements to settlements of citizens - 'becoming stated' in Tanzania

Refugeehood is an experience of exclusion from politics and inability to find platforms where one's political concerns can be listened to and addressed
(Arendt, 1973, p. 296).

In refugee camps, the administrative apparatus is meant to restrict and discourage refugees' political organisation within the host country. Refugees in a camp are expected to be 'non-political actors' and are usually discouraged by institutions (the host state and humanitarian organisations) from engaging in any political activities (Hanafi, 2010). Despite the existing structural limitations, refugees have been organising themselves in political ways, and the growing literature on refugee camp politics brings attention to various forms of protests, resistance, and claim-making (Ilcan 2015, Agier, 2008; Holzer, 2012). Although there are many studies that discuss refugees' political organisation in camps (Lecadet, 2016; Omata, 2017; Hanafi, 2010), not much attention has been given to a post-camp scenario, in which refugees access citizenship. The case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania allows for contributing to these debates, shedding light on evolving citizenship in displacement and bringing attention to the significance of active and participatory elements of citizenship for the long-term displacees.

In 2018, a decade after the TANCOS agreement was initiated, Ulyankulu settlement remains in a transitional governance phase. New citizens are permitted to vote in

national elections and join political parties, but the Settlement Officer continues to act as the highest authority in the settlement. Although following naturalisation former refugees do not anymore need a special permission to leave the settlement, the Settlement Officer, however, remains in power and for the former refugees his arbitrary presence signifies the incompleteness of the naturalisation process. This chapter demonstrates how the settlement's governance was transformed incompletely; creating a hybrid system where former refugees continue to live under camp governance despite having citizenship. For the people concerned, this creates ambiguous lines of authority and incites uncertainty about the future, defining the experience of 'probational citizenship'. The nature of 'probational citizenship', however, is in essence contradictory, and I show how the new citizens navigate the altered forms of governance and attempt to assert their new status by voting in national elections, joining political parties, and attempting to elect a local councillor. Furthermore, the chapter draws out the discrepancies between urban and rural contexts, pointing out to political invisibility of former refugees in urban centres.

The conversations this chapter builds on center around the topic of governance and politics. Following Fukuyama (2013), I think about governance as 'a government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services' (p. 350). As Fukuyama (2013, p. 350) explains, governance is about execution within the domain of public administration, as opposed to politics or public policy. Politics, on the other hand, as used in this thesis, stands for the process of making decisions that lead to achieving and exercising positions on governance, including the activities of the government, members of law-making organizations, or other people who try to influence the way a

country is governed (*Cambridge Dictionary*, 2008). Discussions with former refugees foregrounded the challenges and grievances relating to the governance of the area. People's struggles to influence the governance of the area they inhabit, however, are very much about involvement in politics. This research reveals that the extent of political incorporation in Tanzania is key to former refugees' conceptualisation of citizenship.

Struggles for recognition go beyond electoral participation, and former refugees I met in Ulyankulu strove to gain political voice and representation within and outside the settlement, despite structural obstacles in place. Their efforts to assert political representation, however, were unsuccessful. In 2015, inhabitants of Ulyankulu were informed that they can select a councillor who will represent them at the district level. Although the election took place, the results were eventually nullified, and the councillor was not appointed. In this chapter, I take forward Arendt's notion of refugeehood as 'inability to find platforms where one's political concerns can be listened to and addressed' (Arendt, 1973, p. 296) and explore how refugees in displacement make claims to political inclusion and representation. The chapter concludes that the ongoing struggles for recognition become an inherent characteristic of 'probational citizenship', where people's attempts to get a political voice are undermined by temporality and protracted uncertainty. This has broader implications, as exclusion from politics leads former refugees to question the validity of their new status. Before moving to a detailed discussion of the opportunities, frustrations and tensions entailed by the transition in settlement's governance, I first discuss the

specific context of the Tanzanian governance system, in which Ulyankulu is embedded.

5.1. Ulyankulu governance in the national context

Contemporary studies of governance in Tanzania (Kelsall, 2003; Gray & Khan, 2010; Pedersen, 2012; Lange, 2008) highlight the difference between how governance in Tanzania is planned on paper and how it operates in practice. Scholars have been arguing that decentralisation in Tanzania is accompanied by increasing central government and line ministry control (re-centralisation), which simply hollows out local people's participation and control (Lund, 2008; Bruce & Knox, 2008; Sikor & Müller, 2009). In the context of this research, it is key to highlight that the administrative organisation of the Old Settlements is embedded in national structures and it needs to be understood as a reflection (rather than an exception) of the broader trends in Tanzanian governance.

Governance in Tanzania: multipartism and decentralisation

The multiparty rule was re-introduced to Tanzania in 1992, after almost 30 years of one-party rule under Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) which has been in power since independence. In 1996, the government officially launched the local government reform, with a goal to 'strengthen the local government authorities with the overall objective of improving the quality and access to public services provided through or facilitated by the local government authorities' (Ngwilizi, 2002, as cited in Lange, 2008, p. 1126). The implementation of the reform was largely donor-funded and

according to Lange (2008, p. 1126), there appeared to be considerable ambivalence at different levels of the Tanzanian state apparatus towards the reform.

In contrast to other decentralisation models (e.g. Mozambique or Cameroon), the government of Tanzania abolished chiefdoms and customary authorities, asserting that they have no place in the official governance system. Tanzania is divided into regions and districts, and each district is divided into administrative wards, which again are divided into villages (more than 10,000 altogether). Villages are divided into *vitongoji* (hamlets) into rural areas and *mitaa* (streets) in urban areas. Each hamlet/street elects a chairperson who becomes a member of the village council. The village government is led by an elected chairman and an appointed, salaried Village Executive Officer (VEO) (Lange, 2008). VEOs are nominated by the village government but appointed by the District Council which is also their employer (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001).




Figure 7. Local government structure in Tanzania. Source: Brockington (2008).

Councillors for the district council are elected at the ward level. Each party nominates a candidate for each ward, as well as candidates for the special ‘women seats’ (one-quarter of all council seats). The councillors meet for the full council meeting four times a year, and for this occasion, the district’s Member of Parliament is also supposed to attend. Local Government Authorities in Tanzania rely on three major sources of funding: own revenues, central government transfers, and development aid (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2000).

Decentralisation makes it less clear where decisions are made, exposing the lack of clear hierarchical structure in bureaucracy. Pedersen (2012) observes that decentralisation challenges the ‘conceptual dichotomy between state and local-level institutions’ (p. 268). The decoupling of layers within the structure of administration leads to a discrepancy between reform promises and reform outcomes. Pedersen relies

on the conceptual framework of decoupling which indicates how strong ideals within a formal organisation may result in a lack of coherence between these ideas and daily practices. Building on a detailed study of land reform, Pedersen (2012) observes that in some cases the local-level village authorities are too weak to establish and maintain projects and institutions on their own, while districts, Ministries and donors seem unwilling to take on responsibility for implementation. In other cases, the latter takes responsibility for implementation, thus overlapping with the local authorities and creating parallel structures. The implication of this is that it becomes unclear who is actually responsible for implementation of projects and it weakens the mechanisms of accountability.

The layered public bureaucracies are also evident in the fiscal dependence of Local Government Authorities (LGAs), which rely on central government's transfers and development aid. LGAs receive directives by the central government on how to utilise funds for certain projects, which contradicts the policy of decentralisation. Pedersen (2012) argues that policy implementation in Tanzania is slow and uneven precisely due to an incoherent administrative structure at all levels. Thus, he concludes that governance in Tanzania should be understood as 'polycentric rather than hierarchical' (Pedersen, 2012, p. 271), involving actors at the local, national as well as the international levels. Other scholars have made similar observations, particularly from the perspective of land management but also in relation to the role of civil society organisations in Tanzania (Green, Mercer & Mesaki, 2013). These insights are key for understanding the administrative structure and governance practices in Ulyankulu settlement.

5.2. The administrative structure of Ulyankulu settlement

In their narratives, the inhabitants of Ulyankulu divide the history of local governance in the settlement into three periods: (I) from 1973 until 1985 when the camp was administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services (TCRS), the implementing partners of UNHCR, which provided aid and basic infrastructure, (II) 1985-2007 when humanitarian organisations were absent, Ulyankulu was divided into wards and wards were represented at the district council by local Tanzanian councillors, (III) and then 2007 until now when the implementation of naturalisation began and the wards of Ulyankulu were cancelled. Below, I briefly outline the characteristics of each phase, setting the scene for a broader discussion of the governance structure post-naturalisation.

1970s- 1985

When the Old Settlements were established in the 1970s, the initial set-up and structure were influenced by Tanzania's national policy of socialism and self-reliance, where both international donors and the national government wanted refugees to become self-reliant quickly through the cultivation of subsistence crops for food needs, and fulfilment of tax requirements by planting cash crops (Daley, 1991, p. 189). In these early years, the settlements were overseen by TCRS (implementing partner of UNHCR) together with MOHA's representative, an appointed Settlement Officer. Ministry of Home Affairs worked together with TCRS to build basic infrastructure, refugee village leaders were selected, and refugees were encouraged to cultivate food

crops and cash crops. According to a TCRS report (1985), the strategy of rural settlements turned out to be a success in terms of production and revenue, and after less than a decade the refugees were deemed self-sufficient.

Daley's research in the late 1980s and my own interviews with the elders in Ulyankulu settlement reveal, however, that humanitarian organisations and the government aimed to establish self-provisioning refugee households within the minimum possible time. Refugees were encouraged to cultivate on allocated plots or to work as casual wage labourers on nearby agricultural schemes, including tobacco-growing farms. The 'self-sufficiency' of the settlements was exaggerated and was always dependent on the seasonal migrant labour of some (usually male) family members and an increased household labour of women (see Daley, 1989, 1991).

1985-2007

In 1985, UNHCR left the management of Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba to the Government of Tanzania. This decision was made based on the fact that, according to UNHCR, the settlements were self-sufficient and able to operate without international assistance. The settlements were then placed under the recently revived local government structure. Subsequently, Ulyankulu was administered as a division similar to other areas in Tanzania, with its own wards and representatives (see the diagram of local government structure on p. 137). As Martin, a leader of the market association in Ulyankulu and a prominent figure in the settlement, recalled:

To familiarise us with the process here, the government brought civil servants who spoke Kirundi (they were Ha, Hangaza people) and they explained to us that now we need to follow the Tanzanian political system of governance. They put the candidates in front and told people to queue behind the one whom they wanted to vote for (int. 2016).

Initially, the newly selected village leaders were people who held positions of authority in Burundi before displacement. With time, as the structure of the settlement developed, people who wanted to contest were required to get support in their village and then propose their candidature in a letter to the Settlement Officer. If approved, the lists were sent back for voting to the village.

This created a situation wherein Ulyankulu had its own administrative system with village governments, but these operated under the authority of the settlement's office. The major difference regarding governance between Tanzanian villages and settlement villages constituted the existence of the settlement's office headed by the Settlement Officer. As Daley (1991) shows on the example of Katumba settlement, although village council membership was exclusive to refugees, 'there was no local autonomy in major decision-making, since the settlement commandant's [Officer] office controlled production, education, commercial activities and law and order, including imposition of penalties' (p. 256). The functions of the village administration, as empowered by the Villages Act of 1975, were never extended to the refugee villages. These were centrally-controlled and on hand-over were transferred from the external agency, TCRS, to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Daley, 1989, p. 246). It is

key to understand that despite the representation at most levels of the administrative hierarchy in the villages, the refugee population was unable to participate in the decision-making process of the settlement.

Refugee leaders were appointed to rule at the village level, whereas three¹⁶ Tanzanian Ward Representatives (also referred to as Councillors, Kiswahili *Diwani*) were representing the people in the district council (Miletzki, 2014, p. 115). The presence of the *diwani* (councillor) was crucial. Although they were not selected from within the refugee community, they represented the needs of the wards (which included both refugees and native Tanzanians), and in people's view, they facilitated the delivery of social services. From the perspective of the people interviewed, having a councillor gave them representation at the district level and prevented the invisibility of the settlements. As explained earlier, the districts allocate the budget through elected councillors, and although the councillor selected for Ulyankulu was a Tanzanian, he served as a representative for Ulyankulu's wards. Interviews in Ulyankulu revealed that people were satisfied with the former councillor, Mzee Kagoma, who has lived in the settlement for decades and was well integrated with the community.

My research assistant knew Mzee Kagoma and he introduced us in 2016. Mr Kagoma came from Kigoma region and initially worked as a tax collector in Ulyankulu before he became a councillor. Tanzanians elected him, but he acted as a representative also for the area that included the settlement, and he was the councillor for the ward of Mirambo from 1994 to 2005. In his own words: 'I am Ha, we resemble Rundi

¹⁶ For the wards of Kanindo, Igombemkulu and Mirambo.

[Burundians], I was bringing development here, maybe building a school or whatever, they came and suspected I am Burundian because I have been helping them here, I convinced the government to allow them to build strong houses'. Although he was not above the messy reality of politics and according to my research assistant he was accused of many instances of corruption, Mr Kagoma's work and advocacy for refugees brought health and education services to the settlement. Former refugees I spoke to saw the removal of the councillor position (which coincided with the inception of naturalisation) as hugely detrimental to their livelihoods.

2007 until 2018

In 2007, following the implementation of TANCOS, the UNHCR re-established its presence in Ulyankulu, and the ward representation at the district level was dismantled. This reversal in the government structure was caused by the initial plan that under TANCOS refugees who opted for naturalisation would be resettled to other regions to Tanzania. UNHCR's reinstated presence was supposed to be a temporary measure which was in line with the original plan of resettling former refugees to other parts of Tanzania. As the plans for resettlement were abandoned, and the process of naturalisation extended over the years, the area remained without a ward representative. Village leaders, however, have remained in place, and they continue to report directly to the Settlement Officer. According to the inhabitants of Ulyankulu, the abolition of the ward representatives had real consequences in terms of the delivery of social services, and it affects both the former refugees as well as the native Tanzanians living in the settlement. In the next section, I explore in more detail the

governance situation in Ulyankulu settlement post-naturalisation and people's perception and interpretation of the current situation.

5.3. Ulyankulu governance in transition

Ulyankulu settlement remains in a transitional phase between the established settlement governance and prospective incorporation of the settlement into the Tanzanian local governance structure. This process, however, has not been planned under the initial TANCOS agreement and there is no clear designated period when it is supposed to be completed. In the following subsections, I show how former refugees experience and interpret this uncertain state and what effect does that have on how they experience and understand their new citizenship status.

From 'refugee law' to 'local law': unfulfilled expectations

The idea of refugee camps as exceptional spaces has been explored by many scholars of forced migration (Agamben, 2005; Agier, 2002; Turner, 2006). Turner (2006) defines the state of exception by the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of camp spaces: 'When a country decides that refugees are a threat to the nation-state, and places them in an exceptional space of a camp, which is at once inside and outside the law, the state of exception is realized (Turner, 2006, p. 760). This creates a paradoxical situation where the space of the camp is simultaneously in the grips of the state (which tries to control and contain the refugee population) and outside the very same state (which excludes and alienates the refugees). In the context of encampment, Agamben

(Agamben, 1998, pp. 37-49) has used the term ‘bare life’ to describe refugees existing outside the polis of national citizens. The notion of ‘bare life’ has been criticised and refuted because it implies lack of agency on the part of the refugees. This is contrary to the evidence which indicates that refugees have been organizing themselves politically within refugees’ camps and beyond (Hanafi, 2010; Ilcan, 2014; Lecadet, 2016; Omata, 2017). What is helpful, however, in the theorisation of refugee camps as exceptional spaces is the idea of the simultaneous existence of camps inside and outside the law. The narratives of former Burundian refugees echo these assumptions and show how this dynamic between exclusion and inclusion is affected by naturalisation.

In one conversation, Aloyze, an elderly former street leader, explained to me: ‘Previously the settlement was governed under the refugee law. The village government existed, but it was under the supervision of the settlement commander. It constituted the chairman, secretary, cell leaders from every road’ (int. 2016). Asked about what will be the difference after naturalisation, he replied: ‘What will be the difference after the transition? Political representatives will be added to the structure’ (int. 2016). Asked to elaborate, he explained that although the village government existed, it was always in one way or another under the supervision of the settlement’s office. The major change, when the process of naturalisation is fully implemented, will be that the village governments will be operating under the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG)¹⁷ rather than under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and that members of their community will be representatives

¹⁷ Although this is the full, official name of that Ministry people often refer to it as the Ministry of Local Governance.

at the district level. My research assistant engaged in the conversation and added that: 'Prior to naturalisation the settlement was governed by special laws applying to refugee areas but that should change after naturalisation' (int. 2016). They both agreed that following naturalisation they are expecting a prospective transition from what they refer to as 'refugee law' to 'local government law'. The same sentiment was expressed in a number of other interviews.

This terminological distinction between 'refugee law' and 'local government law' is telling. It symbolises a shift from one kind of imagined juridical logic to another. This shift entails different kinds of recognition, representation and access to resources (in principle and in practice). The transition from 'refugee law' to 'local government law' in people's narratives demands a different type of political representation, meaning the selection of representatives from the community who can then represent former refugees on the district level and ensure access to development funding coming from the district administration. Here, notions of recognition, representation and resources are intertwined. As Lund (2011) eloquently puts it, 'struggles over citizenship and property are, therefore, as much about the scope and constitution of authority as about access to membership and resources' (p. 72). This distinction highlights that former refugees following naturalisation are making claims to substantive citizenship that goes beyond the formal aspects of naturalisation; arguing for full recognition of their status and political representation from within the community. Frustration regarding the delay in the imagined transition from 'refugee' to 'local government' law concentrates on the figure and presence of the Settlement Officer, who is viewed as a symbolic and physical continuation of the 'refugee jurisdiction'.

The figure of the Settlement Officer¹⁸ has been described and analysed in the earlier studies of the Old Settlements in Tanzania. Both Malkki (1995) and Daley (1989) reiterate stories of the Settlement Officers in Mishamo and Katumba, listing the ample abuses of power. In the absence of other measures of control and lack of contact with other representatives of the ministry as well as the lack of humanitarian organisations on the ground, the role of the Settlement Officer was imbued with disproportional power and influence. Daley shows (1989) how because 'requests for assistance from donors, travel permits, further education and trading licences have to be sanctioned by the Settlement Commandant' (p. 239) it created ample opportunities for exploitation. Likewise, in Mishamo settlement, Malkki (1995, p. 118) observed how her informants used the figure of the Commandant to delineate the separation between themselves and the Tanzanians, underlying their isolation and being governed by 'the other'. Following naturalisation, the Settlement Officer remained in place, despite former refugees' access to citizenship. His continued presence in the settlement provides an easy and immediate target for former refugees' frustrations.

In focus group discussions with members of the village governments, even if not prompted, people always raised the issue of the presence of the Settlement Officer: 'Governance is a problem in the settlement - we still don't follow the Ministry of Local

¹⁸ The use of terminology has changed from Settlement Commandant to Settlement Officer in 1998 Refugee Act. In Kiswahili, however, it remained the same, and people refer to the Settlement Officer as *Mkuu wa Makazi* or just *Mkuu* (literally 'the head of the settlement' or simply 'head'). I use the 1998 Act terminology of Officer, however I keep Commandant and Commander in quotes for pre-1998 sources and when it was used by the interviewees.

Governance, we are still under Home Affairs, and Officer is still in charge as a supervisor of village leaders' (int. 2016). The discussion would often get heated, with people exclaiming: 'Settlement Officer, what kind of work is he doing now?! We fail to understand. It is just like in the past, why is he still here?' (int. 2016). My observations during months of living in Ulyankulu expose that the relationship between the Settlement Officer and the local population is non-transparent; characterised by lack of accountability, unclear rules and lack of predictability. Moreover, the continuity of the Settlement's Office work post-naturalisation has an impact on former refugees' confidence in their new citizenship.

During my time in the settlement, I witnessed multiple instances of the Settlement Officer stepping up to prohibit, control and regulate activities in the settlement. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 6., the Settlement Officer has imposed a temporary ban on construction of buildings in 2016 which directly hindered prospective developments in the settlement. The prohibition was based on a logic that the settlement land has not been de-gazetted and a full transition to local governance is yet to happen. As land use plans are not available for this area, people should not build at random risking that in the future their homes or shops might be demolished. Although people defy and renegotiate the ban, it significantly slowed down developments and investments in the settlement. Former refugees reported as well that the building ban has also led them to question the validity of their new citizenship status.

At a dinner of ugali and fish shared with a well-regarded street leader and a good friend of my host family, Mr. Jean discussed with my host and me the problems of lack of clarity and accountability in the settlement office. He exclaimed:

Three days ago, the Commandant announced that if you build a house with an iron sheet, it won't be demolished. He also said if it is built already, then there is no problem, but if you start building now, it can be demolished, you just need permission. You must ask for a permit to build a house now. But yesterday he said they would be demolished regardless, and now he says you need permission. Commandant says this one day, this another day, he is confusing people (int. 2016).

This statement illustrates how the inconsistencies in the communication from the Settlement's Office confuse people and prevent them from securely investing in their homes.

Another domain in which the Settlement Officer exercises unquestioned authority is control of movement in the settlement (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). Although today former Burundian refugees are allowed to exit and enter the settlements freely, visitors are still required to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs which they need to present to the Settlement Officer upon arrival. The permission to enter the settlement is not enforced consistently and it is mostly applied to foreigners. The process of applying for the permit is expensive and misleading, and as a result, diplomats, potential investors and journalists are discouraged from visiting the three Old Settlements. In principle, Tanzanians entering Ulaynkulu are also

required to apply for a special permit and register with the settlement office, however Tanzanians whom I met persistently defy this regulation. As one Tanzanian man living in the settlement told me: 'This is my country. I do not have to ask his [settlement officer's] permission to be here' (int. 2016).

I spoke with the Settlement Officer of Ulyankulu on many occasions, both in formal interviews in his office, as well as in less formal settings at meals at the parish where I lived. In one interview, he explained to me that his office will remain in operation until: 'All people received citizenship, and all integration projects are implemented' (int. 2016). He continued explaining that the area will remain restricted until local integration is over:

It is estimated to take four to five years, but it is not 100%, it depends on the donors. A lot of programs need to be implemented in order for the Government of Tanzania to decide when they are ready to withdraw. The plan is to improve livelihoods, improve social services, health, water, roads, bus stand, and build a modern market (int. 2016).

When I challenged him, saying that it seems that the donors pulled out from the agreement and the promised integration and development projects might never be funded, he responded: 'If there is no funding for the integration program, we might need to stay here for the next 10 to 15 years' (int. 2016). Until then, as he announced: 'My main task is to maintain peace, order, and security here. Security, law, and order' (int. 2016).

This emphasis on security, law and order translates into decisions and activities that shape how former refugees experience their environment post-naturalisation. The unclear continued presence and authority of the Settlement Officer reinforces former refugees' feelings of uncertainty surrounding their new status. I was puzzled by why the Settlement Officer can persist in his post with so much authority post-naturalisation. To shed light on these processes, I reached out to other academics in Tanzania to understand better why the Ministry of Home Affairs maintains their presence in the settlements and what are the underpinning political reasons for such seemingly crude wielding of power. I had an opportunity to discuss the ambiguities of this governance arrangement with Opportuna Kweka, a well-known Tanzanian scholar and refugee studies expert. In conversations and the subsequent email correspondence, Kweka (2018) explained:

My understanding is that the people belong to the Regional Commissioner, but the land still belongs to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). It is not a common situation. The way I understand it is that the MOHA is still holding the land and that is why they still have a representative [Settlement Officer] there (int. 2016).

To paraphrase, the incomplete implementation of the stipulations of TANSPLI (which intended to change the designation of the area from designated settlement land to village land) justifies the continued presence of the Settlement Officer. In result, both Regional authorities and the Ministry of Home Affairs exercise power over Ulyankulu, leading to overlapping authority structure and stagnation, as it is unclear who is

responsible for what regarding the settlement. This ambiguous governance system undermines people's confidence in their newly acquired citizenship. At their core, however, these processes are inherently paradoxical, and in the next section I show how former refugees claim political voice despite the structural obstacles.

5.4. Electoral politics post-naturalisation

The contested presence of the Settlement Officer does not mean that nothing is changing regarding political incorporation of the Old Settlements. In the following subsections, I show how the distribution of citizenship certificates coincided with national elections, in which the new citizens were invited to cast their ballots. Simultaneously, inhabitants of the settlement were mobilised by the political parties and were encouraged to become members of the existing structures. Finally, I discuss how although the ward election was ultimately cancelled, it organised people in political ways and created platforms for claim-making. The following sections illustrate that participation and representation in local and national politics are the key markers of former refugees' conceptualisation of citizenship despite the prevailing limitations.

Voting

People I spoke to, marked the right to vote as one of the most important aspects of their newly acquired citizenship. It is difficult to convey the excitement that former refugees expressed about being able to go to the polls in the elections of October 2015. Most of these conversations took place in May 2015, during my second visit to

Ulyankulu. At that time, the first round of distribution of citizenship certificates was just completed, and it was a time of joy, hope, and enthusiasm. In the words of a young carpenter: ‘The biggest change considering naturalisation is that people can vote now’ (int. 2015). Although some of the oldest inhabitants of Ulyankulu voted in the 1965 elections in Burundi, for an overwhelming majority this was going to be the first time in their lives to participate in local and national elections legally: ‘It was our first time to vote and to run for political positions, we don’t know much about politics yet, we are new in the election’ (int. 2015).

People told me openly that in the past they travelled outside of the settlements and voted before naturalisation. As a young woman in one focus group explained: ‘We voted before, but it was in secret, and it was dangerous. Now you can vote in peace’. The reason why people participated in elections before was to receive a voting card, which could be used as a form of identification. Following naturalisation, voting obtained another meaning. People I spoke to saw their right to vote as a formal recognition of their new status - a proof of their new citizenship. In that sense, voting has become an important marker of citizenship.

Exercising the right to vote in the 2015 elections came up in many conversations during my research. As one teacher from Ulyankulu Secondary School said: ‘We are so happy to be naturalised, and we can also vote now. Yes, really!’ (int. 2015). On my visit in 2016, I followed up on the topic of the 2015 elections, asking about people’s experiences. Mama Emina, a farmer, entrepreneur, and a founder of a small Pentecostal community, told me: ‘Yes, of course, I voted in the elections, I was the

first one in line in the morning when they opened the voting station! It was an important day' (int. 2016). From her perspective, exercising the right to vote was a confirmation of the validity of the newly acquired citizenship status. This was a point of view expressed by many of the people I met. As an elderly couple told me: 'We love Tanzania, we coming from Burundi, we who escaped war, here all are friends, there is no tribalism, we are very grateful to President Kikwete, he gave us a right to vote' (int. 2016).

It is clear from the literature on democracy in Africa as well as civic engagement around the world that electoral participation is neither the only nor necessarily the most important measure of the exercise of citizenship (Campbell, 2003; Logan & Bratton, 2006; Verba et al., 1995). Citizenship is seen less as a container of rights and obligations and more as a relational concept, a set of practices (MacLean, 2011). This perspective emphasises that simply casting a ballot does not make a citizen. At the same time, however, as Bratton (2013) observes:

The act of casting a ballot in a meaningful election signifies more than the chance to participate in choosing a head of state or a representative to parliament. The voting act conveys human dignity by symbolising that every participating individual is an equal and respected member of a political community. As such, voting is a meaningful step on the road to democratic citizenship (2013: viii).

The underlying symbolic value of voting observed by Bratton (2013) resonates with

my research in Ulyankulu. The experience of former refugees shows that in the context of exile, the relevance of electoral participation has heightened significance as it stands for symbolic recognition of the new membership in a nation-state.

Party mobilisation

Linked to voting in national elections was the process of party mobilisation in the settlement. As Bloemraad (2017) hypothesises, political mobilisation can be seen as an invitation to participate in national politics and in that sense, it is a marker of formal citizenship status. She asks: ‘To what extent does it matter when lots of immigrants become citizens for other societal actors, unions, political parties, interfaith coalitions to then go out and actively recruit them?’ (Bloemraad 2017). This indeed happened in Ulyankulu, where following naturalisation CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi*, the ruling party) has been actively recruiting new citizens to become party members.

Party membership cards became an important form of identification documents alongside the naturalisation papers, and people proudly told me countless times that they: ‘Have already registered to join CCM’ (int. 2015). One lady working at the voters’ registration point in Ulyankulu told me: ‘Only CCM has been campaigning here so far, other parties have not yet, and I do not think they stand a chance here’ (int. 2015). Interviews with other people across the settlement confirmed that: ‘If we vote, we vote CCM. They were in power when our parents came here, thanks to them we are here; we were naturalised. We will vote CCM to show our gratitude, our appreciation’ (int. 2015). Bernard, a former employee of TCRS, remarked: ‘Most

people will vote CCM. It would not be right not to vote for the party that supported you for so long' (int. 2015).

I had an opportunity on many occasions to speak to Tobi, a Tanzanian woman who in the past worked as a secretary for a tobacco company based in Tabora. She befriended a Burundian man, who repatriated a few years ago and left her his house in the settlement. Tobi moved to the settlement and was recruited in June 2015 by CCM to get support for CCM from women in Kaliua district. She admits that in her work, she focuses on Ulyankulu: 'Now we put all of our efforts here because they are important voters. We teach them about the party' (int. 2015). She was proud of the work she has done, and a year later told me that although 'CCM has been struggling to maintain support in the district, Jimbo ya Ulyankulu [Ward of Ulyankulu] is their stronghold (int. 2016)'.

This importance of party mobilisation needs to be seen in a broader context of Tanzania. Emma Hunter writes how following independence, tensions emerged between conceptions of political subjecthood defined by the state and alternative forms of membership offered by churches or Islamic brotherhoods or *tarikas*, or by political organisations such as the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (Hunter, 2015, p. 208). She shows how in early postcolonial Tanzania, there was a tension between a definition of citizenship which was open and one which said that being a good citizen meant being a member of the Tanganyika African National Union¹⁹ (TANU).

¹⁹ The principal political party in the struggle for sovereignty in Tanganyika, formed by Julius Nyerere.

This, as Hunter argues, was ‘solved’ in the system of one-party democracy which gradually evolved after independence and was realised in the first elections under the new system in 1965 (Hunter, 2015, p. 200). She writes extensively on the significance of membership cards and argues that ‘buying a TANU membership card and becoming a member of TANU was an act of registration and incorporation’ (Hunter, 2015, p. 194). This legacy remains strong in Tanzania today, and it is reflected in former refugees’ narratives about their party membership and gratitude towards CCM, which people sometimes interchangeably refer to as ‘Nyerere’s party’, ‘the party that welcomed us’, ‘the party that gave us citizenship’. Considering the historical role of TANU in fostering national membership (Hunter, 2015), the developments in the settlements today can be seen as an extension of that system.

The active mobilisation of former refugees by the party shows that political claim-making is relational – not only former refugees seek recognition by participating in national elections, but also the government strives to win their votes and loyalty under the umbrella of CCM by linking the provision of citizenship with the rule of the party. Although not an even relationship, citizenship represents a relationship between different interest groups. In the current political context of Tanzania, the votes of the newly naturalised refugees are valuable to the ruling party (CCM). As the opposition party (CHADEMA) has strengthened its position in the regions surrounding the settlements (Kigoma, Mwanza), CCM prioritised establishing a stronghold among the naturalised Burundians. Former refugees are aware of this happening, and, as Bernard, a former employee of TCRS and successful tobacco farmer remarked: ‘We are many, we can make a difference, and they know it’ (int. 2015).

To sum up, voting in national elections matters for former refugees because of its symbolic meaning of admittance to the national community and official recognition of their new status. Simultaneously, the electoral support of the new citizens was important for the current government, and therefore granting voting rights to former refugees and incorporating them in existing parties was politically feasible. In contrast to voting, electing representatives became a much more contested and challenging issue, which continues to stir debates in the settlements and beyond.

5.5. Electing representatives: the councillor controversy

Among the former refugees, enthusiasm about political participation is demonstrated on two levels: it refers both to the ability to select representatives and to run for elections. Pascal, an employee of a vocational school, when asked about the consequences of naturalisation, responded: ‘Certificates change a lot. They give us the freedom to move, freedom to vote and to run for political positions (int. 2015). The view that citizenship means not only the ability to vote, but also to hold office is widespread in the settlement, especially among educated men. As one of the priests at the parish I lived at explained: ‘Still some work needs to be done here, we need to get leaders; when we get into politics and local governance, we will feel fully Tanzanian’ (int. 2016). The gender divide is very clear in terms of who is considered an appropriate candidate for the elections. However, women and men put equal emphasis on the general importance of having representatives selected from the community. During fieldwork, I held focus group discussions with women groups and two groups listed electing representatives from the community as their top priority.

From the perspective of the people of Ulyankulu, having a councillor is crucial, because the district government allocates the budget through elected councillors, and it cannot allocate a budget for Ulyankulu's wards if they have no representatives. In a focus group discussion, people explained to me: 'If we do not have a councillor, we do not have anyone to speak for our needs at the district council', 'A big problem that we still have is lack of councillors which means lack of development - there is nowhere where you can take your ideas, no one to listen' (int. 2016). These are really important statements which highlight the significance that meaningful representation has for claiming citizenship in displacement.

In rural areas in Tanzania, the most important decisions, such as planning and budgeting, are theoretically carried out at the district level²⁰ (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2010). In theory, districts are empowered to enact by-laws, raise revenues, and prepare development plans and budgets (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2010). In practice, however, in the planning and budgeting process, the council's role is to accept the plans and budgets prepared by sector heads. A REPOA²¹ report shows that councillors have to follow the central government's directives because they finance most of the public services provided by their council (Chaligha et al., 2007, p. 6). Thus, district councils in Tanzania are ridden by financial problems and are highly centralised. The emphasis that former refugees place on having a councillor at the district level reveals that to

²⁰ At the district level, the council consists of the elected ward councilors, members of the parliament (MPs) representing constituencies within the council, woman representatives, and other MPs whose nomination originated from organs of political parties within the district council jurisdiction.

²¹ Policy and research organisation based in Tanzania.

some extent, they exaggerate the actual impact and participatory nature of this position. As such, the discussion here is more about *political inclusion* rather than about the actual performance of the local government.

These reflections highlight that, to some degree, former refugees idealise the extent of political participation that Tanzanians have in local governance. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the governance structure in Tanzania is multi-layered, with many overlapping authorities and power structures. Research shows that Tanzanians across the country report various degrees of marginalisation and disfranchisement (Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). However, I argue that even though the participatory nature of local Tanzanian politics is sometimes limited, it is still a rather positive comparison to what refugees experienced in terms of political silencing in the settlements for decades. Thus, although former refugees idealise the extent of political participation and power of regular citizens in Tanzania, it needs to be understood in the specific context of their experience of displacement.

Councillor's election and controversy

After the 2015 elections, inhabitants of the villages in Ulyankulu were called to nominate candidates for the position of the ward²² councillors. An election across the villages took place, and candidates were selected. Ultimately, however, the election was cancelled, and a clear explanation for the cancellation was not given to the community. What exacerbated the situation was the news that in Mishamo (one of the

²² A village is the lowest government administrative structure at the community level and rural wards are composed of several villages. The councillor represents the ward at the district level.

three Old Settlement) the election went ahead, and councillors were selected. The lack of transparent communication about the issue sparked fierce debates in the settlement.

When I met Martin, he was just recently appointed as a market leader in Kaswa village. We spoke on a few occasions and discussed and compared practices of local governance in Ulyankulu and beyond. Martin started his career in politics as a street leader, then was appointed by the district council to collect revenue, and afterwards the Ulyankulu business community selected him to be their representative in the business cooperative called '*Umoja wafanya biashara Ulyankulu*'. On top of that, he was appointed to be an advisor to a tax collector in Urambo and Kaliua. In 2015, he competed in the ward elections:

They told us we are allowed to be in politics. I was chosen to contest for CCM in the campaign. Then, however, we were told that our wards were not registered. Now, again, they tell us the wards are registered. But we don't know if they will repeat the elections, or what will happen (int. 2016).

One year later, when I returned to continue my fieldwork, the councillor controversy and its aftermath still occupied an important space in public and private debates. In focus group discussions, former refugees alluded to it every time they wanted to illustrate their struggles for incorporation into the Tanzanian government structures. Besides the very pragmatic concerns of limited access to funding for social services, people's frustration with the cancellation of the election was also linked with a sense of rejection from the government structures, undermining their newly acquired

citizenship. As an inhabitant of Kanindo ward explained: ‘We were told by the government that our rights would be respected, and we will be treated like other people in the country. But the election was cancelled, and we don’t know why. We don’t know when it will be repeated’ (int. 2016). Refugee contexts are fertile ground for rumours (Turner 2004), and people in Ulyankulu keep asking themselves what the meaning behind the cancellation of the ward councilor elections is.

The councillor controversy raises the question of the multidimensionality of citizenship. Although former refugees were mobilised and recruited to vote and join political parties, at the same time, they are not given the rights to establish self-representation. The cancellation of the election generated questions about what rights former refugees have acquired with naturalisation, what rights remain withheld from them, and through what avenues can they claim these rights. Analysing the different dimensions of political inclusion and exclusion faced by former refugees reveals the ambiguity of their status and sheds light on the ‘probational’ nature of their citizenship post-naturalisation. Through the framework of ‘probational citizenship’, I try to capture the inherent temporality and uncertainty of these rights. The boundaries of political participation for former refugees are unclear - no one has explicitly announced that they would not be afforded political representation. Yet, the election was cancelled without an explanation. There is no timeline, no deadline and no defined point in the future when this might change. These arbitrary practices affect how former refugees conceptualise the value of their citizenship, making them increasingly doubtful of their ability to influence decisions which directly affect their lives. In the last section, I discuss the discrepancies in political engagement between urban and

camp settings, drawing out the differences and similarities between the different contexts.

5.6. Refugee politics in urban zones

The 1972 refugee community in Dar es Salaam has an established structure, with existing leaders and operating channels of communication. During the design of TANCOS, the Ministry of Home Affairs consulted some of the prominent leaders and members of the 1972 association. They did not have an active role in formulating the policy itself, but they were approached to share their opinions and represent the perspective of the community on possibilities of repatriation and naturalisation. Although one could argue that they function as political representatives of the 1972 community, in reality, they affiliate only the more affluent urban refugees, who have the social networks and safety nets that allow them to come together without fearing for their security. I acknowledge that this association has traces of a political organisation. However, it never developed a strong presence or an agenda, and there are no plans to take it in that direction post-naturalisation. At the moment, the primary function of the 1972 association is to stay in contact with the Ministry of Home Affairs and inform urban refugees about the dates for the forthcoming rounds of citizenship registration in respective settlements and villages (I discuss these processes in more detail in Chapter 7).

My research in Dar es Salaam shows that besides the 1972 association, refugees and former refugees from the Old Settlements do not engage in local and national politics in Dar es Salaam and they prefer to keep a low-profile. Their complete isolation and

separation from local governance issues stands in stark contrast to people's engagement in and an outspoken contestation of political issues in the settlements. The main reason behind this isolation is that in urban areas, people fear that their identity might be revealed, which could compromise their safety, businesses, or even personal relationships; highlighting the contradictory and multidimensional nature of lived citizenship in displacement.

This perspective must be understood through the lens of urban refugees' strategies of integration and protection. Urban refugees and former refugees established urban livelihoods under the guise of other group identities (Sukuma, Haa, Nyamwezi). Learning the vernacular languages and socialising with these groups have served as a protection mechanism. Engagement in politics can destabilise these arrangements. During the months of living in Dar es Salaam and socialising in the Burundi refugee community, I only met one person who held a position of a street leader and one (very successful businessman) who was encouraged by his friends and neighbours to run for office, but in the last moment decided against it because even to him the risk was too high. The man who secured a position of a street leader in his neighbourhood in Dar es Salaam, told me: 'Right now, I am a street leader at the place where I live! But other people, they don't know. We live by hiding. I am a street leader, and I was a 10-cell leader before. But no one knows where I come from' (int. 2017).

A successful career in politics, as Imani, a refugee from Katumba, explained: 'Can generate envy and competition, and people might seek to uncover compromising information about one's past' (int. 2017). People explained to me in multiple

interviews that when one engages in politics, the risks of attracting attention and creating enemies increase, and these risks offset the potential benefits. Therefore, despite naturalisation, Burundian refugees and former refugees in Dar es Salaam agree that exposing oneself in a political context can potentially put one's family in danger. This view is held across gender and class divides, and as a young, educated woman told me: 'Local politics? No, not in Dar es Salaam. Those who I know, they don't participate in political issues at all. People are scared, it's a way of exposing yourself, and it might become known where you come from' (int. 2017).

The recent process of naturalisation has not reconfigured the established mechanisms of protection, and according to my informants, this will only happen for the next generation. 'Our children', as one lady from Katumba said, 'they can do anything they want. They can go to the army. Be policemen. Work for the government. Or even become a President!' (int. 2017). Future oriented thinking about citizenship became an important thread in many conversations I had in Dar es Salaam, which underlines the temporal quality of evolving citizenship in displacement. Many urbanites admitted that they applied for citizenship because it might prove invaluable in the future. Although they do not act upon their rights on daily basis, they see the prospective value of citizenship as an enabling device for their offspring. For themselves, citizenship is only an additional protection mechanism against harassment or deportation.

Here, citizenship is not about access to services or electoral rights. Rather, it is a protection mechanism with potential future and collective benefits for the next generation. Therefore, from the urban refugee perspective, the political function of

citizenship status in terms of voting and representation matters – but it does not matter today. Today, urban refugees and former refugees find active engagement in politics too dangerous, and they prefer to keep a low profile and believe that the situation will be different in the future.

5.7. Cycles of suspicion: other obstacles to political inclusion

In this section, I address other obstacles to political inclusion in rural and urban areas, namely the direct hostility and suspicion expressed by Tanzanians. My research shows that on top of political and structural obstacles to political integration, former refugees also face discrimination due to their Burundian heritage. The Tanzanian state is not a ‘separate and autonomous entity that is really there and is really powerful’ (Abrams, 1988, p. 63). Rather, states are comprised of myriad social relations, practices, and discourses, as well as individuals with their personal commitments, assumptions, and emotions. Although the Tanzanian government (represented here by the Department of Refugees within the Ministry of Home Affairs) has indeed granted citizenship to refugees, this fact has not been fully accepted by the local authorities. The process of naturalisation was centrally driven by the negotiations between the Director of the Refugee Department and the head of the UNHCR mission. Local authorities from the districts hosting the settlements were not consulted at the initial stages of drafting the naturalisation proposal. Moreover, at the implementation stage of the strategy, local authorities opposed the resettlement of former refugees to other regions of Tanzania. They maintained that resettled former refugees will be a burden on education and health services, that there isn’t available land to host them, and that their presence might lead to insecurity and conflict with the local population. My interviews with low

level civil servants and other government employees in Tabora and Ulyankulu reveal that there is still a pervasive sense of distrust and suspicion towards the new citizens. These various factors are intertwined and reveal important barriers to political integration of naturalised citizens.

The fears of 'Burundian enclave'

The event of cancellation of councillor elections sparked many debates in the settlement among both former refugees and Tanzanians. During my research, rather than focusing only on the 'real' reasons behind the cancellation, I also documented people's ideas and perceptions of these events, as well as the perspective of the Tanzanian stakeholders. Using the event of cancellation of the councillor election as a topic for opening conversations and interviews, I was able to gain new insight into the existing prejudices and doubts. In one conversation about the cancellation of ward elections, one of my primary interlocutors told me that maybe Ministry of Home Affairs heard that people here 'are causing too much trouble and so they should be dispersed. Maybe they are planning to resettle us after all' (int. 2016). Other interlocutors speculated that maybe elections were cancelled because only Hutu candidates (and not native Tanzanians) were nominated for the elections, and therefore the government decided to cancel the whole process. This argument is supported by the fact that Mishamo settlement elected native Tanzanians living in the settlements, and their elections were not cancelled. As the former councillor in Ulyankulu ward proclaimed: 'The new Tanzanians [former refugees] got the tribal spirit and wanted to select one of their own. But our government saw that the winning candidate is

immature in the politics civics of Tanzania, and so in result, they cancelled the elections’ (int. 2016).

This was a very popular explanation among the people I spoke to, and it stirred many debates about the new Tanzanians’ right to representation. In one interview, a participant in a focus group discussion said very openly that he thinks the election was cancelled because ‘we elected a Hutu candidate and that is why we were blocked from participating’ (int. 2016). This perspective is widespread in Ulyankulu, and it touches on crucial questions about the extent to which the government is willing to integrate the new citizens in the administrative and political structures. At the same time, however, some older adults in the settlement believed that young people should show gratitude for receiving citizenship and that political incorporation should not be demanded that quickly. As one elderly lady in a focus group discussion summed up: ‘Citizenship was given to us like grace, so we don’t ask what’s left to be done. Naturalisation came like grace from God; we cannot ask for follow up. If someone gives you ugali with beans, you don’t ask for meat’ (int. 2016).

The underlying argument for excluding former refugees from political representation, as put forward by Tanzanian stakeholders I spoke to, is built on the comparison with North Kivu and Banyamulenge²³ in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The narrative I heard repeatedly is that the former refugees in the settlements should not be given

²³ In more recent decades the term ‘Banyamulenge’ has been used as an ‘omnibus’ label to denote all Tutsi in the pre-colonial territories composing post-colonial North and South Kivu, those who migrated during the colonial period, and the political refugees from the Rwanda revolution during the early 1960s (Court, 2013). In my research, people made the comparison with Banyamulenge due to the role these groups have played in tensions during the run-up to the First Congo War in 1996–7 and Second Congo War of 1998–2003.

too much autonomy at once, because: ‘Tanzanians might one day wake up with a powerful minority in the centre of their own country’ (int. 2016). This analogy resonated with many Tanzanian stakeholders, and one of the people who reiterated this narrative to me was Ken, a manager at a large tobacco company in Tabora.

He has worked for the tobacco company for eight years and prior to arriving in Ulyankulu he lived in Singida. As he said himself, he has ‘a good life, drives a big company car, and has a house in Tabora’ (int. 2016). For work, Ken supervised tobacco farmers, distributed fertilisers, seedlings, and provided technical expertise around Tabora region (including Ulyankulu). Ken was quite vocal about his perspective on naturalisation and he shared it with anyone who wanted to listen:

Regarding naturalisation, I think that it was a good idea to give them citizenship. But not a good idea to let them stay here. They will create their own government, have their own councillor, then district representative, and then before we Tanzanians know, they will have a President. And then Tanzanians will wake up. And we will fight them, and it will seem like its Tanzanians fighting Tanzanians, but really it is us fighting foreigners. That won’t happen now; it will be in 100 years or so. Exactly like what we see in Eastern Congo (int. 2016).

Ken’s point of view was expressed frequently by Tanzanians I spoke to, and the comparison with Eastern Congo, in various alterations, was a recurring theme in many conversations and interviews. These interviews included, among others, a local

UNHCR employee, a civil servant from the Ministry of Home Affairs, a council employee from Tabora, and a wealthy cattle trader from Shinyanga. What is crucial here is that the less personal connection people have with the naturalised Tanzanians, the more antagonistic and adverse views they express about their political integration.

Although a concern about the consequences of naturalising a concentrated and isolated minority has been expressed widely among government officials, there is no existing strategy to address it. On the one hand, the government recognises that inward migration of Tanzanians into the settlements is good for integration, and probably should be supported to counter the fear of a ‘refugee island in the middle of the country’. On the other hand, they are displeased with the clandestine movement of Tanzanians into the settlement and have never issued a statement that would facilitate migration into the area. These conversations give insight into the ambivalence associated with political integrations of former refugees and lack of existing coherent strategy to address this issue. This perpetuates a vicious cycle, where the government is suspicious of the former refugees and it continues to keep them under supervision, and the former refugees cannot completely integrate and trust their citizenship because they are not given autonomy.

5.8. Politics post-naturalisation: recognition, political representation and living in ‘open’ environments

The councillor controversy and the continuing cycles of suspicion shed light on important questions of what is at stake when we speak about former refugees’ political participation and how far the Tanzanian Government is prepared to go in terms of their

political inclusion. The provision of voting rights was a level of inclusion meaningful for the population concerned, and in this case, it was also beneficial from the perspective of the ruling party. However, giving full rights to select representatives to a large and concentrated population of former refugees became a contested issue. As such, the case of Ulyankulu speaks to the broader debates about gradation of citizenship. Migdal (2004) has shown that citizenship is not homogeneous and fixed for all members of the community, rather, it is a 'graduated entity'. This entails the presence of variously situated groups with different legal rights and obligations within a state (Bezabeh, 2011, p. 588). In the context of Ulyankulu, former refugees are considered eligible to vote. However, they are not seen as suited for full political participation alongside native citizens – they are voters, but not yet citizens.

For the former refugees, the essential characteristics of the experience of displacement and encampment were restricted freedom of movement and exclusion from self-governance. Although people in the settlements could appoint village leaders, even that had to every time be approved by the settlement's office. As Malkki (1995) pointed out, it perpetuated a perspective that Hutus are always governed by outsiders – Tutsi in Burundi, Tanzanians in exile. Today, the comparison of the Officer's authority with Tutsi domination in Burundi is less pervasive, but the experience of the acute absence of self-governance remains relevant. As such, the exclusion from engagement in politics (understood as selecting representatives who participate in decision-making about community's concerns) dominated the experience of displacement, and it continues to be an important element of people's world post-naturalisation. What I observed, however, was that due to the experience of political

silencing for decades, former refugees prioritise and emphasise an active and participatory side of citizenship. By trying to assert ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ citizenship, former refugees make claims to politics, understood as having a say in the decisions that affect their lives.

What is at the core of the debates about the political inclusion of former refugees is the question of recognition. The practices of ‘active’ citizenship always occur in relation to some form of validating authority, primarily but not only a formalised central or local state authority (Hammar, 2018, p. 2). Therefore, recognition becomes crucial in validating the processes of claim-making. A lot has been written and theorised about recognition, and a broad Hegelian tradition takes recognition as a fundamental human expression of acknowledgement of the ‘other’ (Fraser, 2001; Taylor, 1994). In this thesis, however, following Lund (2016) and Honneth (1995) I use the term recognition to denote ‘simple legal recognition’ (Honneth, 1995, cited in Lund 2016, p. 1206). Legal here does not mean legalistic, rather, it stands for the recognition of rights by an institution and a reciprocal recognition of its authority by their subjects that can effectively define and enforce the claims as rights (Lund, 2016, p. 1206). In this conceptualisation, recognition refers to recognition of rights to property, rights to belonging and political subjectivity. As Lund (2016) shows, recognition is, in essence, reciprocal, meaning that in exchange for recognised rights (to property, land and other entitlements), people recognise and thus legitimise the political power of the institution (p.1206).

The reciprocal processes of recognition are not stable or fixed, rather, they are relational and negotiated. As the former councillor of Ulyankulu ward, Mzee Shahe

Jumanne Abdullah Kagoma, told me and my research assistant in a long conversation at his shop: ‘This will be a new place when the *Mkuu* [settlement officer] leaves. We will have *Utawala* [governance] like other places. *Tutatambikiwa!* [we will be recognised]’ (int 2016). The continued presence of the Settlement Officer as the highest authority in the settlement perpetuates a sense of non-recognition or rather partial recognition of the former refugees’ right to citizenship. Lund critically points out that ‘rights entailed through recognition as a political subject may be limited or extensive [...] or recognition may entail no rights at all, as the capacity to recognise rights is also the capacity to deny and expunge them’ (Lund 2016: 1206). The mutually constitutive but uneven character of recognition is crucial in this context. Although the majority of former refugees received statutory, formal citizenship, they are still struggling to assert their right to self-representation.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the former settlements, political participation in terms of voting and party membership is actively encouraged by the ruling party. However, at the same time, former refugees struggle to advance their interests through the assertion of representation at the district level, which continues to be seen as ‘out of place’. As Omata (2017) observes, in refugee camps, humanitarian organisations advocate for refugees’ ‘agency’ and ‘participation’ but at the same time discourage refugees’ political activity. The challenges former refugees face in entering the government and gaining recognition mirror the paradoxes captured in Omata’s (2017) analysis. Despite naturalisation, former refugees remain constrained by the same existing biases – voting and party membership are supported because they are seen as

orderly expressions of political participation, whereas claim-making and contestation are actively blocked and equated with ‘troublemaking’ and ‘lack of gratitude’.

One of the leaders of a Pentecostal church eloquently put into words something that recurred in many conversations and captured the importance of active and participatory citizenship: ‘Naturalisation certificates are important because they allow us to move but the opening of this space is crucial and still needs to happen. As long as we still have *Mkuu* [Settlement Officer] and closed space, the process is not complete’ (int. 2015). The phrase ‘opening of this space’ was repeated in many conversations, and it shows how people link the notions of mobility, citizenship and political representation. On the surface, ‘opening of this space’ means only allowing migration to and from the settlements. Hearing this expression in multiple contexts, however, I came to realise that it also conveys a notion that a mobile, open space indicates a space where one’s concerns can be ‘listened to and addressed’ (Arendt 1973: 296). ‘Open space’, as imagined by the people I worked with, stands for a space that is not controlled by an arbitrary settlement office but is governed by people elected from the community.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I outlined the transition in governance from refugee settlements to settlements of citizens, and the kinds of opportunities, frustrations and tensions that such a process entails. My research reveals three major obstacles that the new citizens face in attaining the type of political incorporation they desire. Firstly, the settlement is stuck in a transitional space, where despite naturalisation, the Settlement Officer

remains the appointing authority in the settlement, and there is no clear timeline of when this might change. Secondly, former refugees face discrimination due to their Burundian heritage, which remains a key obstacle for political integration. Finally, former refugees tend to idealise the extent of participation and local representation that regular Tanzanian citizens have. Their emphasis on political participation, however, needs to be understood through the prism of displacement and the experience of the decades of political silencing. Thus, the struggles for recognition and representation are not so much about the efficiency of local governance. Rather, what matters at this point is political inclusion and recognition of their new citizenship status by the government and fellow Tanzanians.

For the former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the experience of displacement was characterised by systematic exclusion from political participation and representation. The people concerned expected that their exclusion from politics would end with naturalisation and they assign outstanding significance to voting and selecting representatives. People I spoke to see voting as a formal recognition of their new status, a proof of their new citizenship. In that sense, voting has become an important marker of citizenship. Selecting representatives occupies a similarly symbolic status, and therefore the cancellation of ward elections reverberated strongly and caused uncertainty in the community. People's frustration should be understood through the prism of the protracted experience of exile. Excluded from the nation-state politics for decades, former refugees equate their newly acquired citizenship with active political participation and representation. From their perspective, the recent insecurities

surrounding councillor elections undermine the validity of their new status, exposing the ‘probational’ character of their citizenship.

Conversations with Tanzanian authorities provided insight into the ambivalence associated with political integrations of former refugees and lack of existing coherent strategy to address this issue. People’s opinions and narratives uncovered a vicious cycle, where the government is suspicious of the former refugees and it continues to keep them under supervision, and the people concerned cannot completely integrate and trust their citizenship because they are not given autonomy. The cycle of suspicion amplifies the narratives of ‘probational citizenship’, highlighting that recognition and acceptance by Tanzanian authorities plays a crucial role in former refugees’ perception of their new status. Former refugees highlight the contrast between the constrained, ‘probational citizenship’ they were granted and the normative ideal of citizenship by using a notion of ‘open space’. ‘Open space’, as understood by my interlocutors, means transition to governance that is not controlled by an arbitrary settlement office but is governed by people elected from the community.

Finally, critical analysis of political participation in urban areas shows a discrepancy between the settlement and the city. In Dar es Salaam, former refugees isolate themselves from political activities. They justify this decision by fear of being discovered, which might compromise one’s safety, business, and relationships. The perspective that develops in these contexts is a future-oriented conceptualisation of citizenship. Former refugees, I spoke to believe that their children will be able to be more vocal and involved in urban politics in the future, but for themselves, the risks

are still too high. The experiences and narratives of former refugees both in and outside the settlements emphasise an active and participatory side of citizenship with additional collective and future-oriented elements. This future-oriented, temporal, promising but not quite realised citizenship is what ‘probational citizenship’ forecloses. In the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of land rights post-naturalisation, conceptually linking citizenship and land in displacement.

6. Making claims to land and to a future in displacement

Land rights are always about the expectations of the future

(Gray, personal communication, 2018).

The controversies and debates regarding political inclusion of the former Burundian refugees are intimately tied with an equally essential and challenging question, namely the new citizen's rights to land. Recognition of land rights is a crucial marker of citizenship for former refugees and it is intertwined with expectations of the future. In this chapter I examine how naturalisation both undermined the existing land tenure²⁴ system and strengthened former refugees' claims to land - reinforcing and reinterpreting the relationship between land and political membership.

Land and citizenship are intertwined, both in Western thought, as well as in the more specific African context. According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001), in contemporary Africa, access to rights and ability to exercise political agency are informed by the notion of 'indigeneity', which directly links belonging to land. Following Mamdani, Patricia Daley (2013) argues that 'indigeneity' has become the *de facto* basis for access to citizenship rights in Africa. Migrants' and refugees' access to land had become a contentious issue across the continent, leading to violent clashes between the 'native' and 'incoming' populations (Boas & Dunn, 2013). Many of these conflicts are

²⁴ Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land (FAO, 2002).

grounded in the logic of autochthony, which holds that people can only claim belonging and ownership in places where they can demonstrate some ancestral affiliation. Scholars have highlighted the prominence of discourses of autochthony in the ways that both citizenship and land rights have come to be defined and asserted in contexts of migration and displacement (Jackson, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Lentz, 2013; Boas & Dunn, 2013). I suggest that there is a risk that this emphasis hides other instances and quiet cases of integration, in which autochthony is not the dominant trope through which citizenship or land rights are claimed, as this chapter demonstrates in the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. It is not my intention to challenge the autochthony and land paradigm directly in itself; rather, I simply observe that the paradigm does not capture the concerns of accessing²⁵ land in this particular context of displacement, which exhibits different characteristics.

In Ulyankulu, while seeking recognition of their land rights, former refugees rely on claim making strategies that do not derive their power from the discourse of autochthony and do not encounter opposing claims grounded in the logic of autochthony. Instead, they seek recognition of their rights based on the long-term productive use of the land, land transactions with local Tanzanians, and engagement in land disputes. It is important to note that claims to land are also often insecure for Tanzanians in other parts of the country (Askew et al., 2013). Where former refugees' situation differs is that their land is not recognised under the Village Land Act (GOT, 1999) and they do not even have customary village land ownership. In this chapter, I

²⁵ I use the word *access* as denoting *all* possible means by which a person is able to benefit from land (Ribot and Peluso 2003).

argue that the strategies employed by former refugees indicate that people are trying to convert land access, which they have enjoyed for decades, into land rights. The main finding of this chapter is that access to citizenship increased people's sense of entitlement to the land in Tanzania, and it generated new opportunities and new avenues for claim-making. At the same time, however, the state's engagement in the area following naturalisation has destabilised the previous tenure system, creating new uncertainties. In this chapter, I critically examine former refugees' claim-making practices, linking the recognition of land rights with citizenship and the expectations of the future.

6.1. Land access in Ulyankulu settlement

When examining how people establish land access and claim land rights, it is helpful to ask what land is. As Tania Li (2014) persuasively writes, land as a resource does not have essential or intrinsic quality. Land is assembled and constructed; it always includes a discursive element, and it can 'wax and wane, or morph as technologies are added, values change, and material qualities shift' (Li, 2014, p. 589). Acknowledging the elements assembled in 'making up' land and the processes that stabilise the assemblage gives us tools for approaching the question of land rights more systematically. Inspired by Li's typology and following the data collected, I understand land and its value for the displacees as changeable over time and defined both in material and symbolic terms. In the section below, I outline the initial distribution of land in Ulyankulu and explain why in the 1970s, establishing rural refugee settlements with access to large plots of land was politically feasible. I identify the three main reasons in: (i) the distinctive features of the land tenure regime in




Figure 8. Map of Ulyankulu villages. Source: Sarkara, M. *Rural Watermarks*, KU Leuven (2018-2019).

Upon their arrival, refugees were registered and allocated plots of 5 hectares per household on average (int. 2016).²⁶ They were expected to clear the land, construct their homes and begin cultivating. For these purposes, simple building and farming tools were provided (TCRS, 1985). The village governments were given custody over additional plots of land, which were distributed over the years as the families expanded. During my time in Ulyankulu, I spoke to many elderly members of the community about their memories of arrival to Ulyankulu and the first years in the settlement. One elderly man recollected:

²⁶ The settlement office in Ulyankulu holds a registry that lists all the plots distributed in 1970s. The registry, however, was never updated, and it does not include any of the later land transfers.

When people came here first, agronomists were here. They measured plots, meter by meter, and like that they went around the area, all the plots were the same. As the families increased, the village government added land - you would go to the village chairman, tell them that the family has increased and land is not enough, and you would get an additional plot (int. 2016).

As this quote illustrates, families were given allocated plots of land, and over the years they were able to approach the village government and request additional plots for their children. Therefore, the cultivated area of land in the settlement grew with time and began to expand beyond the initial, neatly planned grid structure.

The year 1978 marked a crucial point in initial land distribution in Ulyankulu. The settlement continued to grow and quickly became overpopulated - at the end of 1976, it housed over 59,000 people, almost 200 per cent beyond its estimated carrying capacity (Daley, 1989). As a consequence, a new settlement was designated, and 30,000 people were resettled to the new site of Mishamo in Mpanda district (Daley, 1989). In people's stories, an additional reason for the resettlement was the extensive flooding which occurred in Ulyankulu, making parts of it inhabitable. According to the Settlement Officer, following floods and refugees' resettlement to Mishamo, the vacant plots were returned to the village government and then distributed equally to the inhabitants of the village. People's narratives, however, reveal that frequently, neighbours of those who were resettled received their plots for a minor payment. As Richard, an inhabitant of Mbeta village explained: 'The floods took long... After

people left, you would give money or a gift to someone who lived nearby the flooded plot. In that way, you got land in these places; I did that myself' (int. 2016).

The 'Mishamo move' marks the beginning of land transactions in the settlement and it accounts for many of the differences in plot sizes between the families. According to people's stories, at that point, there was no competition for the land. The village government was still in custody of vacant plots, which were distributed to refugees as families grew. Today, families that own larger fields for cultivation usually highlight that they obtained them in 1978 when people were relocated to Mishamo or in 2008 when people repatriated to Burundi (discussed in more detail in the latter part of the chapter).

Thus, over the years, refugees gained access to additional plots of land beyond the planned villages both within and beyond the area of the settlement. These newly acquired plots were often located at a distance from the households and today are predominantly used for rice cultivation. Therefore, in Ulyankulu land has multiple uses and functions and many households own two plots of land – one on which they live and cultivate vegetables and keep animals, and another one, further away from their house, where they cultivate rice and other cash crops. Moreover, owners of more centrally located plots sell and rent their land for commercial activities, such as bars, cafés, hostels, and shops. As such, land provides direct commercial and subsistence benefits that people rely on for their livelihoods. With access to citizenship, however, the importance of secured access to land in Tanzania became imbued with another layer of significance. Before moving to a discussion of these processes, I explain why

the establishment and maintenance of rural settlements in which refugees were granted land access was politically feasible in the first place.

Land governance in post-colonial Tanzania

To an outside observer, it seems quite striking and surprising that Tanzanians neighbouring Ulyankulu have not come forward to claim rights to the land on which the settlement was established. In other contexts, such as for example northern Uganda, the settlement of Sudanese and Congolese refugees has provoked deep concerns about land being alienated from its 'rightful' Ugandan owners (Leonardi & Santschi, 2016). In Ulyankulu, however, customary claims to the land preceding the refugee settlement are not dominant. Below, I explain why allocating and securing land for the refugee settlement was possible.

Firstly, in postcolonial Tanzania, the new government decided to nationalise all land, making the state the ultimate trustee (Hyden, 1980, p. 70). As Boone (2015) argues, Tanzania provides a unique example of a sub-Saharan country in which postcolonial rulers have dismantled neo-customary land tenure institutions (p. 176). Boone (2015) makes an analytical distinction between neo-customary and statist types of land regimes²⁷ and argues that Tanzania is a unique example of a statist regime on the continent. Since the 1970s, the Tanzanian state has not offered juridical recognition to ethnicity-based customary land claims, and it has not institutionalised the land powers

²⁷ Boone (2015) acknowledges that this analytic framework is crude and schematic, as local land regimes often mix or combine these different sorts of rules, or display other ambiguities or hybridities. Nevertheless, she argues that this schematic model of variation in land regimes captures critical differences in the forms of authority and political identities that structure smallholders' access to land.

of neo-customary authorities in administrative practice (Boone, 2015, p. 182). Land administration in Tanzania is largely secularised, meaning administrative non-recognition of ‘ancestral (and ethnic) land rights and non-recognition of neo-traditional local leaders with land powers’ (Boone, 2015, p. 182). The statist land tenure regime works to define the land user as a subject or citizen of the state, ‘rather than a member of an ethnic collectivity’ (Boone, 2015, p. 177).

Although this typography is useful for understanding the overarching differences and leading characteristics of various land tenure regimes, the reality on the ground is far more complicated. In fact, land institutions in Tanzania are far from monolithic, and customary land tenure practices and informal markets continue to operate within the overarching institutional framework (Gray, 2018, p. 133), leading to more overlapping systems than Boone’s typography suggests. There are multiple and overlapping ways of making claims to land in Tanzania, and although the land regime is inherently statist, that does not necessarily mean that the legal claims are more respected over other types of claims (Askew et al., 2013). The statist element of land tenure regime in Tanzania, under which the state can confer ownership of land, is, however, precisely what made the establishment of rural refugee settlements possible in the first place. At the same time, the parallel existence of customary land tenure practices and informal markets in Tanzania created a space where refugees could access and make claims to land in and outside the settlements.

According to Abrahams (1981), the Nyamwezi people who had inhabited the area of Ulyankulu until 1958 were evicted due to colonial interventions to fight the spread of tsetse flies as sleeping-sickness vectors. In the 1970s, the area of Ulyankulu was still sparsely populated and overgrown with bush. As a remote and uninhabited area, it was designated to be a refugee settlement. The logic behind this designation was that settling refugees in the area would attract international development funding, develop the periphery, and raise the economic productivity of the region (Daley, 1989). In their narratives, former refugees, as well as local Tanzanians, often emphasised how wild and untamed the environment was before the refugees arrived. An elderly woman from southern Burundi told me: ‘There was nothing when we came here, it was bush, there were wild animals, we were scared’ (int. 2016). A Tanzanian fisherman from the area added: ‘When they [refugees] came here, our living standards increased. We were included in the new services provided. This place would not have been developed if not for the refugees. It was a different place’ (int 2016).

This narrative and many other similar stories I collected from both former refugees and Tanzanians illustrate that the area of the settlement was sparsely populated due to the prior eviction of people living there. Moreover, it was infected with disease and marginalised prior to the refugees’ arrival. The elderly Tanzanians from Ulyankulu and the villages nearby emphasized that the settlements brought social services and business opportunities to this remote and neglected region. Due to this very specific

political and historical context, assertions of autochthony have not emerged here in opposition to the refugees on a large scale.

Recently, however, contestations over alienation of land for refugee camps have emerged around the expanding Nyaragusu camp in Western Tanzania, Kigoma region. There, land has been alienated from farming communities to construct the camps, and they were never appropriately compensated. Moreover, in contrast to Ulyankulu, the communities neighbouring Nyaragusu do no benefit from the services provided to the refugees, and today the hostilities are on the rise (Zhou, personal communication, 2017). Thus, the specific characteristics of the Old Settlements, where land was not alienated directly from the neighbouring farming communities and where the indigenous population was directly benefiting from the services provided to refugees, facilitated refugees' land access.

6.2. Naturalisation and its effects on land access

When the first round of citizenship documents was being distributed, Tanzania's Home Affairs Minister, Mathias Chikawe, proclaimed that: 'The new citizens are meant to enjoy all citizenship rights including land ownership' (IRIN, 2014). According to a few of my interlocutors, a similar statement regarding land ownership came from President Kikwete when he was campaigning in the area before 2015 elections. In reality, the implementation of the naturalisation process has destabilised some of the existing practices of land tenure, and it has not (as of yet) replaced them with the national framework of land governance. What I mean here is that before

naturalisation, refugees enjoyed secured access to land within the settlement due to international recognition of their status and the protection of the area as a designated refugee settlement. With naturalisation, the designation of the area as a settlement will be removed but it remains uncertain when it will be replaced by incorporation of the area into Tanzanian local government structures.

The change of the legal status of the land in Ulyankulu is planned under the TANSPLI (Tanzania Strategy for Local Integration Programme for the New Citizens) scheme. According to the stipulations of TANSPLI (2016), two actions will be undertaken regarding changing the status of the settlement area. The first is the removal by the Minister for Home Affairs of the refugee-designated status over the settlement areas. The second action will be the removal of the forest reserve status in accordance with the Forest Act 2002 (GOT, 2002). Furthermore, the plans stipulate the creation of a master land use plan for the settlement and the surrounding areas, followed by the registration of villages in each settlement, provision of preliminary documentation for land rights, and, finally, issuance of Certificates of Village Lands (CVLs) and Certificates of Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCROs) (GOT, 2016). Therefore, in addition to changing the status of the land (de-gazetting of lands), a key aspect of the local integration programme will be to secure land rights for the new citizens (GOT, 2016, Par 3.2). The timeline and funding for these activities, however, remain unknown.

During fieldwork, I visited the University of Dar es Salaam, where I met Professor Rutinwa. He was the mastermind behind the design of TANCROSS policy, and he has

extensive knowledge about the current situation in the settlements. I went to speak to him about the challenges of changing the designation of land in the settlements. He explained, building on section 16 from the 1998 Refugees Act, that: ‘If we abolish the institution of the Settlement Commandant and dissolve the settlement, the land will revert to its original status, i.e. the status it had before establishment of the settlement in the 1972. It won’t belong to the refugees’ (int. 2014). Professor Rutinwa concluded that the land and property rights for the refugees must be secured before abolishing the settlement. However, there is no established precedent for this type of transition in land governance. In a context marked by a lack of political will as well as lack of financial resources for changing the designation of land, the situation remains unresolved.

Despite the administrative delays and limitations, the political challenges, and anxiety surrounding land ownership, former refugees have developed a strong sense of entitlement to the land, and today, Ulyankulu settlement is abundant in land transfers, land transactions, and land disputes. What is crucial is that access to land in Tanzania was essential to many people’s decision to remain in Tanzania and apply for Tanzanian citizenship. As such, for the people I met, the validity and security of their citizenship status hinges on recognised and secured access to land. In the following sections, I discuss the various actions and processes that illuminate how inhabitants of Ulyankulu developed and strengthened their access to land in exile and how they attempt to claim land rights in the changing circumstances post-naturalisation. The following sections focus on (i) the changing perspective on land in displacement, (ii) the significance of land transactions and documentation, (iii) conflicts and disputes as the new

mechanisms of claim-making, (iv) contestation of the building ban, (v) gender and claims to land in Ulyankulu.

6.3. Thinking about land in displacement

Evidence from my research indicates that people's perspective on land in the settlement has developed in comparative relation to the political and economic situation in Burundi. In this section, I show how over time refugees began developing a different approach to their land in Tanzania; transitioning from a temporary to a more permanent and future-oriented perspective. This is important because the change in people's perspective on land in Tanzania was intertwined with the changing perspective on the possibility of naturalisation.

Changing perspective

The year 1993 marks the most important turning point in former refugees' narratives about how they began to perceive their place in Tanzania as something other than temporary. In a conversation with Mzee Godfrey and Eliza, an elderly teacher and his wife whom I visited multiple times over the years, they recalled that: 'The hope to go back to Burundi was out of our mind after 1993 when the first Hutu President was assassinated. When Ndadaye was killed. Since then we started to hope for citizenship here' (int. 2016). This sentiment was shared by most of the people with whom I spoke. Adam, a teacher at a vocational school confirmed that people's attitudes towards the idea of permanently staying in Tanzania began to change at that time: 'People started to lose their hope of going back to Burundi...the imagination of repatriation

progressively declined' (int. 2016). He explained that since the assassination and the return of civil war in Burundi, people became more cautious about their plots and competition for securing farming land intensified. The perceived increasing importance of land in the settlement became directly proportional to the increased insecurity in Burundi.

This link became even more pronounced in 2015, when the distribution of citizenship certificates coincided with the eruption of election violence in Burundi, followed by months of insecurity, economic decline, and food shortages across the country (Hovil, 2016, p. 1). The people I met in the settlement frequently discussed the issue of land-related violence that repatriates faced upon their return to Burundi. Burundian law acknowledges a person as a rightful owner after cultivating a plot for more than 30 years, implying that many occupants now became legal owners (van Leeuwen, 2010, p. 756). When the government felt that it served useful political purposes, it expelled those who occupied land and granted it to the repatriates. In other contexts, land sharing agreements were enforced.

When the repatriates from the Old Settlements returned to Burundi, many of them became involved in land conflicts and became both victims and perpetrators of violence. The way in which former refugees think about land in the settlement in Tanzania was influenced by the struggles that their relatives and friends faced while making claims to land in Burundi. In other words, inhabitants of Ulyankulu conceptualise the value of their land and citizenship in exile in comparative relation to Burundi. Thus, insecurity, violence, and lack of land access are associated with

Burundi, whereas lack of violent conflicts and the perceived abundance of land in the country are attributed to Tanzania.

Scholarly research on access to land in Burundi accentuates the intimate connection between a *specific piece of land* and people's understanding of identity (van Leeuwen & Haartsen, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2010; Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012).²⁸ Hovil (2009) underlines that for many in Burundi identities are quite literally rooted in the soil (see also Whyte et al., 2013 on Uganda). The extensive International Refugee Rights Initiative (2009) study of the repatriates brings attention to people's desire to recover the land they fled from and where their ancestors were buried:

Land connects the current generation to their ancestors... Land, and especially family land, is priceless; it is a gift you get from the ancestors, and it is a gift you have for your descendants. Land keeps the extended family together and as such it is like a clan umbilical cord (IRRI, 2009, p. 37).

Apparently, when the researchers asked people if they would accept an alternative piece of land, their responses were negative. These findings become more complex and less one-dimensional if we consider that the repatriates in this study were part of the same families that opted for Tanzanian citizenship and today try to secure rights to land in Tanzania. It is vital to understand that people can have a strong sense of

²⁸ It is important to highlight that these studies were written recently and are framed by the discourse of post-conflict reconstruction. For 40 years now no significant research has been done on customary land law, tenure security and local land management outside conflict situations in the Burundian context (Kohlhagen 2011)

attachment to their land in Burundi and at the same time choose to remain in Tanzania. Under conditions of displacement, with very limited options and the impossibility of return, people make adjustments over time and under given circumstances, and through these circumstances, new/different relationships to land necessarily evolve. Due to the continuous instability in their country of origin and the lack of prospects for sustainable livelihood opportunities, the majority of Burundian refugees decided to remain in Tanzania. There, they strive to establish secure access to land within and beyond the designated area of the settlement. In the next section, I look at the strategies they employ to achieve these goals in the constrained circumstances of the settlement.

6.4. Land transactions and documentation

In the following paragraphs, I show how former refugees engage in land transactions and how through these processes, they make claims to land. Moreover, I argue that the documentation and agreements produced in the process of land transactions become an important way of legitimising their land access and claiming rights to land following naturalisation.

Repatriation and expansion of land transactions

As discussed, TANCOS offered Burundian refugees a choice between naturalisation and repatriation. From 2008 onwards, more than 5,000 people repatriated from Ulyankulu to Burundi. This major migration juncture set in motion many overlapping land sales and transactions. Initially, the TANCOS agreement stipulated that upon

naturalisation, refugees would be resettled from the settlements to other regions of Tanzania. According to Godfrey, a teacher at the secondary school in Ulyankulu:

The sales of land were happening before, but they significantly increased when the process of naturalisation started. We were told we would be moved away from here and so people started selling. Also, people repatriated then, and that opened possibilities for land sales (int. 2016).

As Godfrey's story suggests, repatriation of refugees to Burundi was a key force behind the surge of land transactions in Ulyankulu following naturalisation. With many families leaving the settlement, new and often centrally located plots of land became available. Simultaneously, refugees who decided to opt for naturalisation and remained in Tanzania became motivated to own more land and therefore competition for land increased.

It is crucial to highlight that none of the sales were permitted by the settlement's administration (although many officials were benefitting and continue to benefit from these transactions). The refugees never obtained formal titles to the land they occupy, and as an employee of TCRS who worked in Ulyankulu for over 15 years remarked: 'In Tanzania, the President has a right to distribute land. He leased it to the refugees. But they are not permitted to administer it freely' (int. 2014). These stipulations, however, have been widely disregarded by the inhabitants of the settlement. Since naturalisation, land transactions increased between the refugees themselves and they also expanded to include Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas and beyond.

Inward migration of Tanzanians: 'finding' land

Following the implementation of TANCOS, thousands of Tanzanians began to move into the area, and today their number is estimated at around 12,000. This is only an estimate, as Tanzanians do not register with the settlement administration or the village government, and they usually settle clandestinely (although legally they are required to report to the settlement office). Many come in search of business opportunities. However, the key pull factor that motivated Tanzanians I met to move to Ulyankulu was the availability of 'cheap' land.

In the process of 'finding' land, the incoming Tanzanians first approach the seller and then inform the authorities at the lowest level – ten-cell leaders or street leaders. An agreement is usually formulated and signed. The documentation of land sales follows various patterns depending on the relationship between the buyer and the seller. Within families and among close friends or neighbours, usually no agreements are signed, and payments are symbolic. When the two parties are less familiar with each other, a standard procedure is followed. The buyer approaches the seller, they agree on a certain amount of compensation, and afterwards they bring in witnesses and include the street leader (sometimes the village leader is informed as well, but usually the sales happen without informing him or her).²⁹ Next, an agreement is formulated, which is then copied and signed by all the parties involved. As one of the street leaders explained to me:

²⁹ Ten cell (ten household) and street leaders are the lowest authority in the Tanzanian local government structures

Tanzanians, they come first to the ten-cell leader, then to the street leader, then to the chairperson. But first, they go straight to people from whom they access land; someone has more, they divide, negotiate, make an agreement. In my street, we have people from Ngara, Bukoba; I assisted them, they have land now, houses. We live together (int. 2016).

Despite the underlying legal regime that actively discourages people from developing a sense of land ownership in the settlement, refugees continue to engage in land transactions between themselves as well as with the incoming Tanzanians. When I asked Elija, a bicycle *fundi* (repairman), about the details of the transactions, he explained: ‘How do we do transactions? We give them cash. We have some sort of documentation, but that’s not important, what is important is that the neighbours know’ (int. 2015). Apart from the direct benefits of acquiring and selling land, these land transactions also have another function: they operate as recognition by Tanzanians of former refugees’ rights to land. In other words, the willingness of Tanzanians to engage in land transactions in the settlements and purchase land from the former refugees, functions as an indication of their recognition of former refugees’ customary rights to land based on shared cultural notions of the importance of long-term occupation and productive use of land.

Engagement in these transactions produces a document trail fortified by spoken agreements which are both crucial for the former refugees. The documents people showed me included signatures and names of multiple witnesses and family members, they were signed and stamped by street leaders and/ or village chairpersons, and all

parties involved held multiple copies. Documenting the transactions and sales of a portion of their land allows people to delineate and document the boundaries of what they consider is their land. In the context of the settlement, these are the only documents people have to certify the land access they have established over the years.

Mutual benefits

Tanzanians' willingness to engage in land transactions with refugees should also be seen in the broader, national context, where migration to other rural areas and accessing land in new localities is often extremely challenging (Askew et al., 2013). Anatol, a friend of my host family from an area north of Kahama told me one day that:

It is good for agriculture here, I was poor before, and I am better now. I had many friends and family here. I had one friend who told me to come here; he said come, there is land. So I came to settle here. I brought a letter of intention from my village. My friend repatriated. For the land I have a document, it is signed by the village chairman. In the place where I am from, all land is occupied, but here, there is still space (int. 2016).

I discussed this issue in a focus group discussion with Tanzanians who settled in Ulyankulu. We laughed and joked a lot about how Tanzanians who move to Ulyankulu complain about the lack of social services, restricted access, insecure land ownership, but end up building houses in the area and insist that they want to stay here. A sentence that recurred in many conversations with Tanzanians whom I asked why they decided

to move and stay in Ulyankulu was: ‘Ninapenda mazingira hapa’, which literally means ‘I like the environment here’. In the focus group, the Tanzanians I spoke to agreed that ultimately, the business opportunities in Ulyankulu are better than where they come from, and they can quite easily access and expand land holdings in the settlement which they could not afford in their place of origin.

Moving into the area of the settlement provides easy and cheap access to land for the Tanzanians. From the perspectives of former refugees, migration of Tanzanians into the area facilitates integration, and their willingness to purchase land in the settlement functions as a mechanism of recognition of former refugees’ rights to that land. By engaging in these land transactions, Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas strengthen refugees’ claims to land and validate their newly acquired citizenship. Instead of reliance on autochthonous claims, what we are witnessing in this context is an establishment of a shared and functioning (though enclosed) land tenure system between Tanzanians and former refugees within the boundaries of the settlement.

As observed by Hammar (2014), Elliott (2014), Hansen (2014), while displacement often dismantles people’s pre-existing capital, networks, and expertise, it also generates a range of new relationships, creative strategies, and socio-economic spaces. Thus, displacement produces paradoxical simultaneities - both destruction and creation, loss and gain, despair and hope, and confinement and mobility. The new business opportunities emerging in Ulyankulu settlement and the rise of land tenure relationships between refugees and Tanzanians are indicative of what Hammar (2014) calls the ‘displacement economies’. Although I agree that displacement has produced

both loss and economic opportunity in Ulyankulu, I observe that these are unstable and unevenly distributed. The surge in land transactions and business prospects linked to land sales created new inequalities and vulnerabilities in term of land access in Ulyankulu. In the following paragraphs, I turn to the problem of illegitimate land sales.

Illegitimate sales

The legitimising power of land sales and transactions in Ulyankulu has its flipside in the form of illegitimate land sales. I am aware that the concept of ‘illegitimate’ land sales in the context where all sales are prohibited might seem peculiar. However, in this terminology, I follow the point of view of former refugees, who have a very clear and established idea of which sales are and aren’t legitimate. In two different villages in the settlement, I had a chance to witness two contested cases where village chairmen sold people’s land to incoming Tanzanians. As Aisha, a middle-aged woman who was a victim of an illegitimate sale told me:

There are many land conflicts here. Mostly because village chairmen sell land to Tanzanians and others. You think you own land and someday you find it given to someone else without any information, you just find it occupied. So how do you solve that? What can you do? (int. 2016).

In the same village of Mbeta, a young farmer and a father of four faced a similar situation. He told me that he went to cut some trees from the plot he owns which is located at a distance from his house. His family only uses it for seasonal agriculture

and does not visit the plot every day. When he arrived, he saw that someone built a shed on his plot. A man emerged from the grass shed and claimed that he bought the land. The young farmer asked him to show the documents and to bring him to the person who sold the land to him. The man never produced the documents and never showed up for the meeting arranged at the settlement's office to resolve the case.

When I was finishing my fieldwork, these two cases remained unresolved, and both victims insisted that their land was sold without their knowledge by the former village chairman. The man was since then removed from his position, but the conflicts remained without a resolution. As these cases indicate, land sales and transactions are in some cases manipulated by the more powerful and influential members of the community; jeopardising rather than securing people's claims to land. In the next section, I look in more depth into the role and meaning of land conflicts in the settlement.

6.5. Conflicts and disputes: new mechanisms of claim-making

It might seem counterintuitive to speak about land conflicts in the context of a case that is challenging the usual scholarly emphasis on discourses of conflict and autochthony. I suggest, however, that in Ulyankulu, people's engagement in land disputes is a conscious way of gaining official recognition of access to land. As it is firmly established in the literature (Berry, 1993; Moore, 1978; Lund & Sikor, 2009), struggles over land are as much about recognition of rights and institutional authority as they are about control of property per se (Lund & Boone, 2013, p. 1). Following

naturalisation, former refugees are making efforts to gain recognition of their rights to land by the authorities. Rather than a sign of trouble, land conflicts and new conflict resolution dynamics in Ulyankulu are a way of making claims to land. Moreover, I suggest that people's active engagement in land disputes is evidence of an increasing sense of entitlement that they feel towards the land in the settlement. As one elderly lady in a focus groups discussion in the village of Keza remarked: 'Before citizenship, there was less conflict over land. Now there is more conflict because people are sure that they are staying here' (int. 2016). In the following sub-sections, I outline the existing strategies that refugees employ to establish stronger claims to land and the challenges they encounter in the process.

Resolution mechanisms: Taba case

Currently, despite naturalisation, when land conflicts occur in Ulyankulu, the Settlement Officer remains in charge of adjudicating all cases. In line with the established chain of authority, first, a case in question is mediated on the local level through the ten cell and street leaders. If the local authorities fail to resolve it, the case is brought to the village government and presented to the Land Committee. When the parties involved are unable to reach a compromise, the case is brought to the Settlement Officer. Next, he schedules a visit to survey the plots and makes the final judgment. In Taba, one of the villages in Ulyankulu, I had an opportunity to witness a land case being resolved by the Settlement Officer.

The conflict in question was related to encroachment and building on plots that are seemingly ‘empty’ but belong to the settlement’s office. The Officer was instructed to visit the village by the District Commissioner, who received a land conflict complaint at his office. He told the Settlement Officer to ‘take better care of the issues in his area’ and ‘to make sure these types of issues do not reach the district office again’. The Settlement Officer first met with the village chairman of Taba and reminded him multiple times that conflicts in the village, if unresolved, need to be brought to his office. Then, the case in question was brought by a farmer who allegedly expanded his fields for cultivation into the land which belonged to a dispensary (and therefore to the settlement’s officer). He insisted that it is his land, and when he was told to leave the area, he wrote a letter to the District Commissioner to ask for legal assistance. The man was very outspoken and complained that since he is a citizen now, he has a right to do that. In response, he was told that although it might seem to him that he owns the land, it still belongs to the Ministry of Home Affairs. In a later conversation, the Settlement Officer explained: ‘People here believe they have land rights here, but they don’t. They only have rights to use the land but not rights to own’ (int. 2016). Ultimately, the man was told to leave the land he was cultivating and claimed as his property.

His case was not an isolated incident and it is representative of many similar disputes that frequently occur across the settlement. Since naturalisation, many inhabitants of the settlement bypass the authority of the Settlement Officer and bring their cases directly to the Land and Housing Tribunal in Tabora town and the relevant district authorities in Kaliua. Their cases, however, are dismissed, and people are repeatedly

told that the land in the settlement is still governed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and thus they should seek resolution at the office of the Settlement Officer. There is a continuous disjunction between having obtained Tanzanian citizenship and remaining excluded from the national channels of land governance. At the core of these debates is the question who is responsible for solving land disputes following naturalisation and what are the mechanisms for seeking justice that are available to the new citizens.

The nature of property rights in Ulyankulu

Colin Marx (2015) differentiates between land conflict related to distributional inequalities and conflict emerging from the inherent nature of property rights. His focus is on the difference between conflict understood as a (re)distributional struggle over (already) defined property rights and conflict that occurs because of the inherent, contested nature of property rights themselves (Marx, 2015, p. 2779). The idea that the nature of property rights can be a source of conflict is derived from a recognition that property rights are relational, constructed, contingent on social context and must be continually ‘produced’ (Marx, 2015, p. 2780). These insights illuminate the situation in Ulyankulu, where the inherent insecurity of property rights remains at the core of many conflicts. As one a member of a Land Committee in Makonge village explained it pointedly: ‘We don’t have land rights yet [...] our neighbours [from villages outside] have land rights, but we don’t, we are told to keep waiting. Lack of ownership increases the number of conflicts; there are more problems’ (int. 2016).

According to the records provided by the local magistrate, the number of land disputes brought to the local court has increased by over 20 percent since naturalisation.³⁰ The most numerous conflicts in Ulyankulu are around rice fields. As my research assistant explained:

The most contradictions are over rice fields. When people got here, they got land distributed along the roads but what is now used as rice fields was only divided later by the people themselves. So they just use testimony to know who owns which plot. For example, Sukuma pastoralists can come here to buy land from a refugee family. But then the father dies, and the children rise to claim the land back (int. 2016).

The conflicts over rice fields are on the rise in the rainy season when people start cultivating and cross boundaries. Other leading conflicts relate to illegitimate sales of land in the absence of the owner, encroachment on seemingly ‘empty’ plots of land that belong to the settlement office, and dispossession of widows and their children.

As one participant in a focus groups discussion in Keza village told me: ‘Sometimes if *Mkuu* [Settlement Officer] fails to solve a conflict, he would just take the land and give it to whomever he wanted or freeze the land for a few years and not let anyone access it so all the sides of the conflict would lose and learn’ (int. 2016). These arbitrary decisions and lack of accountability in solving land conflicts motivates former refugees to seek resolution in other spaces of authority. As the case of Taba

³⁰ I could not verify the figure as the records for all the years were not available. I use this number here figuratively to indicate the perceive increase in conflicts.

illustrated, people try to bring their land cases to the District office, which in turn refuses to deal with them and sends people back to the Settlement Officer. Although former refugees are aware of these patterns, they continue seeking resolution for land disputes with authorities at the district level. These processes expose the absence of clear judiciary mechanisms for dealing with land disputes in the settlement.

Ambiguities on the judiciary level

The extent of the confusion regarding how land in Ulyankulu should be governed has been exposed to me by the local magistrate who told me:

There are so many land conflicts, and there is no court for land. People fail to know where to take their cases! It would be really good to have a land court. People come to me, and I don't know what to tell them. People want to bring their cases to the Land and Housing Tribunal but they can't. They have no occupancy rights, don't pay taxes for land. This area was not officialised to give people possession of land. And so people are afraid to really invest here (int. 2016).

I had an opportunity to discuss this problem at length with the land committee members in Makonge village. Every village in Ulyankulu has a land committee which consists of people who are part of the village government and are selected for this position. Land committee is the first point of contact for land conflicts before they are brought to the settlement's office. One of the members of the land committee in

Makonge village, reflecting on the issue of people's inability to seek a resolution to their land disputes in court, said:

We got citizenship, yes, but we are told we are still under probation for five years [...] It's confusing [...] We are receiving Sukuma visitors, we are selling the land, but when will we get land ownership ourselves? We got citizenship, but what about land? (int. 2016).

These conversations highlight that former refugees see secure access to land as a necessary condition of citizenship in its fullest, substantive sense. They express this perspective by challenging the decisions of the Settlement's Office and bringing their cases to courts outside of the settlement. The aim of these actions is to seek and gain recognition of the land access they established over the decades and to convert their locally recognised land access into land rights recognized vis-à-vis the state. These actions expose how ongoing struggles for recognition become an inherent characteristic of citizenship in displacement.

Although the statist land tenure regime existing in Tanzania is not monolithic, it is widely accepted and understood in Tanzania that the state can confer ownership of land. This characteristic of land tenure in Tanzania is what made it possible to designate land for refugee settlements in the first place. At the same time, however, today the same characteristics of the land regime in Tanzania are the cause of uncertainty and anxiety surrounding land rights in Ulyankulu because following naturalisation, land rights need to be secured vis-a-vis the state and not only in the

concerned locality. In that context, achieving recognition of relevant authorities has heightened significance. In the next section, I show how former refugees contest ‘a building ban’ and through that productive disobedience attempt to claim rights to a more substantive version of citizenship.

6.6. Building a ban and active contestation

In November 2016, the inhabitants of the settlement (both former refugees and Tanzanians) were told that they are not supposed to build permanent structures or make any improvements to their houses unless they obtain permission. The building ban was based on a logic that the settlement land has not been de-gazetted and a full transition to local governance still needs to happen. Because land use plans for the area are not available, people should not build at random risking that in the future their homes or shops might be demolished. Former refugees, however, perceive the ban as a strategy aimed directly to obstruct development in the settlement. The new citizens, as well as Tanzanians living in the settlement, fiercely contest this ban, and land transactions and construction of houses continue to flourish.

Building a ban

Discussion about the building ban dominated public and private conversations during my last months of fieldwork in Ulyankulu in November 2016. As the former village chairman of Mbata told me over a meal we were sharing:

The big thing now in the settlement is that people were prohibited to build. They are confused; there is no information on why and for how long. People are asking “What is this citizenship if we are obstructed from the right to build”. Also, now electricity was delivered. But people are not allowed to build! So they are asking, where is the electricity supposed to be put on, on trees?! (int. 2016).

The most important thread in this, and many other conversations regarding the building ban, is the issue of misinformation and/or lack of information. As one woman in a focus group remarked: ‘People are not allowed to build, they say there will be a city plan, but no one understands, and we are not informed about anything’ (int. 2016). Another woman from Mapigano village added: ‘Last year people were allowed to build, yes, but now it changed for some reason and we don’t know why’ (int. 2016). As Stepputat (2004) points out, ‘information and in particular the quality of, and trust in, information’ is crucial in the process of decision making in displacement (p. 8). Providing contradictory and confusing information can be seen as a strategy of managing and controlling refugees post-naturalisation, hindering development in the settlements.

Despite these challenges, both former refugees and Tanzanians living in the settlement disobey the building ban by continuing building and construction. Around the settlement, following naturalisation people began laying the building foundations on their land and improving the existing structures. These activities are meaningful in themselves, as they are a material expression of former refugees’ intention to plan and

invest in their future in Tanzanian (as discussed more in Chapter 8). However, laying the foundations for houses needs also to be seen in the broader, national context, where Tanzanians tend to lay the foundations for houses on the land they own or purchased to show that the land is being used and that it is occupied. Therefore, laying the foundations for buildings and improving the existing structures is as much about the houses themselves as it is about securing land access. By constructing buildings on the land they occupy, former refugees also make claims to land in ways that reflect broader trends and practices of the country. Both improving houses and making claims to land, however, support the same argument that access to formal citizenship documentation allows people to make constructive decisions about their future, which in turn manifest themselves in more active engagement with the present. Thus, expressing discontent and openly disobeying the building ban has productive consequences.

These practices of former refugees echo the kind of ‘active’ or ‘substantive’ citizenship that James Holston (2008) and others (Appadurai & Holston, 1996; Diouf & Fredericks 2014; Sassen, 2002) discuss in their work. Although these studies are primarily set within urban settings, the conceptual frameworks that they develop are useful in approaching the urbanising centre of Ulyankulu and the rural villages around. Appadurai and Holston (1996) show how mobilisations for rights are organised in relation to new conditions of work and residence, and concern the people previously excluded from the resources of the state (p. 198). Taking the example of housing, Appadurai and Holston (1996) argue that claims of urban poor relativise thinking about property by claiming that property must fulfil a social function (p. 198). They show that effective claim making in many cases succeeds in producing new legal

regimes in the form of new constitutional principles. Substantive citizenship is different from formal/ statutory citizenship, but they are interlinked. In the context of former refugees in Tanzania, access to formal citizenship has empowered people to make claims to more substantive and participatory rights than what they were granted under the initial policy of naturalisation. In other words, access to formal documents functions here as an actualising tool for people to feel confident to make claims to other, more expansive rights, such as political representation and recognition of rights to land. In the next section, I show that these processes of claim-making and struggles for recognition are mediated differently in relation to gender.

6.7. Gender and claims to land in Ulyankulu

As the previous sections indicated, people who engaged in the various practices regarding claims to land against the authorities were predominantly men. During the initial distribution of land in the settlement, plots were allocated per household and registered in the Settlement's Office under the name of the male head of the household. Women who lost their husbands during the genocide stayed with their relatives until they remarried, and I did not come across cases of women who receiving land in Ulyankulu under the initial distribution. Both Malkki (1995) and Sommers (2010) expressed disappointment at talking with Burundian women, and Malkki claimed even that: 'Efforts to work with women were frustrated' (Malkki, 1995, p. 50). Perhaps because of my age, gender or personality, I did not share similar experiences. Nonetheless, during my research in the settlement, I experienced the overtly patriarchal character of Ulyankulu's social world, and my sample is biased towards men (as explained in more details in Chapter 4).

Questions of political representation and land access were key to all the people I interviewed, regardless of their positionality. However, these markers of citizenship were always experienced and narrated differently by the various groups and individuals depending on their wealth, gender, education and age. In terms of gender, the divergence in concerns and experiences regarding naturalisation was the most significant in relation to land access and the processes of claiming land rights. Women were not directly involved in any of the land disputes I investigated, and they rarely brought their cases to the village government. I learnt that when women attempted to bring their cases to the attention of the village government, they were always dismissed, and therefore they usually came accompanied and represented by their relatives or sons.

One of the women who defied this established practice was Mama Fau. When I met Mama Fau, she was 40 years old, had nine children and was heavily pregnant. She was Tanzanian but born in Kigoma to a Burundian mother. When her father died, they moved to Ulyankulu where her mother still had relatives. Faustina met her husband, a soft-spoken Catechist from Mbata village and they married and stayed in Ulyankulu. In 2007, Mama Fau went to a seminar led by the local UNHCR representative where she learned that women: '*Wana haki sawa*' [Have the same rights]. She told me that it changed her perspective to learn that that is the law and that 'Here there is no place for Hutu habit that only boys inherit, this is the law that women have rights. *Sheria sio mila* [law and not tradition]' (int. 2016). After the training she attended, she committed to support widows in fighting dispossession from their land. Her fierce intellect and

ceaseless energy gained her a reputation and women began coming to her for advice and assistance.

In Ulyankulu, after husband's death, it is common that his brothers claim the land and displace the widow and her children. This is not unusual, and Young (2006), Chen (2000) and others show dispossession of widows is a common practice in India and many African countries. When I met Mama Fau in 2016, she was on her way to assist a woman in a land dispute against her brother. The woman was from a family of one brother and four sisters. The father divided the land in half, gave half to the son and the other half to the four girls. All of the girls got married and left the village, and the brother remained on the land and was using their plots. However, one of the sisters came back to the village after her husband left her, and she decided to reclaim the land that the father left for her. Her brother refused and chased her away. Together with Mama Fau, the woman took her case to the village chairman, but when he refused to listen, they brought the case to the UN office and then to the police.

Finally, in early 2016, the police confirmed that she is allowed to own the plot left for her by her father. When I met Mama Fau, she was insisting that the brother should sign an agreement that he accepts this verdict. He refused and according to Mama Fau said that: 'Since they are from one stomach, he doesn't see a need to go to the Settlement Officer to sign any documents, he said he is satisfied with the agreement, there is no more conflict, but he still doesn't want to sign anything' (int. 2016).

As this story illustrates, women in Ulyankulu are fighting parallel battles for recognition. Most of the struggles that women are engaged in are against their relatives and many cases are never registered or receive any attention from the authorities. With the help of women like Mama Fau, however, more and more woman, and especially widows, demand recognition of their rights to land. Although women are not represented in the formal structures of authority and are invisible in most of the cases brought to the attention of the Settlement Officer, they are taking part in reshaping land ownership and land rights in other spheres. Instead of relying on the existing authorities of the settlement office and village leadership, Mama Fau helps women to bring their cases to the UNHCR office and the police, seeking support and resolution with institutions not directly involved in land governance.

By doing this, women try to create new spaces of authority in relation to land, and they seek to legitimise their claims to land in novel ways; outside of the village government structure that disregards their concerns. Many of these struggles were prompted by naturalisation and former refugees' awareness that they are now allowed to remain in the settlement. In other words, access to citizenship status affects both men and women's engagement in land disputes and it motivates them to assert their rights to land in Ulyankulu for themselves and their children. Therefore, my observations suggest that following naturalisation, both men and women are engaging in ongoing struggles for recognition of their land rights in the settlement and that these processes become an essential characteristic of citizenship in displacement. In their struggles, they resort to the avenues available to them, and parallel processes of claim-making and recognition are happening on different scales in the settlement.

6.8. Citizenship and land in displacement

The processes of asserting land rights are riddled with ambiguities and paradoxes. The inhabitants of the Old Settlements were initially granted land access for cultivation under the umbrella of the settlement structure, and they have established recognition of their rights among the local Tanzanians. Following naturalisation, the existing protection structure is being dismantled, and former refugees' rights to land access has become more vulnerable than ever before. In consequence, people are simultaneously developing a stronger sense of entitlement to land in Tanzania and a stronger sense of insecurity regarding their access. As one woman from Kaswa village remarked: 'Without ownership rights, we are not completely settled, we can't invest securely, we don't know completely what will happen to us' (int. 2016).

In the last months of my research, I visited a family in Tabora that moved out of the settlement, bought land in Tabora and built a house, but kept their plot in Ulyankulu. David, the father of the family, was a retired businessman, and two of his sons were employed in NGO and education sectors. During the conversation, which extended into a late afternoon, the father told me that he kept the original plot the family received in Ulyankulu, but he is uncertain how to assert his rights to that plot:

Our plot, it is so expensive now, it is in the center of Ulyankulu, has a very good location. What if my kids want to return there and build? Or if I want to give it to them [the children] as an inheritance. How can we permanently possess land in the settlement so no one would take it from us? (int. 2016).

He directed this question at me, and waited, hopeful, for reassurance that I could not give. The profound sense of anxiety regarding insecurity of tenure expressed by my interlocutors is not unique to Ulyankulu settlement, and many scholars have been examining insecurity of land tenure in Tanzania (Maganga et al. 2016; Askew et al., 2013). In the context of the settlement, however, recognition of land access and obtaining secure tenure has a different meaning, as from the perspective of the former refugees, recognition of their rights to land is a necessary to validate their new citizenship status.

The various examples and stories presented in this chapter centre around the notion of recognition, which remains at the core of evolving citizenship in displacement. Land transactions, engagement in land disputes, challenging the building ban, as well as bringing land cases to the authorities beyond the settlement are all strategies that rely on recognition of their rights to land by the different levels of Tanzanian authority structure, including the local magistrate, Land and Housing Tribunal, District Government. As Lund and Sikor (2009) show, property rights and citizen rights in their broadest form exist only to the extent that they are produced, recognised and sanctioned by some form of legitimate authority (p. 8). What distinguishes property rights from possession or access is precisely recognition, which can be established through enforcement by society or government, custom, convention, law, or a combination of the above (Rose, 1994; Lund & Sikor, 2009). Likewise, in the context of Ulyankulu, seeking recognition from different sources (local, regional, national) is an essential part of the process through which former refugees attempt to convert their

land access into recognised land rights and by that ensure the validity and security of their new citizenship status.

Conclusion

Evaluating the process of naturalisation from the perspective of land rights brings out the analytical contrasts and paradoxes between the supposed security that is gained through access to citizenship and the actual uncertain and unstable rights of citizenship that came with citizenship. On the one hand, former Burundian refugees view land in Ulyankulu as an essential source of livelihood to which they feel they have a right due to their long-term occupancy, productive cultivation, and the recent process of naturalisation. On the other hand, however, they are aware of the adverse *de jure* regulations that still govern the area, and a strong sense of insecurity continues to dominate daily conversations about land rights in the settlement. Their rights to land access are 'probational' – they are temporal, uncertain, and it is unclear when or how that might change.

However, despite the major structural challenges and the subsequent inherent insecurity of their rights, former refugees continue to engage in land disputes, challenge the Settlement Officer's authority, and seek conflict resolution at the district and regional level. Although it might seem counterintuitive, I suggest that people's engagement in land disputes is a conscious way of gaining official recognition of one's access to land. These are all disruptive actions through which the new citizens assert their rights to land against the state. Their engagement in these practices implies that people are developing a strong sense of entitlement to the land in the settlement. This

sense of entitlement is further supported by the willingness of incoming Tanzanians to engage in land transactions with the former refugees. I observed that these productive practices were prompted by naturalisation and therefore I argue that access to citizenship documents strengthened former refugees' sense of entitlement to land in Tanzania and it motivates them to take action to convert their land access into secure rights.

In conclusion, this chapter examined the evolving process, where following naturalisation former refugees are trying to convert land access, which they have enjoyed for decades and asserted in the locality they inhabit, into land rights recognised vis-à-vis state institutions. I show how the inhabitants of Ulyankulu conceptualise the importance of their land in exile in comparative relation to land in Burundi. In other words, the way in which former refugees think about the importance of land in the settlement is influenced by the struggles that their relatives and friends are facing in making claims to land in Burundi. Thus, insecurity and lack of land access are associated with Burundi, whereas lack of violent conflicts over land and the perceived abundance of land in the country are attributed to Tanzania. By asserting rights to land, inhabitants of Ulyankulu are seeking recognition of their new citizenship in the fullest sense, ultimately seeking a new and more permanent sense of belonging and of the future.

7. From movement to mobility: evolving citizenship in displacement

‘Poverty is deprivation of opportunity’
(Sen, 1999)

In this chapter, I move from the discussion of land, the most tangible marker of citizenship, to the less tangible and more elusive marker of citizenship, namely freedom of movement. In the context of displacement and encampment, the right to freedom of movement becomes imbued with special significance. Although the right to freedom of movement for refugees is granted under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (art. 12. Article 26), in many countries, including Tanzania, refugees’ freedom of movement is restricted both by national laws and the humanitarian encampment practices. The restrictions on freedom of movement have wider consequences on refugees’ autonomy, their access to education and their ability to establish sustainable livelihoods.

Former Burundian refugees I met in Tanzania repeatedly told me that freedom of movement is one of the most important advantages of the newly acquired citizenship status, despite evidence that people have been moving extensively to and from the settlements since the 1970s with minimal official sanction. Moreover, people who have never left the settlement and do not intend to do so, believe firmly that freedom of movement is a crucial benefit of naturalisation. This chapter explores the significance of these narratives, asking what has changed in people’s experience of

movement following naturalisation and what does that reveal about the importance of mobility in the process of affirming citizenship in displacement.

The main argument of this chapter is that access to citizenship documents allows for beginning the transition from movement to mobility which is key in former refugees' conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement. Following de Haas (2009) and Long (2010), I think about mobility more broadly as having intrinsic meaning beyond the mere act of moving or as a means of achieving socio-economic goals. Using Sen's (1999) terminology, I see mobility as a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom itself. As I came to understand the distinction between movement and mobility through the narratives of former Burundian refugees, movement signifies migration from point A to B. Mobility, on the other hand, means the capacity to move freely without fear and anxiety, to have one's movement recognised by the state and other citizens, and to have the right and the choice to live in multiple places.

In Sen's (1994) conceptualisation, a person's capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. In the narratives of former refugees, *kusafiri* [literally, to travel in Kiswahili] as the practice of freedom of movement, as the ability to *travel*, the capacity to be mobile, is a crucial marker of how they conceptualise citizenship. In line with Sen's (1994) framework, movement can be understood as a functioning and mobility can be seen as a capability. The benefits of mobility as a capability, however, are not always evenly, equally or predictably distributed. In the latter part of the chapter, I discuss how class

differentiation impacts refugees' ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by naturalisation. Moreover, I examine how my interlocutors narrate the benefits of freedom of movement in future-oriented terms, revealing that mobility as a capability is still a 'probational' rather than a fundamental right, which is expected to only materialise for the next generation. The chapter pays close attention to spatiality and temporality of displacement and examines how the transition from movement to mobility plays an important role in the process of evolving citizenship for former refugees in Tanzania.

7.1. Restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement

'I am not sure if I am going to move out of the settlement now, but what is important is that I can if I want to' said Daniel once when we were sitting in his house, drinking soda and sharing a watermelon with his kids. He went silent for a while, looked around the room, and said again: 'Yes, what matters is that now I can and my children can'. Daniel is a primary school teacher and a farmer, and together with his family he lives in one of the most remote villages of Ulyankulu: Kanindo. As many ambitious male students from the settlement, when he was young he entered a Catholic seminary in Tabora town to access better education. This decision was riddled with many obstacles, starting from obtaining fake school certificates, illegally leaving the settlement, and then over the years hiding his identity from his teachers and friends. He eventually dropped out of the seminary and returned to the settlement where he secured a teaching post. Daniel's migration story is not exceptional. In every household I visited, some family members have migrated out of Ulyankulu for education, employment, healthcare, business, adventure, or love. Being familiar with

these migration stories and patterns, I was initially surprised at how inhabitants of Ulyankulu would repeatedly tell me that freedom of movement is a key benefit of naturalisation.

As time passed, I got to know Daniel better and began to understand the burden he carried. Years of trying to establish a life and a career out of the settlement and at the same time hiding his identity and actively avoiding threatening encounters with the police or immigration authorities led him to anxiety. His return to the settlement meant giving up plans and dreams he had, but he told me that he ‘could not manage the life in hiding anymore’. Daniel’s story foregrounds the psychosocial toll that many refugees who live beyond the camps and settlements with no permits or protection endure on daily basis. In the following, I discuss the global and national context of restrictions on freedom of movement of migrants and refugees and then move to a more detailed discussion of the differences in refugees’ experiences of movement pre- and post-naturalisation, focusing on the significance of safety and recognition.

Spatial practices of the encampment

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (art. 12 Article 26) both provide that States shall afford refugees the right to move freely within the host State. As written in the 1951 Convention: ‘States shall afford refugees the right to choose their place of residence within the territory and to move freely within the State’. However, many

countries³¹, including Tanzania, specify in their national laws that refugees should live in designated refugee camps and that their movement must be restricted. Ultimately, these laws not only limit refugees' mobility, but also restrict their access to other rights such as employment, healthcare, and education. The widespread practice of placing restrictions on Article 26 of the 1951 Convention shows that freedom of movement is far from being a core norm within the refugee regime (Maple, 2016).

The topic of why refugees are regularly subjected to policies of camps and restrictions on freedom of movement in Africa has received a great deal of attention in academia since the 1990s (Crisp, 2000; Hyndman, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 2006; Shacknove, 1993; Milner, 2011). A state's emphasis on controlling refugees' mobility stems from the perception (or rather a wish) that refugees' presence is temporary and a view that their movement is a potential threat³². The strong resistance to secondary movement of refugees from camps has its roots in overlapping interests of states and humanitarian organisations.

African (and other) governments fear the impact that refugees' freedom to move around and search for employment can have on popular support, especially in countries that struggle with high rates of unemployment (Misago, 2017). As Misago (2017) notes in the context of South Africa, unregulated human mobility is still seen as a threat to the physical and economic well-being of citizens. Moreover, in the specific case of post-colonial Tanzania, containing refugees in camps provided development in the

³¹ Ethiopia: National Refugee Proclamation, No. 409/2004, art. 21(1); Kenya: The Refugees Act, No. 13, Legislative Supplement No. 7 (2009); Tanzania: Refugee Act 1998, Section 17.

³² Threat takes on various meanings here: threat to the established national order of things, a threat to the strained labor market, a threat to voters' support, a terrorist threat.

periphery and various economic benefits (Chaulia, 2003). Establishing rural settlements in Western Tanzania helped to clear and cultivate the land, brought new contribution to the economy in terms of taxes, provided more people to work on the nearby plantations, and populated the remote and peripheral regions. Moreover, the policy of rural settlements attracted donors and provided additional benefits for the country in terms of aid. From the humanitarian perspective, on the other hand, keeping refugees in organised and remote settlements makes it easier to deliver aid and to attract funding. Agier (2011) explores this interdependence between the need to control and govern the refugees in order to provide humanitarian assistance. He highlights the ambiguity of what he calls the 'Humanitarian Government' which consists of '[the] humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military ordering (the hand that strikes)' (p. 5).

Thus, the insistence on keeping refugees in camps is reinforced both by humanitarian and national interests, and encampment continues to dominate the discourse and practice of the responses to displacement. These practices of encampment, however, contradict the existing evidence, which indicates that secondary movement from refugee camps allows refugees to improve their livelihoods, access education and assert their autonomy (Long, 2010; de Haas, 2009; Stepputat, 2004). In recent years, UNHCR began to reassert that 'freedom of movement is a fundamental human right and that mobility should be included in durable solution frameworks' (UNHCR 2014). However, a significant paradigm shift away from operational work within camps is yet to be seen.

In a recent special issue on refugee camps, Simon Turner (2016) reflects on how one of the essential characteristics of camps is the distinction between outside and inside that is created and maintained by spatial markers and by control of movement. Turner (2016) insists that it is important to understand encampment as a spatial practice. Spatiality, as Hammar (2014) observes is a necessary, but not isolated, element of displacement, as movement in any direction as well as inability to move is always necessarily spatial. Space in itself always matters and it is always relational. As Turner (2016) demonstrates:

Living inside a refugee camp—however invisible the line between the camp and its surroundings and despite ongoing contact between the inside and the outside—marks one's life and defines one's position: a position that is simultaneously excluded from and included into host society, excluded spatially and legally while simultaneously being defined and contained by the surrounding society (p. 142).

The right to freedom of movement has been most rigorously restricted for refugees in long-term encampments, where leaving the camp for even a few hours can require specific permits and where the decision to migrate out of the camp without the permit comes with risks of detention and imprisonment. In the Old Settlements, these intrinsic characteristics of camps were maintained spatially by the mechanism of movement control. This is not to say that refugees do not leave the settlements. Rather, their movement is always controlled and considered illegal, and therefore anxiety surrounding movement became inherent to the experience of displacement. In the

following section, I outline the specific mechanisms of movement control in Ulyankulu settlement.

Movement control in Ulyankulu

By 1985, UNHCR decided that Ulyankulu was producing sufficient amounts of food, and the organisation began preparing to hand over the management of the settlement to the Tanzanian government. With the international organisations and their implementing partners absent, the Settlement Officer, appointed by the Director of the Refugee Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs, became the highest legal authority in the settlement. As a legal representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Settlement Officer does not answer to the Regional Commissioners but is a direct subordinate of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This is not in line with the established Tanzanian authority structure, where local authorities within the regions report directly to the Regional Commissioners. Effectively, the appointment of the Settlement Officer by the Ministry placed the camp outside of the normal jurisdiction of the Tanzanian state (Turner, 2010).

In the Old Settlements, humanitarian organisations were absent since the 1980s, and refugees achieved a degree of self-reliance in terms food and income.³³ Thus, authority over refugees could not be exercised through aid distribution; instead, it has been primarily exercised by regulating the space, i.e. by controlling the borders and restricting people's mobility. As Malkki (1995, p. 137) observes, in the Old

³³ As Daley (1989) notes, the extent of self-reliance was exaggerated by the UNHCR.

Settlements, the regulation of space came to have heightened practical and political significance. She shows that although the camp was not surrounded by fences or walls, the 'overabundance of undomesticated and forbidding space' (p.138) acted as a barrier to travel to and from the camp. All three Old Settlements were located in remote regions and were surrounded by kilometres of bush. The refugees, as Malkki notices, experienced their isolation as repressive and the spatial closure of the settlement generated a particular kind of power that allowed the government to control the movement of the people living in the settlement. These geographical characteristics of the settlements produced an invisible boundary which was reinforced by the repressive sense of isolation. In the absence of fences and walls, the power over refugees' movement was exercised through documentation.

In this specific context, where the borders of the settlements (Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu) were open and there was no fence circumnavigating the area, lack of documentation operated as a measure of control. The Tanzanian authorities (Settlement Officer, Immigration officers, police officers) controlled refugees' mobility and defined the limits of the camp space by determining who and when can enter and exit the settlements and to what effect. In other words, the Settlement Officer was in charge of enforcing Tanzania's refugee policy on the ground, overseeing refugees' mobility and creating the sense of the boundary between the inside and the outside of the camp. As an elderly neighbour of my host family remarked:

Before [naturalisation], our feet were like tied by rope, we could not go anywhere, but now, now we are free. Once a soldier came here, and he saw the

settlement. Is this a camp? Really? Where is the fence?! There is no fence, but they didn't need one to keep us imprisoned, lack of documentation was our prison (int. 2015).

Narratives like this suggest that the lack of documents operated as a symbolic boundary but with real disciplining effects. Despite the absence of a fence circumnavigating the area, people could not leave the settlement. In order to leave the settlement, they had to obtain a permit (*kibali*) from the Settlement's Office.³⁴ The pass was valid for fourteen days. To obtain it, one had to first apply in the office of the Village Chairman, who then wrote a letter explaining the destination, the purpose and the duration of the travel. The application was then forwarded to the settlement's office. Each refugee was interviewed, and if their permit was approved, the Settlement Officer would stamp the letter, and the secretary would enter the details in a log book. The process was lengthy and stressful, and applications were often arbitrarily declined. As one businessman who used to travel a lot out of the settlements in the 1980s told me: 'It was very difficult to get permits, the only people who qualified were sick people, business people that aimed to bring goods here or people visiting relatives in Mishamo or Katumba' (int. 2016).

The inhabitants of the settlements lived under this restrictive movement control regime for over four decades, meaning that the second generation of Burundian refugees was born into a context where freedom of movement was a privilege not afforded to them.

³⁴ According to the Refugee (Control) Act 1965, section 12, refugees in Tanzania are required to apply for a permit in order to leave the settlements. Those who leave or attempt to leave a refugee settlement without fulfilling that obligation, are deemed to have committed a disciplinary offence (Section 13 (3a)).

This protracted experience of displacement led to a situation where people began to equate restrictions on freedom of movement with refugee status. While overall the policy of rural settlements improved refugees' income-generating opportunities, from the perspective of the refugees, movement control defined how they experienced their living environment. Although a failure to obtain a permit could result in a maximum of six months' imprisonment, people defied the rules, exiting and entering the settlement without documents. This created a contradictory space, where although refugees managed to exit and re-enter the settlement, their movement was always uncertain and potentially dangerous.

Movement against all odds: migrating from Ulyankulu

As the existing evidence from the literature on encampment, migration and livelihoods illustrates, mobility allows refugees in camps to meet their livelihood needs (de Haas, 2009; Géraldine, 2010; Long, 2014; Stepputat, 2004). Both local governments and United Nations agencies have long been aware that most of the African refugees live outside of the planned settlements (Kuhlman, 1994; Jansen, 2016). Nonetheless, the magnitude of refugees' migration from camps to cities is generally unknown, in large part because their flight is often illegal and undocumented. It is estimated that 59 per cent of the total global population of refugees is now settled in urban areas (Crawford et al., 2015). Evidence of out of camp migration is extensively documented in the existing literature on encampment and livelihoods (Sommers, 2001; Campbell, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006).

Burundian refugees are not an exception to that trend, and they have been exiting the settlements despite the strict restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement. Refugees leave the settlements and migrate to other urban and rural areas for various reasons, including farming, business, further education, employment, marriage, artistic careers, love and adventure. Despite the existing regulations in place meant to control people's mobility, Burundian refugees from the Old Settlements migrated in large numbers, mostly to urban centres of Tabora, Kigoma, Mwanza, Morogoro, and Dar es Salaam.

Before naturalisation, to leave the settlement each person needed not only to obtain the special pass but also had to be prepared to pay the police officers who patrolled the trains and buses leaving from the area of the settlements (regardless of whether they had the official permit to travel or not). Thus, the control of refugees' movement and the disciplining effects of lack of citizenship documentation extended beyond the boundaries of the camp. Police officers on buses and trains departing near the settlements targeted refugees. As Simoni, an elderly leader from Ulyankulu settlement told me: 'Freedom of movement is the most important outcome of naturalisation. Yes, we travelled before, but there were always problems with migration police'. During my research, I noted that although people migrated extensively out of the settlements, these migratory decisions were linked with a strong sense of anxiety and uncertainty.

One of these people was David, whom I met during the last stage of my fieldwork. I was introduced to David in Tabora, where he bought land just after naturalisation and built a new house for his family with the support of his sons. He is a retired

businessman, and before naturalisation he was buying and selling used clothes as well as also buying crops and selling them outside of the settlement. He belongs to a dynamic group of businessmen and entrepreneurs from Ulyankulu, who breached the movement control rules in the settlement and over the years travelled to urban centres in search for opportunities. In his young years, David travelled extensively to nearby towns of Tabora, Kahama, Shinyanga, however, he never permanently settled outside of Ulyankulu. He was eager and proud sharing his experiences of years of exiting and re-entering the settlement, and explained that at first, he used to go to the village chairman, who would then write a letter to the Settlement Officer, and only then he would get a permit to leave (which was sometimes valid only for a few days). Due to the inconveniences and stress inflicted by the process, he often skipped it and travelled without the permit. Despite doing so for many years, he never got caught. 'It was always stressful', he remembered, 'always in the back of your mind that they can catch you. It has not happened to me, but I always anticipated it' (int. 2016). Despite infrequent contact with the authorities and rare cases of detention, fear permeated the experiences and narratives of migration out of the settlements.

The biggest advantage of Burundians in Tanzania, in comparison with other refugee groups (e.g. Somalis in Kenya: Lochery, 2012), is that they can easily blend in with the Tanzanian population: they have similar appearance, speak fluent Kiswahili, and can pass as native Ha (one of the Tanzanian ethnic groups living in Kigoma region). Moreover, the Tanzanian government only recently began issuing national identity cards (NIDA), and the majority of Tanzanian citizens do not carry any form of identification (I return to this subject in Chapter 8). A combination of those factors

enabled Burundian refugees to travel outside of the settlement before naturalisation. As the existing evidence illustrates, the limits of the camp are porous, allowing goods, people and ideas to move in and out of the camp (Lecadet, 2016). However, as Turner (2016) observes, ‘despite these transgressions of the limits of the camp, the perimeter remains an important defining characteristic and shapes the lives of those who remain inside’ (p. 141).

This observation is a good starting point for unpacking why, considering the extent of outward migration from the settlements, so many of my interviewees insisted that the right to freedom of movement was the most important benefit of naturalisation. What exactly has changed in people’s experiences of migration from the settlements following naturalisation? And what does this perspective tell us about the relationship between citizenship and mobility? In seeking answers to these questions, I turn to the narratives and experiences of the people concerned.

7.2. Movement with and without citizenship: unpacking the difference

In this section, I look at how former refugees narrate their experiences of secondary movement from the settlements and what has changed for them following naturalisation. People’s narratives point towards notions of recognition, safety and autonomy, and the following paragraphs are organised around these themes. When brought together, these elements are helpful in defining how the experience of movement changes with access to citizenship and subsequently what role does mobility play in conceptualisations of citizenship in displacement.

The burden of secrecy

John was twelve years old when he fled Burundi with his family. For secondary education, his parents sent him to attend a school outside the settlement. He recalls that during that time he did not tell anyone that he was a refugee. He said that he did not experience any difficulties only because he was always skilfully hiding his identity, always on guard, careful about what he was sharing with his peers and teachers: ‘It is important never to let anything slip about your refugee background, you need to keep all your family stories coherent’ (int. 2014).

John admits that it was extremely difficult to find opportunities for schooling for his own children. Regular Tanzanian schools often require students to show their birth certificates, which children that were born in Ulyankulu do not have. Therefore, most families end up sending their children to private or religious school, which are more lenient and willing to accept students who do not have the necessary documents, but they are also more expensive. When attending a school outside of the settlement, students need to hide their identity not only because of direct discrimination at the schools. What is also at stake is the future of their employment – if their identity is discovered at the school, they might never find work. As John explained: ‘If at the end they discover you are a refugee they won’t employ you, someone might find out further down the road, and then your options are closed’ (int. 2014).

Meeting John and speaking to him about his past and his family helped me to begin understanding why former refugees prioritise freedom of movement as a benefit of

citizenship, despite their extensive history of secondary migration out of the settlements. John explained to me that mobility does not mean only *being able to* physically move to attend a school. Real freedom stands for a capacity, where one's movement is accepted and recognised by the state and other citizens. Only then, he argued, freedom of movement is the most important benefit of naturalisation. John's perspective advances a broad understanding of mobility very much in line with de Haas (2009) notion of mobility as 'a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom itself' (p. 53).

The importance of recognition

John was acutely aware that his family's circumstances are not going to change overnight. However, when confronted with stories of the continued discrimination of students from the settlements in Tanzanian schools and their relatives in urban centres post-naturalisation, he just shook his head with impatience. What matters, he explained, is the legal recognition of their new citizenship status, which with time will change the experiences of freedom of movement for the next generation. At the core of this perspective on the benefits of naturalisation is a notion of recognition.

Recognition can take a number of forms but broadly speaking it refers to people feeling their own sense of identity is affirmed (Renault, 2007). In turn, 'non-recognition can entail people feeling positioned or constrained to act in ways that compromise their self-definition' (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011, p. 27). As the political theorist Charles Taylor (1992) argues, the recognition of identity 'is not just a courtesy we owe other

people. It is a vital human need' (cited in Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011, p. 216). Here, it is crucial to be cautious and not to use recognition to classify and preserve people's identity. Instead, the focus needs to remain on recognising self-identification or self-understanding (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), which foregrounds that people do not have a single coherent identity and that they can express themselves differently across various contexts.

In understanding the importance of recognition for the former refugees, I turn to definitions that emphasize everyday interactions, seeing recognition as 'the ability of individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially' (Painter & Philo, 1995, p. 115). Obtaining recognition comes from multiple places, and it is not a one-off event or a linear process (Lund, 2016). In this particular context, recognition comes from locally settled Tanzanians, local government officials, national government, and Tanzanians in other parts of the country. Moreover, recognition is not always stable, and it needs to be continuously asserted and maintained. From the perspective of the former refugees, the most important layer of recognition acquired with naturalisation is the formal, state recognition which allows them to remain in Tanzania and to move out of the settlements. John's story, however, suggests that recognition of former refugees' rights to access education and employment beyond the refugee settlements is ongoing and not yet realised. It is seen as a long-term process, which might take another generation.

This perspective on the benefits of citizenship illustrates an in-between, 'probational' state where former refugees received citizenship and have the right to freedom of

movement but are not yet able to exercise that right in a broad, substantive sense. Despite naturalisation and permission to remain in Tanzania, former refugees continue to hide their identity even from their friends and partners. At the same time, however, the same people insist that the experience of freedom of movement will change for the next generation and therefore it will become a key benefit of naturalisation. This future-oriented thinking about citizenship is integral to the concept of ‘probational citizenship’. This brings me to another distinction between freedom of movement pre- and post-naturalisation, namely the question of safety.

Naturalisation and safety

Mama Sophia, a wife of a well-known Pentecostal pastor in Dar es Salaam, told me that the first thing she did after obtaining the citizenship certificate was to apply for a passport. ‘A real passport’, she underlined, referring to the forged documents many refugees relied on previously. ‘I was so happy, and it was the first thing to do. They did not question me or anything. Then, we also applied for ID documents’, she continued (int. 2017). ‘For me’, she said, ‘the most important benefit of citizenship is travels, freedom, *kusafiri*’ (int. 2017). Like many of my interlocutors, Mama Sophia never faced problems with immigration officers or police but felt anxiety every time she travelled to visit her family in Katumba. Obtaining the certificate, she maintained, removed the anxiety and potential risks of entering and exiting the settlement.

Similar thoughts were expressed by Dominik, a trader in Kariakoo who frequently travels to the settlements and to Burundi to buy and sell goods: ‘I never got any

problems travelling but nobody knows the future. You might get problems in the future even though you have not had problems until now. They might ask you when you are crossing the border or coming to the city for your documents. So you can be in trouble’ (int. 2015). His perspective, similarly to Mama Sophia’s, highlights that although they were both able to travel over the years without any disturbance, naturalisation has removed the underlying anxiety that something dangerous might potentially happen to them one day.

The narratives of the younger urban refugees support this perception. Issa initially came to Dar es Salaam to work as a shopkeeper. When his boss moved to Mtwara (a town in the south of the country on the coast), he decided to stay in Dar es Salaam, because living in the city gave him more prospects for advancing his artistic career as a singer. He got his citizenship certificate in 2015, and since then he has never had to use it or show it to anyone. Still, he believes it was extremely important to get the certificate: ‘The moment you need to use the certificate is in case of emergency, it is when someone says you are a refugee, and you need to defend yourself, and then you can show the certificate’ (int. 2017). ‘I never had to use it’, he continued, ‘but it feels so good to have it’ (int. 2017). Another young man I spoke to several times in Kariakoo, the biggest market in Dar es Salaam, gave similar reasons as to why he finds having a certificate important:

‘When I walk on these streets now, I walk confidently, knowing that even if somebody catches me, I have a certificate to show. I can live within this city freely without fearing anybody. This is a very great advantage’ (int. 2017).

Similar attitudes were expressed in almost every interview I had with urban residents who recently obtained their papers. What becomes apparent in these narratives is a notion that citizenship functions as a protection mechanism in case of emergency. On the surface, there is not much change in former refugees' migration patterns since they received citizenship, as they migrated extensively and were rarely arrested or harassed by the authorities before naturalisation. However, my research shows that there is a significant shift in urban refugees' sense of personal safety and the level of anxiety they experience on a daily basis, which I discuss further in the next chapter (Chapter 8). What is important here is that access to citizenship documents decreases the sense of anxiety associated with illegal migration out of the settlements and it alters people's experience of movement. In the next section, I turn to the question of why former refugees who never left the settlements and do not intend to do so, firmly believe that freedom of movement is the most important benefit of naturalisation.

Movement and freedom

On a rainy day at the end of April 2015, I went to visit an elderly Pentecostal preacher, whom I was introduced to during a Sunday mass. I was told that he prefers to speak Kirundi, and so my research assistant accompanied me to the house. It was a month of hope and anticipation, as the first round of distribution of citizenship certificates was just completed and the rainy season was good. When we arrived at the house, we found out that the preacher was away, but his wife was there, eager to welcome us. She was just peeling corn and insisted we join her at her tasks and tell her stories. We did as we were told, and we admired the garden, lush, full of flowers and fruit trees. We shared

stories, and she told us how surprised she was that some people repatriated, she obviously wanted to stay in Tanzania, to ‘live where there is peace’ (int. 2015). Like many older adults I met, Bernice remembered the horrors of killings in Burundi and did not believe that it was safe to repatriate.

When we asked about what has changed for her since naturalisation, she replied: ‘There are changes, yes, now we are free, we can move around, no one will catch us’ (int. 2015). When my assistant inquired if she was ever caught by immigration or faced any problems migrating, she told us that she never left the settlement and ‘in all truthfulness, I have not even been to the town center of Ulyankulu. I find it too hectic’ (int. 2015). The preacher’s wife’s story was not unusual – I met many older people in the settlement who insisted that freedom of movement is the most important benefit of citizenship, although they have never moved and do not intend to. Some never leave their villages and cannot recall the last time they went to the market in the center of the settlement.

In these conversations, former refugees linked their newly acquired citizenship with a sense of freedom, which reflects Amartya Sen’s capability approach. In Sen’s (1994) conceptualisation, a person’s capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. The question of the ability to *choose* between different functioning, different kinds of life, is crucial for the capabilities approach. The conversation with Bernice reveals that access to freedom of movement can have ‘a capabilities effect’ without being acted upon. What she values is precisely

the recognition of her right to move and the fact that she can *choose* to remain in the settlement or *choose* to leave (even if she is not planning to do so). What transpires through these narratives is a strong link that former refugees make between their right to freedom of movement and citizenship, where freedom of movement signifies much more than the mere act of moving.

From movement to mobility

Past experiences of restricted freedom of movement and anxiety that comes with migratory decisions generated a conviction among the former refugees that true freedom of movement is an attribute of citizenship, and it cannot be attained in any other way. Identifying refugeehood with restricted freedom of movement translated into equating the opposite of refugee status – national citizenship – with mobility and all the benefits that come with it. In other words, protracted and collective experiences of associating migration with fear and anxiety generated a strong conviction among the former refugees that the main benefit of citizenship is the *recognition* of the right to move freely and improve one's livelihood.

Although people could leave the settlements and establish urban and rural livelihoods in other parts of the country in the past, these practices always came with a sense of potential risk and anxiety. Today, instead of simply *moving*, people are now *mobile*, meaning that their movement is safe, legal, and recognised by the state. These qualities mark the difference between movement prior and post-naturalisation and illuminate why former refugees contend that freedom of movement (understood as mobility) is

one of the most important benefits of citizenship. As the stories shared above indicated, however, the benefits of freedom of movement are still ‘probational’ and former refugees believe that mobility, in its expansive sense, will only fully materialise for the next generation.

I argue that in this understanding of freedom of movement as mobility is where a formal/ statutory version of citizenship meets the substantive version. Having autonomy to choose (and that choice being recognised by the state) is crucial, and the right to choose (expressed in decisions of mobility), becomes a vehicle for claiming substantive citizenship rights. This process is neither linear nor immediate, and former refugees are aware that it might take another generation. What is important here is that even people who are not (and do not intend to) move away from the settlements, underline the importance of having a *choice* to stay or a *choice* to leave – for themselves and their children. The capability to improve one’s livelihoods through mobility becomes a defining feature of citizenship in this specific context of displacement. In the next section, I discuss how migration of former refugees out from the settlements has coincided with the migration of Tanzanians from the neighbouring regions to the settlement, and how does that process reinforce the importance of movement in people’s view of citizenship.

7.3. Mobile citizens, mobile environments

The implementation of TANCROSS policy gave rise to several migration channels. The first one, supervised by the UNHCR and sanctioned by both the Tanzanian and

Burundian state, was the process of repatriation of the families and individuals who opted to return to Burundi. The second channel comprised the outward migration of former refugees to cities and villages across the country. The third, less anticipated and less structured, was the movement of Tanzanians into the settlement. In this section, I discuss the processes of in-migration of Tanzanians to Ulyankulu and the affects it has on former refugees' understanding of citizenship.

Inward migration of Tanzanians

Over the years, Tanzanians came to the settlement as civil servants, teachers, nurses, police officers, administrative officials, and businessmen. Many retired and settled in Ulyankulu. Initially, they constituted a very small percentage of Ulyankulu's population. Following the implementation of TANCOS, however, thousands of Tanzanians began to move into the area, and today their number is estimated at around 12,000 (according to the village chairman of Kaswa village). This is an estimation, as Tanzanians do not register with the settlement administration or the village government, and they usually settle clandestinely (although legally they are required to report to the Settlement Officer). Many come for business, claiming that entrepreneurial opportunities are prolific in the settlement due to the high population density. Moreover, according to the incoming Tanzanians, since the refugees obtained citizenship, they are more inclined to invest in improving their living conditions in Tanzania, which increases their spending capacity.

Before naturalisation, there was a law in place in the settlements which held that while having visitors, one had to report it to the settlement's office. This was recalled in many interviews, and former refugees spoke about the humiliation that it brought to them: 'It was a constant reminder that we live in a settlement' (int. 2015). Listing the benefits of naturalisation, many people remarked how important it was for them that today they do not have to do this anymore, that they live in a space that is open – both for them to leave and for the outsiders to enter. These stories often led people to emphasise how important was the elimination of boundary control in Ulyankulu and how the recent increase in the inward migration of Tanzanians into the area was an indication of that transformation.

The key pull factor that motivated many Tanzanians I met to come to Ulyankulu was the availability of 'cheap' land. Henry, a bicycle fundi (repairman) from Shinyanga town, told me one afternoon: 'I came here because I heard that fertile land was being sold cheaply' (int. 2015). We were sitting in the shadow of his house, drinking soda, as he explained how he bought the house and the land that we were looking at from a Burundian family that repatriated a few years ago. When he came to Ulyankulu in 2010, he first stayed at a hostel and the next day met with a man who helped him to locate refugee families interested in selling their land.

People's stories indicate that while coming to the settlement they usually had friends or family members living there, or they used the services of a 'fixer' – someone who knew the area and could help them to access land. In the process of buying land, the incoming Tanzanians would first approach the seller and then inform only the

authorities at the lowest level – ten-cell leaders or street leaders. An agreement was then formulated and signed by all parties involved. Neither the village leader nor the Settlement Officer was informed about these transactions. The willingness of Tanzanians to engage in land transactions in the settlements functions as an indication of their recognition of former refugees' customary rights to land based on shared cultural notions of long-term occupation and productive use of land (as I discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). What is important here is that although Tanzanians often initially arrived temporarily for business purposes, many decided to stay and settle down in Ulyankulu.

Crucial in this new migration pattern is how it was received and supported by the former refugees. The topic of inward migration of Tanzanians came up in every interview and conversation I had, as it was one of the most visible and debated issues at the time of my fieldwork. The process of integration between the former refugees and incoming Tanzanians should by no means be idealised. As many of the incoming Tanzanians are Sukuma pastoralists, conflicts over cattle, pasture, and damaged crops are ubiquitous. In the main market, competition for stalls has increased, and occasionally one hears rumours that Tanzanians only purchase goods from other Tanzanians. At the level of local governance, friction between the different groups became part of daily life. However, despite the challenges faced in this process of integration, former refugees insist that inward migration of Tanzanians is 'ultimately a good thing'. My interviewees would go out of their way to make sure that my research assistant and I understood clearly that regardless of the number of complaints, confrontations and disagreements, they appreciate the presence of Tanzanians in the

settlement and, overall, the relationship between the groups is constructive. When I probed into the reasons behind this narrative, former refugees would tell me that the presence of Tanzanians legitimises naturalisation and functions as an evidence of their integration with the local communities.

When the inward migration is taken into the picture, citizenship does not only denote individuals' experience of being able to be mobile, to *travel* [*kusafiri*] but also means living in environments that allow for in-and-out migration of people. The experiences and insights of former refugees reveal that mobility is a crucial dimension of citizenship and that it stands for having a *choice* to go but also the *choice* to stay in an open environment. These are not mutually exclusive, rather, they reinforce each other and contribute to how former refugees think about citizenship. The benefits of mobility, however, are not equally distributed, and in the next section, I turn to the limits to mobility.

7.4. The limits to mobility

The narratives of former refugees discussed in this chapter strongly resonate with arguments of scholars who advocate for recognising and legalising refugees' mobility as a solution to their economic and other livelihood needs (Long, 2010; Long & Crisp, 2010; Monsutti, 2008). Migration scholars have shown that repatriation and local integration involve continued mobility within and across borders (Hammond, 2004; Stepputat, 2004; Long, 2010), and humanitarian interventions and immigration policy frameworks 'must adapt to this reality by becoming, respectively, more mobility-and

refugee-friendly’ (Long, 2015, p. 1). My research supports the existing scholarship and shows that mobility has significant symbolic benefits that go beyond access to livelihoods. In the following section, however, I look at immobility as the flip side of mobility; discussing the limits of mobility and its ensuing consequences.

Differentiation and immobility in displacement

As I set out in Chapter 3, immobility, or being stuck, is an integral part of displacement. As Hammar (2014) shows, not all displacement involves physical removal or forced movement away from a particular place. For some people, it may mean various forms of what Lubkemann (2008) calls ‘involuntary immobility’. This may entail being forced to remain, to be ‘displaced-in-place’ with no ability to move (Jones, 2016). For others, it can mean confinement and inability to escape such as in the IDP camps in northern Uganda (Finnström, 2008). Finally, in relation to my study, immobility comes from simply having no means to move (Lubkemann, 2008).

Lubkemann (2008) strongly argues against the implicit ‘conflation of migration with a displacement that currently serves as the definitional point of departure in forced migration/refugee studies’ (p. 454). He shows that in the case of Mozambican civil war, the focus on wartime migration has rendered invisible people who were not able to move and in result suffered a form of ‘displacement in place’. He puts forward an argument that paradoxically, migration resulted in forms of empowerment for at least some social actors, whereas involuntary immobility was the locus of disruption and disempowerment. Consequently, ‘those who suffered most dramatically were not

those who fled the country and became refugees or who relocated elsewhere within Mozambique (IDPs) but were actually those who were forced to remain ‘in place’ within the district throughout the war’s entire fifteen-year span’ (Lubkmann, 2008, p. 455).

In line with Lubkmann (2008), Omata (2017) has been pointing out to significant differentiation in people’s ability to move, access resources, access education, and secure livelihoods in displacement. The issue of differentiation among displacees, whether in camps or not, is an important point. Already in the 1990s, Allen and Turton (1996) warned of the risk of treating displaced populations as if they were a homogeneous group without internal differentiation. Displacement is experienced differently as mediated by age, gender, marital status, and personal goals. In the case of my research, both gender, age and wealth played a crucial role in people’s ability to take advantage of the benefits of naturalisation. According to the people I spoke to in Ulyankulu, naturalisation has increased the spontaneous and self-organised migration out of the settlement, and today more people are leaving Ulyankulu than ever before. However, over the months spent in Ulyankulu, it became clear to me that the benefits of mobility are by no means equally distributed.

Gender is an obvious and well-documented cleavage regarding who can leave a refugee camp (Daley, 2001, p. 256; Sommers, 2001). The same patterns are true in the case of Ulyankulu, where men are significantly more likely to migrate individually. Young men tend to leave the settlements in higher numbers, and young women usually leave for reunification with their partner or parent and in rare cases for further

education. There are, of course, exceptions from that norm, and my primary interlocutor Mama Alice moved out from the settlement on her own and found a job as a secretary at a tobacco company. As she herself asserted, however, her story was unusual. Regarding age, all the older adults I interviewed maintained that they preferred to stay in the settlement. However, I met a few families that relocated their parents to Tabora town so they could be closer to medical facilities (Ulyankulu does not have a hospital). Both gender and age were definitely important determinants of people's ability to move from Ulyankulu.

However, the division that was most significant in the context of my research was the question of financial resources and connections. Van Hear (2014) has explored class as a less studied but equally significant indicator of migratory decisions in refugee camps. Class, in this context, is not understood in the conventional, sociological Marxist framing where people identify themselves as a certain class to gain resources and power from their class identification (Lafferty, 1996). In this analysis, I am using class in a broader sense, to reflect wealth, social connections and status. In line with Van Hear (2014), I understand class in the context of displacement as defined by the different kinds of economic and social resources or 'capitals' that people possess. Van Hear (2014) suggests that considering class in terms of authority relations and different endowments of capital is helpful for shedding light on the functionality of class in displacement. Following on these insights, I paid close attention to who does and who does not move from the settlements and what are the consequences of mobility and immobility.

In line with the existing research on migration and class (Van Hear, 2014; Gomes, 2017; Fathi, 2017) my interviews highlight the correlation between people's ability to move out of the settlements and their access to financial, educational and social capital. As a young farmer once told me: 'Only people who have capital, who have money, are moving away from here' (int. 2015). During my research, I met many people who proclaimed that they wish they could leave the settlement, but they cannot afford to acquire land outside the settlement and have no skills to find a job.

Aloise, a young owner of a hair salon, told me that the problem with Ulyankulu is that: 'Some people have capital, and some don't, and it is very difficult to acquire capital in the settlement. There is a shortage of work here, so people go out, to find capital, but then some come back' (int. 2016). He went to Mwanza, Tabora and Urambo, worked as a manual worker for two years, saved up money, and then came back to Ulyankulu and opened a hair salon. When we discussed if he faced any problems leaving the settlement, he replied: 'In my family we all got citizenship. We have freedom now; we do the same things as other citizens. Before naturalisation I went to school in Tabora, you needed a letter, were stopped by the police, they would question you, disturb. Now that's over' (int. 2016).

The correlation between capital and movement, however, does not mean that all wealthier and better-educated individuals are moving out of the settlement. Some relatively well-off people decide to remain in the settlement because their business is

going well in Ulyankulu or because they find moving stressful. Others, like Aloise, find it easier to establish a business in Ulyankulu, where they have a strong social network and know their potential customers. Anna, a lady who owns a shop where she sells bread in the centre of Ulyankulu told me once: 'If it continues to be good in the settlements, I will stay, if not, I will go, depends on the conditions here' (int. 2016). Thus, having more capital does not necessarily mean that people will leave the settlement. Rather, the difference between the wealthier and the more deprived members of the community manifests itself in the *potentiality* of movement, the *ability to choose*. Those who have capital and connections might not decide to leave Ulyankulu, but migration is a choice they are privileged to make.

Class does not only determine the initial capacity for migration, but it also determines the options available following arrival in urban centres. The types of jobs and accommodation refugees can access in cities depend on their initial capital, education, and the social connections they have. I met several young people in Ulyankulu who returned from Mwanza or Dar es Salaam because 'life was too expensive' and 'they could not make it'. During the months of research with the 1972 refugee community in Dar es Salaam, most households I visited were struggling to make ends meet, and only a handful of families had a family member in a permanent job. I often talked to people about their friends and relatives who came from the settlements and live in Dar es Salaam, and these conversations indicated that the majority of urban refugees, like the majority of other urban poor in Dar es Salaam, struggle to survive. However, during my research I was also able to meet a handful of successful and well-off members of the Burundian refugee community. Over time, the class divide in the 1972

Burundian community became more and more clear to me, revealing a distinct separation between the elite and the urban poor refugees and its' consequences.

Consequences of immobility

Conducting research in Dar es Salaam, I was struck by how many of my informants did not yet have citizenship certificates and did not participate in the earlier rounds of registration. It was explained to me that when the process was initiated they 'did not trust it', 'were concerned that it was a way to discover those living in urban areas', or simply were not informed on time and 'did not arrive on time for the registration'. As the months passed and people realised that the exercise was genuine, they began impatiently waiting for the next round of registration. In January 2017, the government announced that they are going to do another round of citizenship registration in the Old Settlements of Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. The information was sent to the settlements and then disseminated within the urban communities through text messages and by word of mouth. People I met received the news with relief and excitement, and they began making plans to participate in the registration.

In the process of planning the third registration, the Tanzanian Government consulted the elite members of the Burundian community about an opportunity to conduct another registration in Dar es Salaam in 2017³⁵, but the people consulted argued against it. The rationale was that conducting the registration in the city increased their

³⁵ Initially, one of the first rounds of citizenship distribution took place in Dar es Salaam, and many people I knew, including my research assistant and primary interlocutors, received their citizenship by registering in Dar es Salaam. The second round of registration took place in the settlements.

visibility and could put them in danger. These concerns were primarily expressed by members of the refugee community who work in government employment or run their own businesses. For them, the long and expensive travel to the settlements was a more convenient option. Concerns of the more deprived members of the community, who were not consulted on the process, differed starkly from the elite members.

The cost of a return bus ticket to Tabora is around 35 USD, whereas a train ticket to Katumba and Mishamo is even more expensive. Considering that many households have five or more family members, the expenditure amounted for them to more than 200 USD per family. The majority of the families I interviewed do not have a disposable income or savings to pay for the tickets. Moreover, the government did not communicate the dates of the exercise clearly and eventually announced the dates only ten days before the beginning of the exercise. That left very little time for the families to save money and prepare for this major expense. Registration took place while I was still doing my research in Dar es Salaam, and I met many individuals and families who could not afford to travel to the settlements and in consequence missed the chance to register for citizenship.

I met Jacob in a large Pentecostal Church where I did many of my interviews and met many people from the Burundian community. Jacob has been in Dar es Salaam for five years. His family rents a house from a Tanzanian owner who doesn't know where they come from and he believes they are from Sumbawanga. Jacob has a wife and seven children who came with him from the settlement. He has never been to Burundi and from the beginning decided that he wants to naturalise: 'My family is here, the children

are at school, they are in government schools which are free now, the schools are better here than in Katumba. We have family in Burundi, but I have never been, I would never go, I am scared. I want to stay in Dar es Salaam *sana sana* [Kiswahili *very very much*]' (int. 2017). As we continued talking, I realised that no one in his family has citizenship documents. Jacob's only job is selling coffee, and he told me that he could not afford the train tickets for his family to go to Katumba for registration. '*Sina uwezo*' [Kiswahili for no ability, not being able to, not having capacity], he concluded, 'we know it's very important and we would go, but we just can't afford it' (int. 2017).

In a conversation with Albert, a street vendor and a friend of my research assistant, I asked him if he knows many people in Dar es Salaam who did not get citizenship. He said that most people he knew did not get the documents and also that they will not participate in the next registration:

Many people won't go for the registration now because of hard life and not being able to afford the costs of transport. Many. In the past, let's say a father would go with a child, but mother and another small child would stay here [during the last exercise]. And remember, that was during Kikwete's time and the economy was better, and people had more cash. So now, many people they will miss it. If it was done in Dar es Salaam, we could come more easily (int. 2017).

As I continued my research, I realised that he was correct, and many households sent one person to register for citizenship because they could not afford to pay for tickets for the whole family.

My research assistant confirmed these findings, as some of his relatives and friends are in a similar position of being unable to go and register for citizenship. Many people told me that due to lack of funds only one or two members of the household would travel to register for citizenship. Paradoxically, migration to urban centres might eventually prevent some of the refugees from accessing citizenship. This tragic episode reveals stark division within the 1972 urban community, where more influential members advocated for a solution more convenient for themselves, subsequently depriving the poorest members of the community of the opportunity to register for citizenship.

This episode is of enormous consequence. Humanitarian agencies and governments working with refugees/displaced people tend to entirely ignore differentiation and devise blanket policies for all displacees (Hammar, 2017). Omata (2013, 2017) exposes these dynamics in the context of repatriation of Liberian refugees to Ghana, where he shows significant differences in returnees' capacities to settle in the country of origin. Drawing on the evidence, he urges UNHCR to rethink its approach to differentiation and to provide tailored assistance, especially for displacees who are likely to be exposed to new types of vulnerability following the implementation of durable solutions.

This argument resonates strongly with the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Access to financial, social, and educational capital determined not only people's initial ability to leave the settlement but it also shaped the types of opportunities available in urban zones. These opportunities, in turn, structured people's access to cash and capacity to travel back to the settlements for citizenship registration. Among the 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the condition of displacement accentuated the existing class divide, determining not only people's access to employment and further education but also their access to citizenship. Here, the *involuntary immobility* (Lubkemann, 2008) of urban refugees might deprive them of a chance to apply for citizenship documents and generate further vulnerabilities in this already marginalised population.

Conclusion

Although freedom of movement is a right granted to refugees under international conventions, in practice, refugees' movement is monitored and restricted. In the mid-1980s, the inhabitants of the Old Settlements were considered to be self-sufficient, and the international organisations handed over control of the settlements to the Tanzanian government. In the absence of other measures of control, control of freedom of movement in the Old Settlements became imbued with special significance. Although the area was not fenced, and the borders were not clearly defined and policed, leaving the settlements without an official permit was linked with potential danger and anxiety. The repressive isolation of the settlements and the lack of documentation allowed the Tanzanian government to control the movement of the refugees. Thus, in the Old

Settlements in Tanzania the lack of documents operated as a symbolic boundary but with real disciplining effects.

Despite the strict restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement, Burundian refugees from the Old Settlements migrated in large numbers, mostly to urban centres of Tabora, Kigoma, Mwanza, Morogoro, and Dar es Salaam. The biggest advantage of Burundians in Tanzania is that they can easily blend in with the Tanzanian population and that the Tanzanian government only recently began issuing national identity cards. A combination of those factors enabled Burundian refugees to live outside of the settlements before naturalisation. Despite refugees' ability to exit and enter the settlements, fear and anxiety defined their experience of migration.

Drawing on people's narratives and my own observations, I argue that with access to citizenship documents, the experience of movement in displacement began to change from migration to mobility. In this chapter, I outlined an idea of evolving process of transition from migration to mobility, where migration denotes movement from point A to B with a destination, and mobility, on the other hand, signifies the capacity to move without fear and anxiety, to practice freedom of movement with recognition of the state and other citizens, and to live in multiple places open to migration. I observe that in this understanding of mobility, having autonomy to choose (and that choice being recognised by the state) is crucial, and even people who are not (and do not intend to) move away from the settlements, underline the importance of having a *choice* to stay or a *choice* to leave. Mobility, in its expansive sense, becomes a crucial marker of citizenship in displacement.

The rights to choose (expressed in decisions of mobility) becomes a vehicle for claiming substantive citizenship rights. The transition from movement to mobility, however, is neither immediate nor linear, and former refugees are aware that it might take another generation. In that sense, although mobility carries enormous opportunities for the former refugees, many still have to hide their identity and they believe that the benefits of mobility will (hopefully) be realised for the next generation. The narratives about freedom of movement reveal an underlying temporality of citizenship in displacement, where certain rights are withheld for an undetermined period; reflecting the proposed tenets of 'probational citizenship'. Moreover, research among the urban refugees in Dar es Salaam has shown that many could not afford to travel back to the settlements, and as a result missed the opportunity to register for citizenship. This tragic episode revealed a stark class divide in the 1972 community, highlighting the importance of social status in who can move and to what effect. With a significant percentage of the urban population missing the registration exercise and consequently with many families having a close relative or friend who did not receive citizenship, the citizenship status of the former Burundian refugees as a group remains imbued with uncertainty. In the next chapter, I shift my lens from mobility to the materiality of citizenship, exploring further the paradoxical interplay of safety and uncertainty that came with naturalisation.

8. The tangible and intangible benefits of citizenship documents in displacement

When you have a citizenship document, you walk confidently, with your back straight

(int. 2017, Dar es Salaam).

Citizenship is more than a document, but documents become more and more necessary to prove and assert one's formal citizenship. Material and perishable, documents lurk behind citizenship status. Although legal status goes far beyond documentation, at the same time it relies on the materiality of documents for proof and validation. As the recent Windrush scandal³⁶ in Britain has shown, legal status can sometimes depend on fragile paperwork and data files that might be destroyed or manipulated (Gayle, 2018). Even when people have a right to membership, without documents to prove it, their rights can become meaningless (Gordillo, 2006; Lochery, 2012). In the African context, biometric identification is on the rise, with major national and international stakeholders investing in ID programs across the continent (see Behrends, 2018 on Chad; Breckenridge, 2014 on South Africa; Makulilo, 2017 on biometric voter identification in Tanzania). As these developments advance globally, identity documents become more important for proving one's membership in the nation-state.

³⁶ The Windrush scandal happened in 2018. It was a British political scandal concerning people who were wrongly detained, denied legal rights, threatened with deportation and wrongly deported from the UK by the Home Office. Many of those affected had been born British subjects and had arrived in the UK before 1973, particularly from Caribbean countries as members of the Windrush generation.

The implementation of naturalisation of Burundian refugees needs to be seen against that backdrop.

The fieldwork for this research took place during the distribution of citizenship certificates and therefore the materiality of documentation played a crucial role in how my interlocutors narrated their experience of naturalisation. In this chapter, I show how former refugees treat their new citizenship documents in their material form and how close attention to these practices reveals an ongoing interplay of safety and uncertainty. Following Hammar (2018) and Kelly (2006), I believe that studying and looking *at* citizenship documents and the way people treat, use, and understand them can give insights into how they conceptualise citizenship itself. Paying close attention to the materiality of naturalisation highlights both the benefits of certification such as safety and ability to plan for the future, as well as the new uncertainties and vulnerabilities created with access to citizenship documents.

In the past, researchers have shown that people can integrate without access to formal citizenship, and that documented citizenship often does not guarantee rights and privileges. This analytical approach has been widely applied by scholars researching the experiences of migrants and refugees who manage to claim rights despite the lack of legal and documented status (see Gasarasi, 1990; Jacobsen, 2017; Polzer, 2012). In this chapter, I argue that the case of former Burundian refugees contradicts these earlier perspectives, and drawing on the experiences of former Burundian refugees, in this chapter I explore the tangible and intangible significance of the materiality of citizenship documents in displacement. I argue that in contemporary Tanzania, and

many other countries in the world, access to documentation becomes more and more crucial for achieving integration even if the people concerned rarely interact with state agencies and services.

In this chapter, I evaluate themes of safety, planning for the future, and uncertainty of certification. What transpires from analysing how people handle and understand their citizenship documents is ambiguous. On the one hand, former refugees see their citizenship status as unstable and uncertain. On the other hand, they assert that access to citizenship allows them to feel safe and make plans for the future in Tanzania. The literature on displacement (El-Shaarawi, 2015; Brun & Fabos, 2015; Horst & Grabska, 2015; Turner, 2016) shows that the spatial and temporal aspects of uncertainty are central to the experiences of conflict-induced displacement, transit, and refugeeness, where both ‘radical’ and ‘protracted’ uncertainty is produced. In the final part of the chapter, I evaluate how the framing of ‘probational citizenship’ emerges directly from the narratives of former refugees, allowing to highlight the relations of power that make citizenship meaningful.

8.1. Approaching citizenship through documentation

During my fieldwork in Dar es Salaam, I met Francis, a former Burundian refugee and a friend of my research assistant. We were sitting drinking soda on the top floor of a busy building in Kariakoo market. Following a casual conversation about the weather and the traffic in the rainy season, I asked Francis why he opted for Tanzanian citizenship and what, if anything, has changed for him since naturalisation. Ignoring

my initial question, Francis replied: ‘Do you want to see it?’, and before I could respond, he started fumbling around in his pockets, searching for something. Then, he pulled out a laminated photocopy, put it on the table, straighten it, and we looked at it for a moment, in silence. After that brief encounter, followed by an exchange of smiles, the document was folded and hidden away again. It was a photocopy because, as I learnt later, people kept the original citizenship documents hidden in places they considered safe. As Francis’ told me on another occasion, he keeps the certificate far away down the coast from Dar es Salaam with his uncle, ‘who retired and has a nice house’ (int. 2017). Starting from this one and other similar encounters, I began paying closer attention to how people handle and use their citizenship documents in their material form and what insights can be learned from that.

Evans-Pritchard (1950) drew attention to the problematic ways in which documents have been disregarded in structural-functionalist anthropology, which established participant observation as its privileged method. Thus, although bureaucratic documents have been late to come under ethnographic scrutiny (Hull, 2012), they have by now received a lot of attention in contemporary anthropology (Kelly, 2006; Gordillo, 2006; Gupta, 2012; Lowenkron & Ferreira, 2014). Anthropologists have highlighted the need to go beyond documents’ informational and instrumental dimension and use documents instead as producers of knowledge and effects (Stoler, 2009). Overall, the fundamental insight from the literature on documentation is that documents are not simply instruments of bureaucratic organisations: they are constitutive of rules and the organisations themselves (Hull, 2012).

Chhotray and McConnell (2018) explore how identity documents of various types play a vital part in certifying and authenticating claims to citizenship. They bring together a range of disciplinary perspectives which undermine the notion of citizenship as absolute and fixed. Instead, looking closely at identity documents, the contributors seek 'to theorise the very mutable 'hierarchies' and 'degrees' of citizenship' (Chhotray and McConnell, 2018, p. 111). This approach is particularly productive in contexts where displacement or structural discrimination has created uncertain situations for individuals who struggle to obtain documents to 'certify' their citizenship, as Gordillo's (2006) work on indigenous Argentinians demonstrates. Chhotray and McConnell (2018) elaborate on an idea of 'certification of citizenship' which is meant to capture the role of authority and recognition in the processes of asserting citizenship. I find the notion of 'certification of citizenship' productive in the context of capturing the evolving citizenship in displacement and I return to it in the latter part of this chapter.

As Tobias Kelly (2006) writes in the context of Palestinians in the West Bank: 'The forms of legal identification that they hold are central to the life chances of many Palestinians, as it is these documents that help determine the ability of the holder to move around the West Bank and access rights and resources' (p. 90). At the same time, however, Kelly (2006) shows how identity documents are always partial and unstable, generating apprehension and suspicion of forgery. In other words, people gain a measure of security through holding the right documents, but simultaneously these same documents also mean that 'their lives are shot through with fear and uncertainty' (Kelly, 2006, p. 90). Kelly concludes that identity documents are an unpredictable and

unstable technique of governance, which produces considerable anxiety for all those subject to their use.

Drawing on his extensive research in Palestine, Kelly (2006) argues that for many people in the region the forms of legal identification they hold are central to their life chances. Thus, documents should not be seen anymore as abstract entities, but ‘must be understood in the wider institutional and political context in which they are produced, verified, and take effect’ (Kelly, 2006, p. 92). Following Kelly’s insights, I pay close attention to how people handle and understand their citizenship documents in their material form to learn more about how they conceptualise and experience their new status. Studying and looking *at* citizenship documents and the way people treat, use, and understand them can give insights into how they conceptualise citizenship itself.

8.2. The tangible and intangible consequences of certification

Thinking about how former Burundian refugees treat their citizenship documents in their material form is grounded in the broader context of rapid roll-out of ID documents’ programs across the continent. The increasing importance of biometric identification and the awareness of the new dangers of lack of certification have a profound effect on how former refugees take care of and use their citizenship documents. This section shares stories of how people treat their citizenship documents in their material form and what does it tell us about the broader understanding of citizenship in the context of displacement.

Documented peace of mind

At the various stages of this research project, people I interviewed, when asked questions about the process of naturalisation, showed me the photocopy of their citizenship document in response to my queries. These encounters then led to more in-depth conversations about how and when people use their documents, what it means to them, what has changed for them following naturalisation and what are their biggest concerns. What I observed was that across the urban and rural contexts, people treated their documents with outstanding care, always carrying photocopies and keeping the original document in places they considered safe, such as houses of well-off relatives in other regions of Tanzania or their family homes in the settlements.

The opening conversations about the documents always centred around themes of safety and *amani* (*Kiswahili* 'peace', also used to refer to peace of mind). As Javi, an interlocutor who works as a teacher at a vocational school told me many times, 'obtaining citizenship certificate brought peace into my heart, before I have lived in fear' (int. 2015). Javi told me that the feelings of insecurity escalated at the time of suspension of naturalisation (2010-2014), when it was unclear if following naturalisation people will be required to relocate to other parts of Tanzania, allowed to remain in the settlements or will the whole exercise of naturalisation be cancelled, and everyone will be repatriated to Burundi. It was a very tense time for the Burundian refugees, and when certificates were finally distributed, people welcomed it with relief. It is important to highlight that the delayed and confusing implementation of naturalisation aggravated people's anxiety.

I met Sara, a middle age woman from Ulyankulu, during my first visit to the settlement. She was a family member of one of the teachers who assisted me during the first phase of my research. I saw her again when I returned to Ulyankulu two years later and I found out that she did not receive a certificate in the first round of distribution due to an administrative mistake. Sara has a learning disability and was dependent on her brother and his family. The relatives were extremely worried that she will be forced to repatriate on her own and will not survive in Burundi. Following an intervention from the local UNHCR office, Sara received the certificate in the second round of distribution one year later. In one conversation at a dinner at her brother's house, she told me: 'The certificate was important for me because it allows me to be here. When the government will do a search, without certificate you will be chased away. Before I feared they would chase me away' (int. 2016).

Both Javi and Sara experienced heightened anxiety regarding the final distribution of the citizenship certificates. When they eventually received the document, they told me repeatedly that it brought 'peace to their minds'. What is important in these narratives is that people do not speak directly about 'using' the document to achieve certain goals or access services or opportunities that they could not access before. Rather, the majority of the people I met spoke about citizenship documents as protection against deportation, as a *certification* of their right to remain in the settlements or urban areas, as a proof of their right to carry on the life they established in Tanzania. As Alida, a woman from a remote area of Ulyankulu who managed to convince her husband that the family should not repatriate, put it into words: 'Why are certificates important? Because they allow us to stay here, no problems will happen' (int. 2016).

The same perspective was articulated by a young man in a focus group discussion: ‘If the police have an inspection, on a bus or in a hostel, looking for some criminals, they ask everyone to show ID and if you don’t have you get in trouble’ (int. 2016). When I inquired in the group if anyone has ever faced harassment due to lack of documentation, people admitted that it happened extremely rarely and none of them has ever experienced it personally. They agreed that the reason why it has never happened to them is because they are ‘careful’ and ‘know how to lie low’. Moreover, they argued, just because it has not happened in the past, it does not mean it will not happen in the future. Their narratives show how people gain a measure of security through holding citizenship documents. Even if they rarely or never *use* the documents in the sense of showing them to the authorities, the fact of having a citizenship certificate ‘brings peace to their minds’.

There is something important to be said about the role of *not*-using the documents. I very rarely heard that someone had to show their naturalisation document unless they were applying for a passport. People rarely found themselves in situations where they had to *use* their documents in the sense of legitimising their identity. In fact, the power of the document lies in *having* it rather than actively using it for a specific purpose. The ‘peace of mind’ and sense of security described by my interlocutors comes from the sheer fact of having a document, which protects them from deportation and allows them to begin planning a future in Tanzania. In other words, the newly acquired citizenship documents carry essential psychosocial benefits of safety and certainty but with real material effects – as in being able to plan, hence invest in, the future. In the

next section, I look at the interrelatedness of the material and the psycho-social or symbolic value of the documents in displacement.

Building for the future

As Horst and Grabka (2015) show, displaced people often report ‘feeling “stuck” between places and in between past and possible future lives’ (p.1), and the case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees confirms these observations. The link between the inherent uncertainty of exile and the consequences it has on people’s ability to think about the future is crucial. In the interviews I conducted in 2014, when the process of naturalisation was temporarily suspended, the theme of planning for the future dominated many conversations. As one elderly father told me: ‘Life is well, but future is a problem, we cannot make long-term plans, how are we supposed to leave this world in peace if we don’t know how to prepare our children for the future, this hurts us’ (int. 2014). A teacher at a school in Ulyankulu expressed the same perspective: ‘Elders pass away, they need to make preparations for their children, how are we supposed to do that if we don’t know what will happen, we don’t know how to prepare our children for the future in this country’ (int. 2014). In the same interview, he continued:

People here don’t invest their potential fully, anytime you might be asked to leave, what will be our future, our destination, we never know, we live in fear, that brings a lot of stress, health problems, for those who are directly facing the

problem, they do not even sleep wondering what to do and what will happen (int 2014).

This narrative mirrors the main arguments in the existing studies on displacement and uncertainty (Brun & Fabos, 2015; Horst & Grabska, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 2015). Drawing on cases from Georgia, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya and beyond, the authors observe that uncertainty about the future becomes a dominant characteristic of the experience of displacement, generating radical and protracted anxiety. They argue that it is the expectation that exile should be temporary, combined with the reality of protracted uncertainty, which leads to the disquieting experience of living in transit (Horst & Grabska, 2015). In my research, I observed that the distribution of citizenship certificates marked a point from which former refugees began to think about their future in Tanzania in more stable and secure terms. This shift manifested itself in a material form as a surge of building and construction activities across the settlement.

The first round of distribution of citizenship certificates in Ulyankulu took place in early March of 2015. When I arrived in Ulyankulu a few weeks later, I witnessed a major transformation occurring in the settlement – both in spatial and affective ways. Following the distribution of the citizenship certificates, the area of the settlement began resembling a construction site, with roads being repaired, electricity poles being laid out, and a first bank going under construction. Moreover, many individuals and families began expanding and improving their existing houses. After the distribution of the certificates, people from the settlement and the nearby villages began

speculating that the Tanzanian government might even create a new administrative district of Ulyankulu³⁷, which will bring further developments to the settlement.

The dreams of development fuelled optimistic and vigorous public debates. The interviews I conducted at that time had an overwhelmingly hopeful outlook. As a leader of a choir in the Catholic Church told me: ‘Obtaining citizenship certificate brought peace into my heart. Before I lived in fear. Now we are free to go anywhere. It truly changed a lot’ (int. 2015). Another member of the church remarked: ‘Before we feared, now we feel confident’ (int. 2015). These conversations had an underlying collective and future-oriented tone. Many of the people I spoke to emphasized that the most important aspect is the safety of their children and opportunities that their future, as citizens, as Tanzanians, can bring for them. As Mzee Godfrey put it, the most important benefit and consequence of naturalisation was that: ‘After my death, my children will be living in peace’ (int. 2015).

When citizenship certificates were finally distributed, some of the concerns and worries that dominated interviews at the early stages of my research had lost their purchase. Following naturalisation, former refugees began to think differently about their future, and these new ways of thinking about the future translated in new ways of engaging with the present. As already mentioned, the distribution of citizenship certificates was followed by vigorous investments in the improvement and construction of houses and other structures around the settlement. The extent of these

³⁷ It is a common practice in Tanzania to establish a new district when the population of a particular area increases – the aim is to encourage more efficient local governance (Rutinwa 2015).

activities was illustrated to me by a visit of a representative from the Institute of Adult Education.

Mr Bilia came to Ulyankulu in late 2016 to see the settlement and survey some of the schools. I spent a few days with him, and we travelled around the settlement, visited different villages, and shared meals and interesting conversations. Before he left for Dar es Salaam, he told me:

When I came here, I was wondering why, why, if people have money here as I hear, why the houses look so poor here. But then, that village chairman of Ikonongo told me that people only started building now, before they were scared. This was because they didn't know how long they will be allowed to stay here. But now that they know, they buy *piki piki* [motorcycles], they build houses (int. 2016).

The same observation was made by my research assistant, who grew up in Katumba settlement, but lives in Dar es Salaam and has not been back in the settlements for over a decade: 'What I think is one of the advantages of people obtaining citizenship certificates', he said, 'is that now people started building nice houses. Before they feared, any time they could be returned to Burundi, but now they have started' (int. 2016). The energy with which people committed themselves to improve their livelihoods in the settlement was visible even to the outsiders.

These practices echo Sen's (1999) capabilities approach, which suggests that the various kinds of resources that people need for survival should never be seen as goals in their own right. Rather, they are needed to achieve certain functionings broadly defined as 'the various things, a person may value doing or being' (Sen, 1999, p. 75). The potential functionings are unlimited, and they range 'from very basic ones, such as being sufficiently nourished or having access to adequate housing, to complex ones, such as having self-respect or being able to participate in society' (Pfister, 2012, p. 242). Following this line of reasoning, the push for building and construction in Ulyankulu has been triggered by naturalisation, and it symbolises people's ability to finally imagine and invest in a future in Tanzania.

As I discussed in Chapter 6, the Settlement Officer has made attempts to ban and control the rise in construction projects across the settlement by introducing a building ban. Former refugees and Tanzanians living in the area, however, kept defying the ban. I argue that people's commitment to improving their houses in the settlement following naturalisation is an indication that access to formal citizenship documentation allows people to make constructive decisions about their future, which in turn manifest itself in more active engagement with the present. Despite the obstacles and the vague prohibitions coming from the settlement's office, people focused their energy on improving their surroundings following naturalisation.

These processes highlight the material and symbolic implications of having or not having legal documentation. The initiation of construction projects in the settlements demonstrates that formalisation of status allows people to make decisions and

participate in activities which foster their integration in the host country. What is important, however, is that access to documents provided a sense of safety and security, and only then these feelings opened spaces for more engagement and investment in the present. In Sen's (1999) terminology, building and construction can be seen here as functioning and ability to plan for the future in Tanzania is a capability. In the next section I show how despite the productive impact that certification has on people's abilities to invest and plan for the future, it simultaneously generates feelings of uncertainty.

The fragility of certification

Mzee Godfrey and his wife Eliza are an elderly couple living in a neat, centrally located house in Ulyankulu surrounded by a small vegetable garden. They do not farm anymore due to their old age and they rely on support from their children. I got to know them well during the years of fieldwork, and the last time I saw them, they told me over a meal: 'We use the certificate only when we need to travel. Otherwise, it stays inside, we were told we wouldn't get another one if we lose this one, so we take good care of it' (int. 2016). When I asked if I could see their certificates, I discovered that they laminated them, placed them into neat school folders and hidden away in boxes. To the couple, the possibility of losing the certificate causes major distress, and safeguarding it is a major source of anxiety. For them, the biggest fear is what would happen if their house burns and they lose the citizenship certificates. As my research progressed, I discovered that they were not an isolated case and that there were

complex and profound reasons behind people's anxiety about losing or damaging their documents.

In a focus group discussion with the village government in Keza, one of the most vibrant and outspoken villages on the outskirts of Ulyankulu, one participant remarked:

We were told that if we lose the certificate if it burns, there is a fire at home, or whatever, we will have to pay 700,000 TZS [almost USD 300]. Until when will that be like this? Until when do we have to move around with that copy and guard these certificates? It does not seem fair (int. 2016).

This topic was picked up by other people in the group, and they discussed it at length. What emerged from that discussion was that people are aware that at least in theory, they will remain Tanzanian citizens even in the event of losing or damaging the certificate. However, in practice, requesting a replacement of the certificate means spending an unimaginable sum of money, travelling to Dar es Salaam, and navigating a complicated and intimidating administrative system, which is all out of their reach due to educational and financial barriers.

Former refugees living in urban areas expressed similar fears. Francis, whom I introduced at the beginning of this chapter, keeps his original citizenship document with his uncle who lives at the coast (Pwani region) because he does not think that the document is 'safe enough' in his rental room in Dar es Salaam. His story illustrates

many spheres where safety and uncertainty overlap. On the one hand, he believes that access to documentation offers him safety from deportation and harassment, and he explained to me that having the documents made him feel more secure living in the city. On the other hand, he does not completely trust the people and surroundings in which he lives. His fear stems from multiple sources. He is scared of what would happen if someone found his certificate and discovered that he comes from a refugee settlement. At the same time, he also fears that if he needs to change accommodation or gets robbed, his certificate might get lost or stolen, and that could put him in potential danger in the future. Weighing and considering his options, he decided to keep the certificate with his uncle hundreds of kilometres away from where he lives. In that way, he ameliorates the risks, and carrying only the copy of his certificate provides him with sufficient protection.

At the heart of these narratives is an implicit tension related to the notion of certification. On the one hand, certification of citizenship (Chhotray & McConnell, 2018) implies certainty and security facilitated by the established authorities. On the other hand, the certainties projected through holding ID documents are far from fixed and secure. As Hammar (2018) observes, ‘holding or ‘owning’ such documents is not always secure in itself: in precarious conditions, these may be lost, stolen, destroyed or confiscated’ (p. 241). Like Palestinians in the West Bank (Kelly 2006), former Burundian refugees assign both values of security and anxiety to the newly obtained documents. In the Palestinian-Israeli context, accusations of forgery as well as mistrust towards the types of documentation carried by Palestinians are the source of anxiety. In the case of Tanzania, however, former refugees report that the authorities respect

their new documents. The source of anxiety, in this context, comes from the belief that citizenship might be arbitrarily ‘taken away’, as well as from a related fear of what would happen if one accidentally loses one’s citizenship documents. Simultaneously, however, obtaining citizenship documents and the legal status that comes with it is for many an invaluable source of recognition and safety.

Therefore, citizenship documents that former refugees so scrupulously guard *are equal to* citizenship because for the people concerned, losing the original documents is equivalent to losing citizenship. The existing studies in anthropology suggest that people can value documents to the ‘point of seeing them as objects whose potency emanates from their materiality rather than from social relations and conventions’ (Gordillo, 2006, p. 163). This perception does not adequately reflect the case of the former Burundian refugees in Tanzania. People I worked with indeed see citizenship documents as objects whose value derives from their materiality, but not because they do not understand that the document is a symbol of social relations and conventions. Rather, their care and reverence for the documents come from an acute awareness that in case of the certificates’ loss or damage they might not be able to replace them. The scrupulous ways in which people handle their citizenship documents are embedded in purely pragmatic concerns, as losing the document for many might equal losing the only proof of their citizenship. Seen in the political context of the rapid roll-out of ID programs in Tanzania, their concerns are pertinent. Whenever I asked my interlocutors about the hypothetical consequences of losing one’s naturalisation document, my questions were always met with solemn silence. In the following, I show how close

attention to how people speak about and use their citizenship documents exposes the new vulnerabilities generated in the process of certification.

8.3. Certification and the new vulnerabilities

In this section, I look at how the process of naturalisation and certification of citizenship has produced new vulnerabilities. Although the majority of the former refugees received their certificates, over a thousand applicants were rejected and currently remain in limbo, without access to either Burundian or Tanzanian citizenship. Other people never registered for naturalisation in the first place but remained in Tanzania. Moreover, some of the repatriates returned from Burundi and are now living in Tanzania, but they are not permitted to register for naturalisation. Taking the lens of the materiality of citizenship documents, I explore how these vulnerabilities were created, developed, and what effects they have on the lives of the people concerned.

'Pending cases'

As discussed in the Introduction, one of the reasons behind the delay in the distribution of citizenship certificates was the decision of the Minister of Home Affairs (Lawrence Masha) to grant citizenship in an individual 'fast track' procedure rather than by a Presidential Decree to all refugees as a group. The 'expedited' procedure followed an individual screening but simplified some of the regular existing procedures and requirements that individuals who apply for naturalisation in Tanzania need to conform to. The idea behind this approach was to simultaneously mitigate negative

public opinion that citizenship is given away without screening and to establish a feeling among the refugees that Tanzanian citizenship is something they need to qualify for. As the report by Nordic Consulting Group (2010) reveals, due to shortages of resources, trained staff, and resistance among the local officials, almost half of the applicants were simply rejected by the local officials at a certain point in the process. The report (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010) argues that the rejections were speculative and not legally valid (p. 36). In order to address this issue, UNHCR has assisted MOHA by providing an electronic database to allow the ministry to categorise the different reasons for rejection. After that was completed, it was agreed that rejection on the grounds of being accused of 'poaching, without evidence, trial, conviction, was not considered a valid reason for rejection' (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, p. 36). At the time of my research (2016), I was told by a local UNHCR official that across the three settlements over 1,200 applicants remained in the rejected category.

The existence of these 'pending case' played an important role in people's understanding of citizenship as it generated suspicions and rumours around why certain people's applications were rejected and what does that say about the security of citizenship status for those who received the documents. If the state can arbitrarily deny some people's applications, can it also arbitrarily take people's citizenship away? In conversations, people expressed their suspicion and disbelief by citing cases they heard of and could not comprehend. One story I heard many times was of a small child that had his citizenship denied on the ground that he was accused of poaching. Another

story was of a leader of a popular woman choir at a Pentecostal Church, who had her application denied while everyone else in her family received the certificates.

I did not intend to dig deeper and uncover the truth behind these stories. What was more important to me was the impact that the existence of ‘pending cases’ and rejected applications had on how people spoke about their citizenship status in uncertain terms. In other words, the presence of outwardly innocent people who did not receive their citizenship documents was a physical reminder of the ambiguous and uncertain implementation of TANCOS. The situation where some people have received citizenship certificates and others haven’t, created a new differentiation, a new boundary between the various members of the community which manifested itself in real, material form of documentation. Neighbours and relatives who all lived with a refugee status for decades are now facing a new distinction based on people’s access (or lack of thereof) to citizenship documents.

People who had their applications rejected came to me for advice and support, hoping that as a white researcher I will be able to help them navigate the difficult terrain of Tanzanian bureaucracy. I tried to explain my lack of power in the process of granting naturalisation but I directed people to the right channels of authority and put them in touch with people who were able to help them file their appeals. In Ulyankulu settlement, due to the presence of a supportive UNHCR officer, many people were assisted in requesting reconsideration of their application. I was unable to follow up on people’s situations myself, but according to my research assistant, in late 2018

many people who applied for naturalisation remain without citizenship certificates. Another group that faces similar problems are the returning repatriates.

Returning repatriates

Returning repatriates are people from the Old Settlements who indicated an intention to repatriate and either repatriated and returned from Burundi or changed their mind and remained in Tanzania. In the database, they are registered as repatriates and are not allowed to re-register for naturalisation. During fieldwork in 2015, I met a family whose grandmother repatriated to Burundi with one of her sons. She said she did not know what was happening, but she saw people fleeing from the north, and so she took the grandchildren and returned to Ulyankulu. The UNHCR found out about her presence and declared that it was going to transport her and the children to the new camps close to Kigoma (Nyaragusu camp). She and the grandchildren were not permitted to reside in Ulyankulu, because they opted for repatriation, and this decision was not reversible. Yet asked if she wants to go back to Burundi when peace comes, the woman replied: ‘No, I prefer to stay, I do not want to go back again. They told us there was peace and safety to return to last time, and you see now’ (int. 2015). Every single person I interviewed in Ulyankulu knows someone with a similar story, someone who repatriated to Burundi, and now fled again to Tanzania because of the current events.

Some of the returning repatriates live in the settlements with their families, whereas others settled in villages and cities beyond the settlements. As a neighbour of my

research assistant told me in one conversation: ‘They [the repatriates] went to Burundi, faced serious problems there, those who had enough money could buy their house from current owners, others struggled. Now many of them are coming back; they are hiding, some of them here, some in other regions. They need protection’ (int. 2015). Similar views were expressed by a bicycle repairman whom I befriended in the central market of Ulyankulu. I often cycled in the settlement and had to fix my bike many times at his workshop. He was a Sukuma pastoralist but resided in Ulyankulu and ran a profitable bicycle business. In one conversation, he explained to me:

Yes, some of the repatriates are coming back now, there is war in Burundi.

Yes, they do. I know three who came back and were imprisoned. They are now in the arrest. Minister of Home Affairs warned that the ones to host and hide them would be held responsible too. I have neighbours, his parents repatriated, many old people repatriated, but now you see them here again (int. 2015).

Together with my research assistant, we decided that meeting with these people could draw attention and expose them, and therefore he conducted the majority of the interviews with the repatriates on his own. The interviews revealed that people who indicated a wish to repatriate but eventually remained in Tanzania or repatriated to Burundi and then returned to Tanzania, are desperate to register for citizenship and are trying to find ways to make that possible by registering under new names in different settlements. As my research assistant reported: ‘They don’t have citizenship because they returned to Burundi. They are thinking about changing their names to access citizenship certificates in Tanzania. They could change their names by registering at

another village here in Ulyankulu or in Katumba'. Interviews conducted by my research assistant indicated that many returnees believe that establishing a secure future in Tanzania depends on access to documentation. Their risky and illegal tactics of trying to secure citizenship highlight the importance of citizenship certificates.

The precarious situation of the returning repatriates strongly influences how former refugees conceptualise their evolving citizenship. People I spoke to often juxtaposed the value of their newly acquired citizenship with the unsafe situation in Burundi (as discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to land access). In these narratives, memories of the past are intertwined with contemporary events, giving an explanatory power to the current protests in Burundi. In that context, former refugees perceive their new citizenship documents as a symbol of security, both in terms of physical safety and the ability to plan for the future. Thus, the conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement is developed in relation to the uncertain situation in Burundi and the precarious situation of the returnees. It is a paradoxical context where we can observe a 'gradation of uncertainty' regarding citizenship status. Naturalised refugees face many insecurities and anxieties regarding their status, however they underline that their circumstances are considerably better than those of those who did not obtain the citizenship certificates in the first place.

Finally, a large proportion of urban poor refugees did not get a chance to register for citizenship due to lack of access to information and financial limitations as discussed in Chapter 7. Urban refugees were initially apprehensive towards the citizenship registration, as they assumed that it was just a coax to identify the urban refugees and return them to the camps. As one interlocutor told me: ‘We didn’t trust that we will receive citizenship the first time when it was announced. You know Tanzanian Government, they say one thing, do another, we just did not trust’ (int. 2017). However, three years later when their family members, friends and relatives received the actual citizenship certificate, people became eagerly waiting for an opportunity to register. Unable to pay for transportation for all family members, only a few registered for citizenship. As I have shown in Chapter 7, the condition of displacement accentuated the existing class divide, determining not only people’s access to employment and further education but also depriving some of the opportunity to apply for citizenship.

At the beginning of this chapter, I introduce a short caveat about Francis. As we continued speaking on other occasions, I found out that Francis’ wife, Cecilia, does not have citizenship documents. Francis told me that he met her when he went to visit his parents and siblings who repatriated to Burundi: ‘When I went to visit my family in Burundi, it was about three years ago, that’s where I met my wife and I married her there. Her family repatriated, but after we got married, we went back to Tanzania. She doesn’t have any documents’ (int. 2017). Cecilia was born in Ulyankulu settlement.

However, although she was born in Tanzania, she can't register for citizenship because she opted to repatriate earlier with her family and that decision is not reversible. Francis told us that he understands that the documents are very important, and he tried to get them for his wife. He communicated with authorities both in her village in Ulyankulu and in his village in Katumba: 'I failed, I asked people in the village if she can be registered for citizenship now, but they say no because she was on the list of those who repatriated' (int. 2017).

Francis was already naturalised when they got married, and the couple never faced any problems with the immigration officers or police, but they are concerned it might change in the future: 'I don't know how things will be in the future and that worries me' (int. 2017). His last question, whenever we talked, was always about his wife, asking if my research assistant or I could help her in any way. He also asked my research assistant what he recommends for them to do and if there are any other documents she could obtain and use for protection. My research assistant told me that he knew of many other marriages that faced similar challenges.

These pockets of incomplete registration for naturalisation generated new vulnerabilities, creating subgroups of refugees who for one reason or another did not register for citizenship and/ or did not receive their certificate. In the current volatile context of Tanzanian immigration politics (as discussed in Chapter 2), the lack of certification might lead in the worst scenario to imprisonment or deportation. For others, it might limit their access to higher education and formal employment. For many, however, it will mean that they will also be deprived of the less tangible benefits

of certification, including increased sense of safety, peace of mind, and the ability to plan for the future. These indirect but fundamental ‘capabilities’ that come with naturalisation will be withheld from the marginalised groups discussed above.

8.5. The evolving experience of ‘probational citizenship’

What emerges from paying close attention to how people treat their documents is an inherent instability at the core of their conceptualisation of citizenship. On the one hand, the interviews conducted following distribution of the certificates indicate that people equate citizenship with safety and security. On the other hand, many of my interviewees expressed doubts about the security of their citizenship status, pointing towards the prolonged waiting for the distribution of the citizenship certificates and incomplete incorporation of the settlements into the Tanzanian government structure. As months passed, it became clear that the district of Ulyankulu will not be created, that land governance remains unclear, and that the settlement’s office remains in place. The high number of cases of people whose citizenship applications were rejected or who did not manage to register for citizenship further increased uncertainty surrounding the *extent* of naturalisation.

When I was completing the last stages of fieldwork in 2017, a notion of ‘probational citizenship’ emerged in many interviews, often in forms of questions, doubts, and demands for clarification:

People still don't believe if the citizenship is for real - we are given 5 years of the integration period, and there are many rights we can't access. For example, we can't own land. Also, there are rumours that if you don't behave, you will be taken back - in seminars run by the government they told us that we are under probation period [...] If we don't show good traces, they will take our citizenship away. So do we have rights or not? (int. 2017).

This narrative has been perpetuated by the authorities, including the Settlement Officer as well as the government officials who ran the initial seminars about naturalisation. In one interview, the head of the UNHCR mission in Ulyankulu said to me that according to the citizenship act: 'Any citizenship given by naturalisation can be taken away... It happened to two people here already. It's all a matter of security, if the state feels that someone is a danger for the country, they can take their citizenship away' (int. 2017). This stipulation became well-known in the settlement and people would often ask me if it is true. In the final weeks of my fieldwork, the notion of 'probation' became the theme of many discussions and debates in Ulyankulu. My research assistant agreed with my observations, saying: 'People still don't trust the citizenship provided. We are told we are under probation and if we are not seen fit, they will take it away from us' (int. 2017).

Drawing on the narratives of the people I met, I developed a concept 'probational citizenship' to capture the temporality, uncertainty and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement. The meaning of probation links to two interrelated discussions. On the one hand, probation links to practices of assessing, judging,

valuing. Here, the question is who can be put on probation and how, by whom, and to what effect. The conversations with former refugees reveal that they believe that they were put on probation by the government. The probation period indicates that they will be judged based on their behaviour and qualities. It is unclear, however, where this assessment comes from, who is assessing them and how, how long this 'trial period' will last, and what will be the consequences.

This brings me to the second, performative meaning of probation. Being on probation, as a condition and as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The condition of probation is characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation is uncertain, there is no evident end-date, it can be extended or might lead to unwanted or tragic consequences. The framing of 'probational citizenship' also highlights the relations of power that make citizenship meaningful. 'Probational citizenship' implies uneven power relations where an authority in power is able to limit the scope of rights and evoke feelings of temporality and uncertainty. Power, in the framing of 'probational citizenship', is exercised precisely through the uncertain duration, boundaries and conditions of 'probational citizenship'.

To summarise, from the perspective of former refugees the process of naturalisation is characterised by a continuous interplay of anxiety and security. In a sense, the recognition given by the state (in the form of naturalisation and distribution of citizenship certificates) is key to generating a sense of security. At the same time, the state's actions (such as initial suspension of naturalisation, pending applications) undermine the faith people have in the recently distributed citizenship. It is an

ambiguous reality, where citizenship is ‘probational’, but at the same time, it provides a window of safety and a glimpse of a better future.

Conclusion

In my fieldwork, former refugees often relied on the materiality of citizenship to support their narratives and explain their perspective on naturalisation. Materiality of citizenship became important both in literal sense, as people showed me the photocopies of their documents to mediate their stories, as well as in a broader, metaphorical sense, where many discussions about naturalisation evolved around who received and who did not receive the citizenship certificate. These discussions often focused on people whose applications were rejected on seemingly arbitrary basis, which stirred debates about the validity of the new citizenship status even for those who already received it. Throughout the research, I paid close attention to how former refugees spoke about and treated their citizenship documents in their material form.

Through conversations and observations of these practices, I came to realise that possession of citizenship documents brought simultaneously a sense of safety and an increased sense of anxiety. On the one hand, people treat their documents with profound care and maintain that access to legal documentation eliminated the fear of deportation and allowed them to begin planning and investing in a long-term future in Tanzania. On the other hand, however, people’s inability to reapply for the citizenship documents in the case of loss or damage generated further fear and anxiety. Although former refugees know that their citizenship goes beyond the material form of the

documents, they are scared that if they lose their only proof of citizenship, they might not be able to afford to have it reissued. The consequence of that scenario, especially for the less privileged and affluent members of the community, equates to losing the citizenship status itself. Moreover, ‘certification’ of citizenship has created a subgroup of refugees who were rejected or unable to apply for citizenship in the first place, and thus face new vulnerabilities.

The interplay of safety and uncertainty evident in former refugees’ treatment of their new documents highlights the inherent contradictions in how they conceptualise citizenship itself. What emerges from these narratives and observations is a notion of ‘probational citizenship’. Temporarily fixed and aspirational in nature, ‘probational citizenship’ is conferred but not quite realised; it comes with recognised legal status, but it remains uncertain. The underlying conditions and boundaries of ‘probational citizenship’ are unclear, and the recipients believe that their status can be arbitrarily withdrawn. Thus, although naturalisation has brought undisputable benefits to the 1972 Burundian community in Tanzania, the aftermath of this policy is riddled with continuous uncertainty. In that sense, looking at the materiality of citizenship documents helps to see the broader and less tangible challenges people face in asserting the benefits of their newly acquired citizenship.

9. Conclusion: ‘probational citizenship’ and its global relevance

In 2007, the Government of Tanzania and the Government of Burundi in partnership with the the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) adopted the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS). TANCOSS offered a choice between repatriation and naturalisation to 220,000 Burundian refugees and their families who had been living in three rural settlements in Western Tanzania (Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo) since 1972. It was an unprecedented intervention and it garnered international attention and support (Milner, 2014). Initially, obtaining citizenship was meant to be conditional on relocation away from the refugee settlements. This plan, however, was renounced, and ultimately those who opted for citizenship were permitted to remain on the land of the settlements. Having been given a choice between repatriation and naturalisation, 79% (171,629) of people opted for naturalisation, whereas 21% (45,547) decided to return to Burundi (TCRS, 2012).

This thesis shows that naturalisation was implemented incompletely, leaving issues of land governance, political incorporation and processing of all applications unresolved. Although legally Tanzanian citizens, the inhabitants of the settlements remain isolated from the development projects provided by the local government, they have no political representation, and their access to land – the main source of livelihood for many – remains unrecognised. At the same time, due to their new citizenship status, they are no longer a concern of the international community and are outside of the mandate of the UNHCR. This responsibility gap renders former refugees politically vulnerable and uncertain about the extent of their rights. A genuine concern for the

future of the people who shared their stories with me shaped the direction and the content of this research.

Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis makes an important contribution to the understanding of citizenship in a context of displacement, bringing to light the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. This is achieved by bringing together a combination of the key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, which are not often addressed at the same time, namely: political representation, land, mobility and materiality of citizenship. Rather than deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, the thesis explores how experiences and priorities of the displacees can shift and alter the established elements and understanding of citizenship. Importantly, this research moves the emphasis away from a technocratic approach to ‘refugee caseloads’ and ‘solutions to displacement’. Instead, it addresses a much deeper set of questions about citizenship among displaced people being a complex, multi-layered, multi-spatial and multi-temporal process.

This thesis demonstrates that the decision of thousands of Burundian refugees to opt for Tanzanian citizenship was a courageous statement indicating people’s desire to establish safe and stable livelihoods in Tanzania. The incomplete implementation of naturalisation, however, undermined people’s aspirations, stirring up anxiety among an already scarred and marginalised population. In this concluding chapter, I bring together the empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions made in this thesis. Building on these contributions, I suggest that the concept of ‘probational citizenship’, developed through the narratives and experiences of former Burundian refugees, has relevance and significance in the wider, global context.

9.1. Research contributions

Identifying a responsibility gap

TANCOSS has initially been applauded for being a progressive and promising ‘solution’ to displacement. It was meant to become a blueprint for other similar protracted displacement situations, offering a way out from the long-term impasses. The design and implementation of the policy, however, did not match the expectations. Due to the rapidly changing priorities of the international development industry and the bulk of the funding being redirected to other (more pressing) emergencies, as well as the political changes within the Tanzanian Government, TANCOSS has been sidelined both in international and national context. Initially, the third pillar of TANCOSS outlined plans for resettlement of naturalised refugees. This proposal led to major disagreement between the different stakeholders, with the local governments refusing to host the new citizens and the international organisations viewing relocation as another layer of displacement. Ultimately, the plans for relocation were discontinued. The crux of the problem, however, was not the discontinuation of the resettlement pillar of TANCOSS but the absence of an alternative plan for local integration.

Only in 2016, almost a decade since the initial inception of TANCOSS, the Tanzanian Government with the support of UNHCR and the World Bank drafted the Tanzania Strategy for the Local Integration Programme for New Citizens (TANSPLI). TANSPLI outlined ambitious goals. It has envisioned investments in degazetting the area, improving the infrastructure and engaging international stakeholders in a variety of projects. By the late 2018, the programme has not yet been launched and

consequently, the response by humanitarian and development actors has been very low. This has created a responsibility gap, where neither the government nor the international organisations which have initiated and initially backed TANCOS feel responsible for investing in changing the local governance system, clarifying land ownership rights for the new citizens, and creating opportunities for further social and political integration of the area. Instead, the document of TANSPLI was put on a shelf and the new citizens remain in limbo; legally Tanzanian citizens but constrained by the arbitrary laws of camp governance. The lack of plans and investments in the post-naturalisation integration processes created a responsibility gap, leading to an unclear transition from camp governance to local governance.

From camp to local governance

Although a lot has been written about refugees' political organisation in camps not much attention has been given to a post-camp scenario, in which refugees access citizenship. The case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania allowed for contributing to these debates, bringing attention to the significance of active and participatory elements of citizenship status in displacement. In Chapter 5, I explained that although the new citizens were permitted to vote in national elections and join political parties, the Settlement Officer remained as the highest authority in the settlement. For many people, his arbitrary presence and the unrelenting display of power signify the incompleteness of the naturalisation process.

It is clear from the literature on democracy and civic engagement in Africa that struggles for recognition go beyond electoral participation and that the right to vote does not immediately bestow other rights and privileges. The former refugees I met in

Ulyankulu were acutely aware of these limitations and they strove to gain political voice and representation within and outside the settlement, despite the structural obstacles in place. Their efforts to assert political representation, however, were unsuccessful - they were permitted to vote but remained excluded from running for office. They are voters, but not yet citizens. This has had broader implications, as the systematic exclusion from politics has led former refugees to question the validity of their new status.

Accessing land in displacement

Linked to the exclusion from local politics and the continued presence of the Settlement Officer is the unclear and uncertain terrain of land rights for the new citizens. Burundian refugees in Ulyankulu have been granted access to land for housing and cultivation within the designated area of the settlement and over the past four decades they have established customary ownership of that land which is recognised by Tanzanians from the nearby areas. Over the years, many Tanzanians moved into the settlement and together with the refugees they established a functioning, albeit enclosed, land tenure system. Access to land became one of the key reasons why many of the Burundian refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship and consequently it became crucial in people's conceptualisation of citizenship.

I observed how the established framework of autochthony, which dominates the literature on land access in contexts of migration and displacement, does not capture the complexities of this particular context. As Chapter 6 demonstrated, due to the specific history and governance of this area, autochthonous claims to the land in Ulyankulu are absent. Instead, the former refugees seek recognition of their rights

based on the long-term productive use of the land, land transactions with local Tanzanians, and engagement in land disputes. I suggest that the strategies that former refugees employ indicate that people are trying to convert land access, which they have enjoyed for decades, into land rights. Access to citizenship documents increased people's sense of entitlement to the land in Tanzania, and it generated new opportunities and new avenues for claim-making. At the same time, however, the state's engagement in the area following naturalisation has destabilised the previous tenure system, creating new uncertainties.

From movement to mobility

The next crucial marker of citizenship in displacement examined in this thesis was mobility. If land is the most immobile and tangible marker of citizenship, mobility is definitely more elusive and less researched. The existing studies have shown that mobility allows for access to a range of benefits and opportunities and as such it can be promoted as a fourth solution to displacement (Long, 2014). The evidence shows, however, that the right to freedom of movement for migrants and refugees is constrained by national regulations (Maple, 2016). In result, refugees are often confined within the designated camps and many break the law and migrate illegally in search of work, livelihoods, education and other opportunities.

Using Sen's (1999) Capabilities Approach, in Chapter 7 I defined mobility as a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom itself. Mobility, in the stories of my informants, is a key marker of citizenship and it stands for the capacity to move freely without fear and anxiety, to have one's movement recognised by the state and other citizens, and to have the right and the choice to live in multiple places. An important

findings here was that in this expansive understanding of mobility, having autonomy to choose (and that choice being recognised by the state and other citizens) is crucial, and even the people who do not intend to move away from the settlements underline the importance of having a *choice* to stay or a *choice* to leave. Mobility, as ability to choose different livelihoods, becomes a crucial marker of citizenship in the narratives of the former refugees. The benefits of mobility, however, are not evenly distributed, and in Chapter 7 I critically examined how class and wealth differentiation impacted former refugees' ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by naturalisation.

Materiality of citizenship

Thousands of Burundian refugees who registered for naturalisation did not receive their documents. Interviews with people whose applications were rejected or lost revealed the crucial significance that materiality of citizenship documents carries for the people in displacement. Many scholars of citizenship studies (Blitz & Lynch, 2009; Grace, 2013; Balaton-Chrimes, 2014) emphasize the substantive aspects of citizenship over the formal, national modes of belonging, arguing that formal citizenship often does not translate in access to rights. On the contrary, this case study exposed the tangible and intangible importance of the materiality of citizenship documents. The people I met and worked with, highlighted that the documents give them a peace of mind, make them feel safe and allow them to begin forming a different relationship with the future - giving them the courage to invest in their housing, farms, education and businesses. The security which comes with citizenship documents is a double-edge sword. Issuing a new certificate, in case the original one is lost, damaged or

stolen, carries astronomical costs unaffordable to the majority of former refugees. In result, former refugees scrupulously guard their citizenship documents and see them as *equal to* citizenship.

People's care and reverence for the documents comes from an acute awareness that in case of the certificates' loss or damage they might not be able to replace them. For them, losing the original documents is equivalent to losing citizenship. The anxiety over losing or damaging the documents is interlinked with the fear of 'denaturalisation' in case of 'disloyal behaviour' or not being able to 'prove' one's citizenship. Tanzanian law, like many other countries, allows for denaturalisation of citizens on the basis of vaguely defined crime, fraud, or disloyalty (GOT, 1995). Interviews with local government officials and the UNHCR staff in Ulyankulu revealed that the narrative of 'taking citizenship away' and 'trial period' has been propagated by the local authorities and was picked up by the new citizens.

The ways in which the difference between citizenship by birth and by naturalisation has been communicated to former refugees, however, has been misleading and has led them to believe that they have been given a temporary, probational citizenship document that can be taken away from them arbitrarily. This powerful and dangerous narrative makes it seem like anyone can be deprived of their new status for no reason, which has planted a seed of insecurity among the former refugees regarding the validity of their citizenship status and the extent of their rights. To capture the complex, multi-dimensional and multi-temporal nature of citizenship in displacement as experienced by the former Burundian refugees, this thesis developed a concept of 'probational citizenship'.

9.2. Probational citizenship and its broader relevance

The notion of ‘probational citizenship’ was inspired and shaped by normative knowledge produced from the standpoint of ethnography. Prioritising the narratives and perspectives of former refugees, I observed that their understanding of citizenship could not be captured by the existing theories. Drawing on observation and interviews, I suggested that the lived experience of displacement can shift the conventional markers of citizenship, reinterpreting the functions and benefits of citizenship itself. The unique experience of the decades of exile followed by an incomplete policy of mass naturalisation has placed former Burundian refugees in Tanzania in an ambiguous space, which challenges the conventional dichotomy between citizenship and refugeehood. What emerges from these experiences is an in-between state of ‘probational citizenship’.

The underlying condition of ‘probational citizenship’ is uncertainty. The new citizens believe that citizenship can be withdrawn, that they are put on probation, and their status is ultimately uncertain. ‘Probational citizenship’ is different from actual legal probation, as its requirements and boundaries are unclear. It can be described as an uncertain state, where the subject believes that citizenship status can be arbitrarily withdrawn for reasons that are undefined. The meaning of probation links to two interrelated discussions, namely probation as practices of assessing, judging, valuing, but it also has a performative meaning, where being on probation as a condition and as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The condition of probation is characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation is uncertain, there is no evident end-date - it can be extended or might lead to unexpected consequences.

In the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the ‘probational’ character of citizenship in displacement manifested itself in hundreds of pending applications, ambiguities in political participation, insecure land access in the settlements, and general sense of uncertainty about the validity and extent of the rights acquired through naturalisation. What is crucial here is that the essential and fundamental value of citizenship as a source of security and freedom is undermined in the experience of ‘probational citizenship’. In other words, the intrinsic value of citizenship is nullified when freedoms become contingent instead of fundamental. Here, I want to suggest that this experience of uncertain and contingent citizenship narrated by Burundian refugees is not exceptional. Instead, it is becoming more and more common and it resonates with the circumstances of foreign-born citizens and their families, naturalised citizens, residents, and other first and second-generation migrants across the US and the UK.

In June 2018, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (U.S.C.I.S.) had formed a task force and launched a team of investigators to complete the work of “Operation Janus” – an intervention aimed at identifying people who lied on their citizenship applications and denaturalising them (DeGooyer, 2018). The government efforts stretched back a decade to identify people who had gotten citizenship under false identities, committed crimes in the past which were not registered on their application, or lied on their application in any other way. The citizenship application forms are filled with questions that can be used against the applicants and even minor omissions or inconsistencies might provide basis for denaturalisation.

Gessen (2018) shows that the problem with this new intervention is that naturalisation,

fundamentally, is meant to make naturalised citizens legally indistinguishable from other citizens. She argues that ‘the creation of the task force itself is undoing the naturalisation of the more than twenty million naturalised citizens in the American population by taking away their assumption of permanence [...] all of us are second-class citizens now’ (Gessen, 2018). A system which creates a retrospective, unclear, and ambiguous process which can lead to denaturalisation of naturalised citizens undermines the security of their citizenship. Echoing the narratives of former Burundian refugees, the possibility of denaturalisation makes it impossible for some of the naturalised immigrants in America to feel fully safe.

In 2018, Britain was embroiled in a different scandal which raised very similar fears and questions. The members of the Windrush generation³⁸, after decades of living and working in Britain, were wrongly classified as illegal immigrants. The majority of these affected had been born British subjects and had arrived in the UK before 1973, mostly from Caribbean countries (Wray, 2018). Journalists have discovered and reported dozens of unlawful detentions and deportations. An unknown number of British citizens was incorrectly classified as illegal migrants leading many to lose their homes and jobs, leaving them destitute and heavily in debt. Although the government apologised and promised to pay compensations, a year later, 29 people were again deported to Jamaica (Gentleman, 2019).

Denaturalisation of American citizens and the unlawful deportations of the members of the Windrush generation stirred fears in all foreign-born nationals, naturalised citizens, and residents on both sides of the Atlantic, managing to instil a sense of

³⁸ The term ‘Windrush generation’ refers to a ship named Empire Windrush which brought one of the first groups of West Indian migrants to the UK in 1948.

vulnerability which rippled far beyond those who were directly affected. While the issue of denaturalisation of American citizens and the plight of these Jamaican British deportees are quite different, they in fact centre on the same questions: What does it mean to be a British or American citizen? And how easily can rights of citizenship be withheld depending on one's origin?

Professor Matthew J Gibney (2019), commenting on a recent case of denaturalisation of Shamima Begum³⁹, a British citizen, pointed out that 'no Western country [...] has made its citizenship as easy to lose as the UK or used its laws with greater frequency.' He argues that these trends weaken British citizenship, making it almost as easy to lose as the residence rights of those holding immigration permits. Although the case of Shimama Begum, a British citizen who was denaturalised on the grounds of 'terrorist threat', differs starkly from the other cases discussed above and it presents its own set of analytical challenges, it is linked to the same trend of increased use of legislation that effectively allows the state to disown its own nationals.

Historically, no more than a few dozen individuals lost their citizenship under deprivation provisions between 1930 and 2014. Since 2006, the United Kingdom home secretary has revoked the citizenship of at least 373 Britons and deprivation of citizenship has become a more common practice (Weil & Handler, 2018). Therefore, Shimama Begum's case, which dominated the news and sparked fierce debates, can be seen as part of a broader turn by the government to get rid of citizens considered undesirable. The result, as Sykes (2016) argues, is that citizenship is re-constructed as

³⁹ Shamima Begum was stripped of her British citizenship on the grounds of 'terrorist threat'. She left Britain as a 15-year old to join ISIS in Syria. After losing two children in the war zone and seeing her husband surrender, she fled to a refugee camp and wanted to return back to Britain to 'bring up her son'. She was denaturalised and shortly after her few months old baby passed away in the camp.

a privileged status that states are empowered to withdraw. In such a world, citizenship is ‘probational’ and can be removed as a punishment.

These developments are troubling, as the right to be secure in one’s citizenship has been a ‘cornerstone of the post- war European liberal political order’ (Weil & Handler, 2018, p. 296). Instead, in more and more countries, citizenship ceases to be seen as a right and is increasingly understood as a provisional privilege. The uncertain nature of citizenship extends not only to people who were naturalised but also those who were born in the UK and the US but whose parents were immigrants. As this thesis has shown in the context of former Burundian refugees, an atmosphere of fear and insecurity regarding one’s status has far- reaching tangible and intangible consequences and can circumvent access to other rights. For example, those wishing to exercise rights of political protest may feel scared to do this if the threat of removal of citizenship is hanging over them.

As Britain nears the end of Brexit negotiations, many analysts and commentators are becoming concerned that in the years to come, EU nationals might face the same fate as the Windrush generation. Rutter and Ballinger (2019) note that due to language barrier, lack of adequate documents, technological illiteracy and lack of information, thousands of elderly people, children in care, and other marginalised EU nationals might miss, misunderstand or not qualify for the EU Settlement Scheme⁴⁰. If they miss the opportunity to register, they might, in the next few years, be identified as ‘illegal’ migrants. Although this comparison disregards the crucial racial dimension of the

⁴⁰ A scheme available to EU, EEA or Swiss citizen living in the UK to protect their rights to public services, public funds and pension after the UK exits the EU.

Windrush scandal, it raises an important point about the increasing insecurities in the processes of certification of status.

The growing incidents of denaturalisation and deportation of American and British citizens in 2018 and 2019 have resulted in rising insecurity and anxiety among some migrants, residents and naturalised citizens in these countries. Arguably, this is to become a global trend, as in recent years Canada, Australia, France, and the Netherlands have either debated or enacted denaturalisation statutes (Weil & Handler, 2018). It is apparent that the value of citizenship for naturalised citizens and their families is at a critical crossroad, making the experience and the concept of 'probational citizenship' increasingly more relevant. From the central Tanzania to the cities and towns of the UK, the rights of many citizens and residents remain precarious and contested, depriving people of the sense of safety and security necessary to fully engage in the present and make constructive plans for the future.

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Appendix 1. List of interviews.

Table 1. Individual interviews with refugees, former refugees and Tanzanians living in Ulyankulu, Urambo and Tabora.

	Date(s) of interview	Pseudonym	Gender	Age range	Location	Occupation
1	24/3/2014; 15/5/2015 Key informant	Fr Joshua	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Parish priest at the Catholic Parish in Ulyankulu
2	26/3/2014	Pierre	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Businessman
3	25/3/2014; 5/5/2015; 7/10/2016 Key informant	Godfrey	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at secondary school
4	25/3/2014; 28/3/2014; 18/5/2015; 2/11/2016 Key informant	Javi	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at VETA in Ulyankulu

5	29/3/2014 Key informant	Alice	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Urambo, Tabora	Secretary at Tobacco Board in Urambo
6	1/4/2014; 22/5/2015	Leon	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Village Chairman of Kaswa
7	3/4/2014	Grace	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Tobacco farmer
8	31/3/2014	Simon	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a primary school
9	31/3/2014	Morgan	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Pastor at a Pentecostal Church in Ulyankulu
10	2/4/2014; 28/7/2016; 10/8/2016	Edwin	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a secondary school
11	4/4/2014	Juma	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Leading pastor at the largest Pentecostal Church in Ulyankulu
12	24/3/2014	Samuel	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at VETA in Ulyankulu
13	25/3/2014; 31/10/2016	Joyce	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	UNHCR Representative Ulyankulu
14	1/4/2014	John	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Teacher at VETA
15	27/3/2014; 27/4/2015; 30/4/2015;	Edmund	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a secondary school
16	27/3/2014;	Jonan	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a secondary school

	7/5/2015					
17	27/3/2014	Matthew	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a secondary school
18	29/3/2014; 28/4/2015 Key informant and research assistant	Mtasha	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Pentecostal preacher, teacher at a primary school
19	26/3/2014	Magnus	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Tobacco farmer
20	26/3/2014	Bariki	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Tobacco farmer
21	26/3/2014	Antoni	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Tobacco farmer
22	28/4/2015 Key informant	Mama Blessi	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a secondary school and wife of research assistant
23	2/5/2015	Peter	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Wealthy farmer
24	6/5/2015	Asha	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Primary school teacher, neighbour

25	6/5/2015	Bernard	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Former employee of TCRS, successful tobacco farmer
26	7/5/2015; 25/10/2016 Key informants	Mzee Godfrey and his wife Eliza	M, F	50+	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	A retired teacher and his wife
27	7/5/2015	Bernice	F	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer, wife of a Pentecostal preacher
28	8/5/2015	Jean Claude	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Retired teacher
29	9/5/2015	Martha	F	50+	Ulyankulu	Traditional healer
30	11/5/2015	Boniface	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Guard at a secondary school
31	11/5/2015	Pascal	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a vocational school
32	12/5/2015	Elija	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Bicycle repairman, Sukuma
33	12/5/2015	Lambert	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer
34	14/5/2015	Henry	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Bicycle repairman, Sukuma
35	15/5/2015	Anatol	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at Ulyankulu Secondary School
36	15/5/2015	Dominik	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Businessman
37	16/5/15	Yves	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Senior Pentecostal Church leader

38	17/5/2015	Gloria	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Choir singer and farmer
39	17/5/2015	Jean Pierre	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer
40	17/5/2015	Aloyce	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Pastor
41	17/5/2015	Eliezel	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer
42	17/5/2015	Emelyne	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Choir leader
43	19/5/2015	Arsan	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	UNHCR Staff
44	21/5/2015	Eric	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Repairman, Sukuma
45	21/5/2015	Kelvin	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Repairman, Sukuma
46	22/5/2015; 12/6/2017	Mr Mnacho	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Former Settlement Officer
47	23/5/2015	Arthur	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
48	23/5/2015	Jenifer	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Tailor
49	23/5/2015	Morris	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
50	23/5/2015	Andrew	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Soldier

51	24/5/2015	Kyle	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
52	24/5/2015	Sara	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Parent
53	23/7/2016	Aloys	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Lawyer, NGO worker
54	25/7/2016	Mzee Philip	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Retired village chairman of Mbeta
55	25/7/2016	Anna	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer, businesswoman
56	25/7/2016	Simoni	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Retired village leader from Kaswa
57	25/7/2016	Baraka	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Retired village government member, farmer
58	25/7/2016	Sara	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
59	26/7/2016	Johnny	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmer
60	26/7/2016	Oscar	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
61	26/7/2016	Zak	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Kaswa Village Secretary
62	26/7/2016	Aisha	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mbeta	Farmer
63	31/7/2016	Harry	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Carpenter; ten cell leader, Sukuma
64	31/7/2016	Gilbert	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer, from Kahama,
65	31/7/2016	Donna	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer, from Songea
66	31/7/2016	Elisa	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer from Mara
67	31/7/2016	Isabel	F	50+	Ulyankulu	Businesswomen, cantine owner; from Mara
68	31/7/2016	Ben	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer, from Uyoa,
69	31/7/2016	Maurice	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Bicycle repairman from Mwanza
70	1/8/2016	Rosa	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mapigano	Farmer

71	1/8/2016; 10/10/2016	Upendo	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer, Businesswoman, former leader of a Pentecostal church
72	1/8/2016	Blessie	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Ten cell leader, member of the village committee
73	2/8/2016	Alex	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Ten cell leader
74	2/8/2016	Aloyze	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Former Street Leader
75	2/8/2016	Mzee Kagoma	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Former counsellor of Mirambo Division, contestant to Ulyankulu elections 2015,
76	2/8/2016	Victor	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Leader of the market place in Ulyankulu centre
77	3/8/2016	Jean	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Street leader
78	3/8/2016	Guy	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer, assistant to a 10 cell leader, Sukuma
79	3/8/2016	Deo	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Former chairman of Kaswa, candidate in ward elections
80	3/8/2016	Tobi	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	General secretary of CCM women in Kaliua district, from Shinyanga
81	4/8/2016	Tiger	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Fisherman, farmer, former street leader in Uyoa
82	4/8/2016	Casey	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Tailor
83	4/8/2016 15/10/2016	Daniel	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Farmer and primary school teacher
84	5/10/2016	Alida	F	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer
85	5/10/2016	Sofia	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer
86	7/10/2016	Adam	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Teacher at a vocational school
87	8/10/2016	Fergus	M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Magistrate

88	9/10/2016	Jeffery	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Baptist preacher
89	11/10/2016; 17/11/2016	Max	M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Settlement Officer Mbanga
90	12/10/2016	Emina	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Pentecostal church women leader, entrepreneur
91	13/10/2016	Marcus	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Leader at the Catholic Church
92	14/10/2016	Marcella	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmer, from Moshi
93	15/10/2016	Stanley	M	30-50	Tabora	Catholic Priest
94	20/10/2016	Kieron	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Usigala	Pastoralist, Sukuma
95	20/10/2016	Miriam	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Usigala	Farmer
96	20/10/2016	Ian	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Usigala	Leader, competed for councillor position, won for Kanindo
97	21/10/2016	Chester	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Imara	Pastoralist, Sukuma
98	21/10/2016	Liam	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Imara	Pastoralist, Sukuma
99	22/10/2016	Martin	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Businessman, market leader
100	22/10/2016	Alexandre	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	NIDA official, Tanzanian
101	24/10/2016	Stephen	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Businessman, Tanzanian
102	27/10/2016	Tim	M	0-30	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Farmer, former factory worker
103	28/10/2016	Aloise	M	0-30	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Hair salon owner

104	31/10/2016	Dr Bilia	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Representative Adult Education Centre
105	1/11/2016	Mama Fau	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Farmer
106	2/11/2016	Michael	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Veta Director
107	3/11/2016	Sebastian	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mbeta	Village chairman
108	10/11/2016	Niall	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mbeta	Former village chairman
109	10/11/2016	Charles	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Teacher
110	11/11/2016	Chris	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Fisherman, farmer, from Tabora
111	11/11/2016	Simoni	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Makonge	Farmer, businessman, village leader
112	14/11/2016	Ken	M	30-50	Tabora	Tobacco company manager, Tanzanian
113	16/11/2016	Percy	M	0-30	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Cattle owner, Sukuma
114	16/11/2016	Paul	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Supervisor of cattle market, from Kilimanjaro
115	17/11/2016	Peter	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mbeta/Kaswa	Farmer, seller of fertilizers
116	18/11/2016	Richard	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mbeta	Farmer
117	21/11/2016	Terry	M	50+	Ulyankulu	Cattle owner, businessman, Sukuma

118	22/11/2016	Emilio	M	30-50	Ulyankulu Mapigano,	Village chairman
119	24/11/2016	Lucy	F	50+	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Farmer
120	24/11/2016	Karl	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Village Chairman
121	24/11/2016	Julian	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Kanindo	Ten cell leader

Table 2. Focus group discussions and group interviews conducted in Ulyankulu, Urambo and Tabora.

	Date(s) of interview	Type of interview	Number of participants	Gender	Age range	Location	Occupation
1	31/3/2014	Focus group discussion with Women's Group at the Pentecostal Church in Kaswa	6	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmers
2	28/3/2014	Interview with choir members at the Catholic Church	3	2 F, 1 M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers
3	1/4/2014	Interview with Baptist pastors	3	M	30-50	Ulyankul, Ikonongo village	Pastors

4	29/3/2014	Interview with a couple at the Adventist Church	2	M, F	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers
5	29/3/2014	Focus group discussion with Pentecostal pastors	4	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa village	Pastors
6	3/5/2015	Focus group discussion with worshippers at the Pentecostal Church	5	4 M, 1 F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmers
7	20/5/2015	Interview with grandmother and her son	2	F, M	50+	Ulyankulu	Farmer and a guesthouse owner
8	21/5/2015	Interview with a couple	2	F, M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers
9	22/5/2015	Interview with a farmer's family	4	2 F, 2 M	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmers
10	24/5/2015	Interview with a couple	2	1 F, 1 M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers and leaders of the Catholic Church choir
11	25/7/2016	Focus group discussion with former village leadership	7	4 F, 3 M	50+	Ulyankulu	Former village leaders and one Anglican preacher

12	25/7/2016	Interview with a married couple	2	1 F, 1 M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers
13	2/8/2016	Focus group discussion with women from the Women's Group at the Pentecostal Church	6	F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Farmers and small business owners
14	5/8/2016	Focus group discussion with former and current leaders from a Pentecostal Church	5	2 M, 3 F	30-50	Ulyankulu	Church leaders and farmers
15	5/10/2016	Family interview with grandparents and grandchildren	4	2 M, 2 F	50+ 0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers and students
16	10/10/2016	Interview with a mixed marriage couple (Sukuma husband and former Burundian wife)	2	F, M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Small business, selling fruit
17	11/10/2016	Focus group discussion with church leaders	4	3 F, 1 M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mkindo village	Focus group with church leaders

18	11/10/2016	Interview with a couple	2	F, M	0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers
19	13/10/2016	Interview with a couple, mixed marriage	2	F, M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Primary school teacher and a carpenter
20	16/10/2016	Family interview, grandparents, parents and a grandchild	6	3 F, 3 M	50+ 30-50 0-30	Urambo	Farmers, small shop owners, family
21	17/10/2016	Focus group discussion	3	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Keza	Farmers
22	17/10/2016	Focus group discussion	6	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Keza	Farmers
23	20/10/2016	Focus group discussion	4	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Usigala	Farmers, village committee members
24	20/10/2016	Focus group discussion with village leadership in Usigala	7	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Usigala	Village leadership
25	21/10/2016	Focus group discussion with village representatives in Imara village	3	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Imara	Village Committee representatives, farmers
26	21/10/2016	Focus group discussion	4	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Imara	Village representatives
27	1/11/2016	Focus group discussion with	7	M	50+	Ulyankulu, Makonge	Village Committee

		village committee in Makonge village					
28	1/11/2016	Focus group discussion with family of a single mother with four sons	5	1 F, 4 M	50+ 0-30	Ulyankulu, Makonge	Farmers
29	11/11/2016	Interview with a family in Makonge village	3	1 F, 2 M	50+ 0-30	Ulyankulu, Makonge	Farmers, family
30	12/11/2016	Interview with a family in Tabora	3	1 F, 2 M	50+ 0-30	Tabora	Catechist and his parents (David and Simona)
31	14/11/2016	Interview with a family	3	2 F, 1 M	50+ 0-30	Ulyankulu	Farmers and tailor daughter
32	15/11/2016	Interview with two sisters	2	F	0-30	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Tailors
33	22/11/2016	Focus group discussion with women in Mapigano village	9	F	30-50	Ulyankulu, Mapigano	Farmers
34	25/11/16	Focus group discussion with Sukuma men	4	M	30-50	Ulyankulu, Kaswa	Cattle owners, farmers, businessmen

Table 3. Interviews with refugees and former refugees conducted in Dar es Salaam.

	Date(s) of interview	Pseudonym	Gender	Age range	Location	Occupation
1	17/4/2014 Key informant and research assistant	Jonas	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam	University student from Katumba
2	18/3/2014; 28/4/2015	Leonce	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam & Ulyankulu	Human rights activist
3	3/1/2017	Benedict	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Maize seller
4	4/1/2017	Albert	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Sugarcane seller
5	5/1/2017	Patrick	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Fruit seller
6	7/1/2017	Alex	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Temeke	Tailor
7	13/1/2017; 13/6/2017 Key informant	Simon	M	50+	Dar es Salaam, Mwananyamala	Pastor
8	13/1/2017	Oscar	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam, Sinza	Former university student, now formally employed
9	14/1/2017	Innocent	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Sinza	Pentecostal preacher, leader
10	15/1/2017	Maria	F	50+	Dar es Salaam, Mwananyamala	Parent, student, businesswoman, all

						church choir members
11	15/1/2017	Sophia	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Mwananyamala	Secretary at a Japanese NGO, leader
12	16/1/2017	Jacob	M	50+	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Coffee seller
13	19/1/2017	Imani	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Clothes seller
14	24/1/2017	Issa	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam, Buguruni	Teacher and singer
15	25/1/2017	Akil	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Mwanyanamala	Coffee seller
16	25/1/2017	Erica	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Mwanyanamala Temeke	Parent
17	25/1/2017	Juma	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Mwanyanamala	Contract worker
18	26/1/2017	Hasani	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam, Kariakoo	Small business
19	26/1/2017 Key informant	Francis	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam Kariakoo	Coffee and fruit seller
20	2/2/2017	Lydia, Francine, David	F, F, M	30-50, 0-30	Dar es Salaam Buguruni	No occupation
21	3/2/2017	Gerard	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam Kariakoo	Small business

22	3/2/2017	Alexis	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam Kariakoo	Businessman
23	4/2/2017	Renatte and Melchor	F, M	30-50	Dar es Salaam, Buguruni	Parent, Catholic preacher, Business selling crops

Table 4. Interviews with GOT officials, academics, and NGOs' staff.

	Date(s) of interview	Pseudonym	Gender	Age range	Location	Occupation
1	17/3/2014	Noel	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	Employee at Asylum Access
2	18/3/2014	Lin	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam	UNHCR Head of Mission
3	19/3/2014	Abdul	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam	Employee at the Department of Refugees, Ministry of Home Affairs
4	21/3/2014	Salim	M	0-30	Dar es Salaam	UNHCR Resettlement Coordinator

5	10/4/2014; 10/2/2017	Mr Mseke	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	Director of the Refugee Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs
6	14/4/2014; 23/4/2015	Edwin	M	50+	Dar es Salaam	University of Dar es Salaam/ Department of Forced Migration
7	19/4/2014; 21/4/2015; 9/1/2017 Key informant	Izengo	M	50+	Dar es Salaam	Operational Manager at TCRS, formerly based in Ulyankulu
8	11/4/2014	Esther	F	0-30	Dar es Salaam	Local NGO
9	6/2/2017; 13/6/2017 Key informant	Teddy	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam Msasani	Urban refugee administrator at an NGO
10	6/2/2016; 13/6/2017	Mr Mzirai	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	Vice Director of Refugee Department, Home Affairs Ministry

11	7/2/2017	Eloyz	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	International NGO, Lawyer, project coordinator
12	7/2/2017	Sylvia	F	50+	Dar es Salaam	UNHCR, UNHCR representative
13	7/2/2017	Gerard	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	UNDP, Project coordinator
14	8/2/2017	Charlotte	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam	International NGO, Lawyer
15	8/2/2017	Mrs Kweka	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam	University of Dar es Salaam, Academic
16	9/2/2017	Larissa	F	30-50	Dar es Salaam	European Union, EU representative to Tanzania
17	9/2/2017	Jensen	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	Danish Ambassador
18	10/2/2017 Key informant	Elijah	M	30-50	Dar es Salaam	International NGO, Director

Appendix 2. Recommendations for improving other prospective naturalisation policies.

Burundian refugees living in the Old Settlements should have been engaged in public consultations regarding the design and the negotiation of TANCOS, and their needs and insights should have been taken seriously. Instead, former refugees were asked to answer closed questions in a pre-designed survey, which gave them a binary choice between naturalisation in Tanzania and repatriation to Burundi, disregarding transnational connections and livelihoods. Although majority of my informants insisted that they want to remain in Tanzania and the choice between naturalisation and repatriation was straightforward for them, many highlighted that they wish they had an option to choose a citizenship status that reflects their sense of belonging to both Burundi and Tanzania.

Burundian refugees were aware that Tanzania does not allow for dual citizenship, but many of my informants insisted that a solution respecting transnational belonging could have been achieved under the shared East African Community (EAC) passport. Generally, former refugees expressed substantial trust in opportunities offered by the East African Community. As a primary interlocutor told me: ‘What could help Burundi? We could dilute it, stronger East African integration, more Burundians moving to other countries and more people moving in, diluting ethnic tension by migration!’ (int. 2015). According the former Burundian refugees, the principles of EAC should have been guiding the design of TANCOS.

Second crucial lesson from this case study is that any similar prospective policy needs to be developed in more detail, accounting for and ensuring recognition of rights such as political representation and land rights. TANCOS was designed to accommodate the initial plan for refugees to be resettled to other parts of Tanzania before they received citizenship. As discussed, that approach was eventually renounced, and Tanzania Strategy for the Local Integration Programme for New Citizens (TANSPLI) was formulated to facilitate the full integration of the settlements into the Tanzanian state structure. This strategy, however, was delayed and the international organisations which were previously involved in TANCOS did not approve the budget proposed and did not commit to implementation.

In result, the agreements of TANCOS and TANSPLI left it ambiguous who would be responsible for implementing the administrative, developmental and social programs that were designed to turn former refugee settlements into properly integrated towns and villages. Without accountability mechanisms, the recipients of TANCOS policy were unable to hold the humanitarian organisations accountable. The incomplete and problematic implementation of the various pillars of TANCOS left the former refugees in a precarious and uncertain condition of a responsibility gap. What was initially advocated as a ‘comprehensive solution’ led to an uncertain and unstable citizenship status for the people concerned.

To sum up, if prospective naturalisation policies intend to successfully and with integrity protect the well-being of refugees, the people concerned need to be engaged in the design of the policy itself. Moreover, the policies need to be planned with

attention to political participation and property rights. Step-by-step actions necessary for implementation need to be built into the agreements. The exact processes for transition must be outlined and responsibilities must be clearly defined. Furthermore, accountability mechanism that allow the beneficiaries of the naturalisation policy to keep the government and the international organisation accountable should be integrated and effective. Finally, funding for the various stages of implementation needs to be secured from the beginning, regardless of the changing priorities and trends of the NGO industry.